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LIST OF EXHIBITS 
HEARING TRANSCRIPT 
taken on JANUARY 5, 2011, will be lodged with the Supreme Court. 
EXHIBITS ADMITTED into record before IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
1. IDOL Order to Deny Re-Open mailed 1/14/10 (5pgs) 
2. Employer Request to Reopen HearinglRequest for Rehearing filed 1/13/10 (4pgs) 
3. Notice of Telephone Hearing mailed 12/22/09 (3pgs) 
4. Important Information About Your Hearing Read Carefully (2pgs) 
5. Employer Exhibits 3-10 (172pgs) 
6. Exhibit 10F audio CD 
LIST OF EXHIBITS - (SADID, SC # 38549) - i 
HABIB SADID, 
SSN:  
Claimant 
vs. 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
APPEALS BUREAU 
317 WEST MAIN STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83735-0720 
(208) 332-3572/ (800) 621-4938 
FAJ(: (208)334-6440 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
~ DOCKET NUMBER 1777-2010 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, 
Employer 
) 
) 
) 
DECISION OF APPEALS EXAMINER 
and ) ) 
IDAHODEPARTMENTOFUillOR ) 
----------------------------------) 
DECISION 
Benefits are ALLOWED effective November 8, 2009. The claimant was not discharged for 
misconduct in connection with employment, as defmed by §72-1366 (5) of the Idaho 
Employment Security Law. 
The Eligibility Determination dated December 3, 2009, is hereby REVERSED. 
mSTORY OF THE CASE 
The above-entitled matter was heard by Janet C. Hardy, Appeals Examiner for the Idaho 
Department of Labor, on January 5, 2010, by telephone in the City of Boise, in accordance with 
§72-1368 (6) of the Idaho Employment Security Law. 
The claimant was represented by John Lynn, attorney at law. The claimant testified on his own 
behalf. 
The employer was neither present nor represented. 
Exhibits #1 through #10 were entered into.and made a part of the record. 
ISSUE 
The issue before the Appeals Examiner is whether unemployment is due to the claimant quitting 
voluntarily and, if so, whether with good cause connected with the employment -OR- being 
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\ 
discharged and, if so, whether for misconduct in connection with the employment, according to 
§72-1366 (5) of the Idaho Employment Security Law .. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Additional facts or testimony may exist in this case. However, the Appeals Examiner 
outlines only those that are relevant to the decision and those based upon reliable evidence. 
Based on the exhibits and testimony in the record, the following facts are found: 
1. The claimant worked for this employer on two occasions - from August 1987 until he 
quit to go to work for Boeing. His most recent date of hire was August 1991 as a full 
professor. His contract for the school term ended on May 15, 2009, however a new 
contract was signed shortly after May 15, 2009 for the new school term. He was 
suspended on August 4,2009, and discharged on October 23, 2009. 
2. On May 6, 2009, the claimant was served with a Notice of Contemplated Action from 
Dean Jacobsen based on the claimant's "continued pattern of behavior." Dean Jacobsen 
did not appear at the hearing. 
3. On August 4, 2009, the claimant was placed on administrative leave with pay by Dr. 
Vailas, president of the university. On August 19, 2009, the claimant filed a grievance 
with the Faculty Appeals Board. 
4. The Faculty Appeals Board found that sufficient evidence had not been presented to 
justify the claimant's termination. President Vailas was so notified on October 23, 2009. 
5. The claimant was discharged on October 27, 2009 by Dr. Vailas. Dr. Vailas did not 
appear at the hearing. 
AUTHORITY 
Section 72-1366 (5) of the Idaho Employment Security Law provides that a claimant shall be 
eligible for benefits provided unemployment is not due to the fact that the claimant left 
employment voluntarily without good cause, or was discharged for misconduct in connection 
with employment. 
An employer may discharge an employee for any reason. However, only a discharge that is found 
to constitute misconduct for unemployment insurance purposes makes an employee ineligible for 
benefits. 
The employer must carry the burden of proving that the employee was discharged for 
employment-related misconduct Parker vs. St. Maries Plywood, 101 Idaho 415, 614 P 2d 955 
(1980). 
Misconduct within the meaning of an unemployment compensation act excluding from its benefit 
an employee discharged for misconduct must be an act of wanton or willful disregard of the 
employer's interest, a deliberate violation of the employer's rules, a disregard of standards of 
behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employee, or negligence in such degree 
or recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design, or show an intentional and 
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substantial disregard of the employer's interest or of the employee's duties and obligations to the 
employer. Rasmussen vs. Employment Security Agencv. 83 Idaho 198,360 P.2d 90 (1961). 
In Application of Citizen Utilities Company, 82 Idaho 208, 351 P 2d 487 (1960), the Idaho Supreme 
Court held that while the Commission is a fact-finding, administrative agency, and as such, is not 
bound by the strict rules of hearsay evidence governing courts oflaw, its findings must be supported 
by substantial and competent evidence. Id. at 213,351 P.2d at 492. In an administrative proceeding 
hearsay evidence-standing alone-is not sufficient to support findings. Id. at 214,351 P.2d at 493. 
Hearsay is "[ aJ term applied to that species of testimony given by a witness who relates, not what he 
[or she] knows personally, but what others have told him [or her], or what he [or she] has heard said 
by others." BLACK' S LAW DICTIONARY 722 (6th ed. 1990). The testimony is "offered to 
prove the truth of the matter asserted." Id. 
The positive, uncontradicted testimony of a credible witness must be accepted as true even if the 
witness is an interested party. Testimony may not be arbitrarily or capriciously disregarded, but 
may be disregarded if it exceeds probability or is impeached. Testimony which is inherently 
improbable, or rendered so by facts and circumstances disclosed at the hearing, may be disregarded, 
but this is warranted only when it is physically impossible for the evidence to be true, or its falsity is 
apparent, without any resort to inference or deduction. Dinneen vs. Finch. 100 Idaho 620, 603 P.2d 
575 (1979). 
CONCLUSIONS 
The employer asserts the claimant was discharged for inappropriate conduct described in several 
documents in the record. The entire documentary record, however, is considered as hearsay and 
the Idaho Snpreme Court has ruled that hearsay evidence, standing alone, is not sufficient to 
support a finding. 
The employer failed to appear and testify as to the truth and veracity of the allegations of 
misconduct contained in the documents. As the claimant testified, and denied the employer's 
allegations, it cannot be found that a preponderance of the evidence supports the employer's 
allegations. The claimant's swom testimony must be given greater weight and consideration. 
The burden of proving misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence falls strictly on the 
employer. Where that burden is not met, benefits must be awarded to the claimant. Roll v. City 
of Middleton, 105 Idaho 22,25,665 P.2d 721, 724 (1983); Parker v. St. Maries Plywood, 101 
Idaho 415,614 P.2d 955, 959 (1980). 
The Appeals Examiner concludes that the employer has not met this burden. The claimant is 
eligible for benefits. 
~~ 
Appeals Examiner 
Date of Mailing January 6, 2010 Last Day To Appeal January 20, 2010 
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APPEAL RIGHTS 
You have FOURTEEN fH.l DAYS FROM THE DATE OF MAILING to file a Written appeal with 
the Idaho Industrial Commission. The appeal must be mailed to: 
Or delivered in person to: 
Or transmitted by facsimile to: 
Idaho Industrial Commission 
Judicial Division, IDOL Appeals 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0041 
Idaho Industrial Commission 
700 S Clearwater Lane 
Boise, ID 83712 
(208) 332-7558. 
If the appeal is mailed, it must be postmarked no later than the last day to appeal. An appeal filed 
by facsimile transmission must be received by the Commission by 5:00 p.m., Mountain Time, on 
the last day to appeal. A facsimile transmission received after 5:00 p.m will be deemed received by 
the Commission on the next business day. A late ~ will be dismissed. Appeals fIled by any 
means with the Appeals Bureau Of a Department of Labor local office will not be accepted by the 
Commission. TO EMPWYERS WHO ARE INCORPORATED: If you file an appeal with the 
Idaho Industrial COl1vnission., the appeal must be signed by a corporate officer or legal counsel 
licensed to practice in the State of Idaho and the signature must includ.e the individual's title. The 
Convnission will not consider appeals submitted by employer representatives who are not attorneys. 
If you request a hearing before the COirunission or pennission to file a legal brief, you must make 
these requests through legal counsel licensed to practice in the State of Idaho. Questions should be 
directed to the Idaho Industrial Commission, Unemployment Appeals, (208) 334-6024. 
If no appeal is fIled, this decision will become final and cannot be changed. TO CLAIMANT: If 
this decision is changed, any benefits paid will be subject to repayment If an appeal is fIled, you 
should continue to report on your claim as long as you are unemployed. 
DECISION OF APPEALS EXAMINER - 4 of 5 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF lABOR 
APPEALS BUREAU 
317 WEST MAIN STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83735-0720 
(208) 332-35721 (800) 621-4938 
FAJ{: (208)334-6440 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on January 6. 2010 . a true and correct copy of Decision of Appeals 
Examiner was served by regular United States mail upon each of the following: 
HABIB SADID 
1420 ASPEN DR 
POCATELLO ID 83209 
JOHN LYNN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW "~t-, j~:N', . '; 
~~i~~; DR, STE 200 ref' [i} ~L\fdJA)£/. 
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE LLP ~'".----
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW ~ / !;fo vi 
405 S 8m ST. STE 250 <:: f5 ,y rr 
BOISE ID 83702J 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY=:::: .. ~.n A (b:;vtLru.l ~ ( 
921 S 8m £1.Cj(l1: ()l" '" \ (, I 12 . /1 .. 1 /1,( t I, 
STOP 8107 . "' '~~C: ~1 \, L,)L{G lJP<i~ ~ O} .. ,LtflJ_-r Ll'trY(."li 
POCATELLO ID 83209 to &->; 1';"")-1 ! J !, 
0nj~J'" 'r-ft --:-", "" ~ 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY/ i c..-L..i>\" 6~ii-C4 - }3'1l 
POBOX 8219 
POCATELLO ID 83209-0001 
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I!2ttlQ [8iffl rr I~rle 
Docket No 11777 yr 12010 _ Notes 
Participant Name L.. .. 
r 
.... _ ..... _ ..... _____ _ 
SSN (like 999-99-9999-0) ,-I ____ _ Get Docket Info· . Clear 
Must have both Docket No and Year to enter notes. 
.. " .. _..::1 Update I 
Docket Claimant Employer Office FileDate 
1777 -201 0 ~IH~AB::-:I-::-B~S-:-AD~I-::-D-.-. ---I ~I D~A-:-H~O~S~TA ...... T~E-:-U-:-N-:-IV ...... ER-:-S ...... ITY----/27. [jiJ16~2009 
Issues: Hearing Schedule: 
r:O-=-2':"'O--D"'"':i-s-ch:-a-r-g-e-; ---------,."'1. [Jan 52010 11 :30 AMHardy 
Appellant:!gaimant 
.m..:.J Updated:112118/2009 BY:ls~chter . 
Idaho State University / Johnson & Monteleone Llpattourneys And 
Counslers At Law / John Lynn, esq .... ..::1 
Notes: 
2010-01-25 13:19:17-(sr) - Got hard copy from scanning and emailed IC and Legal decision. 
Will be mailing an audio cd today, file is to large to email; 
2010-01-25 13:19:16-(sr) - Got hard copy from scanning and emailed IC and Legal decision. 
Will be mailing an audio cd today, file is to large to email; 
2010-01-22 1O:53:50-(sr) - problems getting decision to email from AX, waiting to hear back 
from IT before I can send to IC and Legal; 
2010~OL-2208:5.4:17-'sr}"Rec'd IC protest; processed as needed; 
2010-01-21 12:31:24-Gh) - Received yet another request to RJO from ERs attorney (Claim 
for Review and Affidavit in support of motion for rehearing). DENIED. Advised ER via 
letter they must protest to the IC.; 
2010-01-15 14:21 :24-(tg) - David Alexander from Racine Law Ofcs, ER rep, called from 
855-9080 to ask about the time frame for appealing to IC. I told him he has 14 days from the 
date of the mailing of the denial to re-open. ; 
2010-01-15 08:50:57-(ms) - recv'd in mail from attny reqt to reopen.it's been denied. sent reqt 
to scanning; 
2010-01-14 15:51 :32-(ms) - Attny for ER called told him the reqt to reopen was denied.he 
can appeal to I C ; 
2010-01-13 16:30:29-Gh) - Employer's request for RJO DENIED.; 
2010-01-13 09:47:59-(ms) - printed off file from application extender gave to AE; 
2010-01-13 09:32:39-(ms) - recv'd fax from Attny for ER .reqt to reopen gave to AE; 
2010-01-13 09:32:22-Gh) - Employer requested RJO. Gave to AE.; 
2010-01-05 12:26:48-(tc) - ckd with ae and the mailing date was 12/22, so cUd emplyr and 
1m on phone of the mailing date; 
2010-01-05 12:16:25-(tc) - emplyr clld (Shannon) said they didn't receive the nth, told her 
both addrs it was mailed to and that was the correct addr, wanted to know date of mailing, 
will ask ae aft hearing; 
2010-01-05 12:00:26-Gh) - Employer did not appear.; 
2010-01-04 14:36:08-(sr) - Rcvd additional docs, hand delivered, from the CL; 
2010-01-04 12:40:12-(ms) - recv'd fax notice of association of counsel for CL .added to 
Earticiapnts put in file; 
\n ~ 
John A. Bailey, Jr. (ISB No. 2619) 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE 
& BAILEY, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Telephone: (208) 232-6101 
Fax: (208) 232-6109 
Attorney jar Employer 
APPEALS BUREAU 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
HABIB SADID, an individual, 
SSN:  
Claimant, 
vs. 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, 
Employer, 
and ..... 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. ) 
) 
Docket No. 1777-2010 
CLAIM FOR REVIEW 
COMES NOW, the Employer, IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, by and through counsel of 
record, John A. Bailey, Jr. of Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, Chartered, and hereby gives 
notice pursuant to Idaho Code Section 72-1368(7) and IDAP A Section 09.01.06.066.01 of its claim 
for review of the decision of the appeals examiner in the above captioned case dated January 6,2010, 
and the denial of Request for Rehearing dated on or about January 14,2010 .. The Employer further 
requests that it be permitted to present additional evidence, on the grounds and for the reasons that 
it was denied an opportunity to present evidence at the hearing before the Appeal Examiner. As set 
forth in the Request to Reopen Hearing or for Rehearing filed herein on January 13,2010, and the 
CLAIM FOR REVIEW - 1 
Affidavit of David J. Miller filed therewith (a copy of which is filed herewith), the Employer was 
closed over the Christmas holiday, from the day after the Notice of Appeal Hearing was mailed until 
the day before the hearing. The relevant officers ofldaho State University did not receive the notice 
until after the hearing. The ISU Human Resources Office called the Department of Labor during the 
hearing and was denied an opportunity to participate or present evidence. In the interests of justice, 
the Employer requests that the Commission hold a hearing to receive evidence from the Employer, 
or that the matter be remanded backA:o the Appeals Examiner for an additional hearing and decision. 
rl1 
DATED this .;) i ~ay of January, 2010. 
CLAIM FOR REVIEW - 2 
CERTIFICATKOF SERVICE 
r' jt) Il:!'</" 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of January, 2010, I served a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows: 
Sam Johnson 
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P. 
405 South Eighth Street, Suite 250 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
John Lynn 
Attorney at Law 
776 E. Riverside Dr., Ste 200 
Eagle, ID 83616 
CLAIM FOR REVIEW - 3 
:1 
[~U. S. Mail 
Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 947-2424 
L'\:r-u. S. Mail 
Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile (208) 685-2355 
John A. Bailey, Jr. (ISB No. 2619) 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE 
& BAILEY, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Telephone: (208) 232-6101 
Fax: (208) 232-6109 
Attorney for Employer 
APPEALS BUREAU 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
HABIB SADID, an individual, 
SSN:  
Claimant, 
vs. 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, 
Employer, 
and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Bannock ) 
Docket No. 1777-2010 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID MILLER 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
REHEARING 
COMES NOW DAVID MILLER, Director of Human Resources for the Employer 
herein, IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, and on his oath deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am the Director of the Human Resources Office for Idaho State University. The 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID J. MILLER - 1 
~--". \) \ 
Human Resources Department has responsibility for matters involving unemployment benefits 
for former ISU employees, including the responsibility for responding to appeals pending before 
the Appeals Bureau of the Department of Labor. 
2. My office, as is true of all administrative offices ofIdaho State University, was 
closed from December 24,2009 through January 3, 2010 by order of the President of the 
University as a cost-saving measure. 
3. As of our last working hours on December 23, my office had not received notice 
of the scheduling of Dr. Sadid's appeal hearing. 
4. My office reopened on January 4, 2010, and later that day we received almost two 
weeks worth of mail. Our copy of the Notice of Appeal Hearing shows that it was stamped by 
the Human Resources Department on-January 4,2010. It was not addressed specifically to the 
attention of any person, and was placed in the inbox of a person not associated with the 
unemployment process. It was not found until the afternoon of January 5. 
5. In the afternoon of January 4, we received an email from Dr. Sadid's attorney 
with attached exhibits, but the email did not state a date or a time for a hearing. The same day, a 
person dropped off at our office a CD with no information except that it pertained to Dr. Sadid. 
On January 5, my staff called the local Department of Labor office to ask about the date and time 
for the hearing of Dr. Sadid' s appeal, but the local staff was unaware of any scheduled hearing. 
They referred us to the Department of Labor offices in Boise. 
6. At about 12:15 p.m. on January 5, my stafflearned in a phone call to the Boise 
office that a hearing was scheduled forI 1 :30 that morning and that there was no option for ISU 
to participate. I was not in the office at that time, and by the time I returned, the hearing was 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID J. MILLER - 2 
over. 
7. Had we been aware of the time and date of the hearing, we would have made 
arrangements to attend with counsel and with witnesses in support of ISU' s claim that Dr. Sadid 
was terminated for misconduct. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT. 
~L 
DATED this --12 day of January, 2010. 
-.H.... 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this fa, day of January, 2010. 
(SEAL) 
AFFIDA VIT OF DAVID J. MILLER - 3 
NOTARY P~IC FOR IDAHO 
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My Commission Expires: 1t1.a; 3 ::20// 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1'3 tt;ay of January, 2010, I served a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows: 
Sam Johnson 
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P. 
405 South Eighth Street, Suite 250 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
John Lynn 
Attorney at Law 
776 E. Riverside Dr., Ste 200 
Eagle,ID 83616 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
HABIB SADID, ) 
SSN:  ) IDOL # 1777-2010 
) 
Claimant, ) 
) 
vs. ) NOTICE OF 
) FILING OF APPEAL 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, ) 
) 
Employer, ) 
) FILE D 
and ) 
) 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. ) JAN 2 8 2010 
iNDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: The Industrial Commission has received an appeal from a 
decision of an Appeals Examiner of the Idaho Department of Labor. A copy of the appeal is 
enclosed. Documents that are already part of the record or file will not be copied. 
Further action will be taken by the Industrial Commission in accordance with its Rules of 
Appellate Practice and Procedure, a copy of which is enclosed. 
PLEASE READ ALL THE RULES CAREFULLY 
The Commission will make its decision in this appeal based on the record of the proceedings 
before the Appeals Examiner of the Idaho Department of Labor. To request a briefing schedule or 
hearing, refer to Rule 5(A) and 7(A,B) of the Rules of Appellate Practice and Procedure. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS DIVISION 
POST OFFICE BOX 83720 
BOISE IDAHO 83720-0041 
(208) 334-6024 
NOTICE OF FILING OF APPEAL - 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 28 day of January, 2010 a true and correct copy of the Notice of 
Filing of Appeal and compact disc of the Hearing was served by regular United States mail upon 
the following: 
HABIB SADID 
1420 ASPEN DR 
POCA TELLO ID 83209 
JOHN A BAILEY JR 
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE & 
BAILYCHTRD 
PO BOX 1391 
POCATELLO 83204-1391 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
STATE HOUSE MAIL 
317 W MAIN STREET 
BOISE ID 83735 
mcs 
NOTICE OF FILING OF APPEAL - 2 
\'0 
LAW OFFICES OF 
W. MARCUS W. NYE 
RANDALL C. BUDGE 
JOHN A. BAILEY. JR. 
JOHN R. GOODELL 
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE Be BAILEY 
CHARTERED 
JOHN B. INGELSTROM 
DANIEL C. GREEN 
BRENT Cl. ROCHE 
KIRK 9. HADLEY 
FRED J. LEWIS 
ERIC 1... OLSEN 
CONRAD J. AIKEN 
RICHARD A. HEARN. M.D. 
LANE V. ERICKSON 
FREDERICK J. HAHN, III 
DAVID E. ALEXANDER 
PATRICK N. GEORGE 
SCOTT J. SMITH 
JOSHUA D. JOHNSON 
STEPHEN J. MUHONEN 
CANDICE M. MCHUGH 
CAROL TIPPI YOLYN 
BRENT 1... WHITING 
JONATHON S. BYINGTON 
DAVE BAGL.EY 
THOMAS J. BUDGE 
MARK A. SHAFFER 
JASON E. FLAIG 
Idaho Industrial Commission 
Judicial Division, IDOL Appeals 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0041 
201 EAST CENTER STREET 
POST OFFICE BOX 1391 
POCATELLO. IDAHO 63204-1391 
TELEPHONE (206) 232-6101 
FACSIMILE (206) 232-6109 
www.racinelaw.net 
SENDER'S E-MAIL ADDRESS:dea@racinelaw.net 
January 29,2010 
Re: IDOL Docket No.: 1777-2010 
Habib Sadid Claimant: 
Employer: Idaho State University 
To Whom it May Concern: 
BOISE OFFICE 
tOt SOUTH CAPITOL 
BOULEVARD, SUITE 208 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
TELEPHONE: (208) 395-00 t 1 
FACSIMILE; (208) 433-0167 
IDAHO FALLS OFFICE 
477 SHOUP AVENUE 
SUITE t07 
POST OFFICE BOX 50698 
IDAHO FALLS, 1083405 
TELEPHONE: (208) 528-6101 
FACSIMJLE: (208) 52a~6109 
ALl.. OFFICES TOLL FREE 
(677) 232-6101 
LOUIS F. RACINE (f 917-2005) 
WILLIAM D. OLSON, OF COUNSEL 
Attached is the Employer's Reply to Memorandum in Opposition to Employer's Claim of 
Review, for filing with respect to the above Claim for Review. 
DEAcc 
Attachments 
c: Sam Johnson (w/attachments) 
John Lynn (w/attachments) 
John A. Bailey, Jr. (ISB No. 2619) 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE 
& BAILEY, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Telephone: (208) 232-6101 
Fax: (208) 232-6109 
Attorney for Employer Idaho State University 
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMlSSION 
JUDICTAI DIVISION, IDOL APPEALS 
HABIB SADID, 
SSN:  
Claimant, 
vs. 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, 
, Employer, 
and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
IDOL Docket No. 1777-2010 
REPLY TO MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO CLAIM FOR 
REVIEW 
COMES NOW, the employer, IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY (hereinafter "ISU'), by and 
through its counsel of record, and replies to the Brief in Opposition to Employer's Claim for Review 
as follows: 
In its claim for review, ISU is asking the Industrial Commission for an opportunity to present 
evidence regarding Dr. Sadid' s claim that he was fired without cause. This is a claim that was 
rejected by the Department of Labor in the first instance. Dr. Sadid managed to succeed before the 
Appeals Examiner only because of a scheduling quirk which left ISU without sufficient notice of the 
REPLY BRIEF - Page 1 
hearing, and because of the Department of Labor' s refusal to permit ISU to participate in the hearing 
when representatives from the University called while the hearing was still in progress. 
The Appeals Examiner correctly noted that notice of the hearing was mailed in a timely 
fashion, which is all that is required by the law. However, it is within the discretion of the Industrial 
Commission to hear additional evidence or remanded to the Appeals Examiner for a rehearing. Idaho 
code § 72-1368(7). The interests of justice require that the state ofIdaho, as the employer of Dr. 
Sadid, be given an opportunity to demonstrate that Dr. Sadid was fired for cause before state funds 
are paid to him in contravention of public policy. 
The affidavit of David Miller, which is part of the record, establishes that Idaho State 
University was closed from the day after the mailing of the notice until the day before the hearing. 
It was therefore impossible for anyone at Idaho State University to have had actual notice of the 
hearing before the fourth day of January, fewer than 24 hours before the start of the hearing. In 
reality, it was necessary for the notice to make its way through the mail system, and it did not make 
its way into the hands of a responsible person in the Human Resources Office until January 5. 
Likewise, although counsel for the employee sent an email to the ISU Human Resources Office in 
the afternoon of January 4 (Employees' Exhibit C), it did not on its face state the date and time of 
the hearing. Such information was only contained within an attachment. The exhibit which 
Employees' counsel had delivered to the Human Resources Department, the same day was an audio 
CD and likewise did not state the date and time of the hearing. 
As was also established by the affidavit of David Miller, the ISU Human Resources 
Department made a reasonable attempt to determine what hearing was being held on January 5, and 
actually reached the appropriate persons at the Department of Labor office while the hearing was in 
REPLY BRIEF - Page 2 
progress, only to be told they could not participate. 
Under these facts, the failure of ISU to participate in the hearing was reasonable and 
excusable. Where ISU was closed for two weeks over the holidays, it was not possible during that 
period for responsible persons at ISU to be notified of the pending hearing. To suggest, as the 
claimant does in his Brief in Opposition, that ISU should have made "the proper arrangements for 
someone to check his mail and call to his attention an important date of hearing," is to deny the reality 
of how a government office operates. It would defeat the purpose of an order to close the University 
over the holidays (as a money saving measure) for the Department of Labor or another state agency 
to require that ISU keep its offices staffed to respond to hearing notices. It is quite likely that the 
Commission would look unfavorably on a claimant who filed an appeal and then failed to watch his 
mailbox for the notice of hearing. But that is not what happened here. ISU did not initiate the appeal 
and was not aware that a hearing was due to be scheduled. 
The people of the State of Idaho deserve an opportunity for their representatives to present 
to the Commission the facts regarding Dr. Sadid's termination. It is public policy that people who 
are terminated for cause not receive unemployment insurance benefits. Public policy therefore 
strongly favors giving an employer an opportunity to demonstrate that cause, ifit exists. Where such 
cause exists, as here, and the employer's failure to participate in the hearing is reasonable and 
excusable, as it is here, it offends justice to deny the employer an opportunity to present the evidence 
showing cause, especially when the public purse is doubly implicated because the employer is itself 
a state agency. 
F or these reasons, the employer respectfully requests that the Commission review the 
decisions of the Appeals Examiner and conduct a hearing or remand this matter to the Department 
REPLY BRIEF - Page 3 
of Labor for a further hearing before an Appeals EX'V1 ..iner. ~ 
RESPECTFUllY SUBMITTED this t fI day of J/IItII~r 2010. 
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CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE 
£lUI: I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day ofJanuary, 2010, I served a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows: 
Sam Johnson 
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P. 
405 South Eighth Street, Suite 250 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
John Lynn 
Attorney at Law 
776 E. Riverside Dr., Ste 200 
Eagle, ID 83616 
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http://www.tr~asurevalleyl(Jl1lyers.com 
FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL SHEET 
To: Mary From: Sam Johnson/Cara Rice 
,Company: Idaho Industrial 
Commission 
Fax number: (208) 332-7558 
Phone number: 
Re: Habib Sadid 
o Urgent o For Review 
Notes/Comments: 
Date: February 3, 2010 
Total no. of pages including cover: 17 
Sender's reference number: 
Your reference number: 
o Please Comment o Please Reply o Please Recycle 
See attached Claimant's Opposition to Employer's Claimjor Review. 
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE 
The information contained in this facsimile message is legally privileged work product, 
and confidential information intended only for the use of the individual or entity names 
below. lfthe reader of this message is not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified 
that any dissemination, distribution or copy of this telecopy is strictly prohibited. If you 
have received this telecopy in error, please immediately notify us by telephone and return 
the original message or work product to us at the address shown above, via the U.S.P.S. 
121001/017 
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, S~m Johnson, ISB No. 4777 
'JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, LLP. 
405 South Eighth Street, Ste. 250 
. Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 331-2100 
Facsimile: (208) 947-2424 
sam@treasurevalleylawyers.com 
John C. Lynn, ISB No. 1548 
.776 E. Riverside Drive, Ste. 200 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 685-2333 
"Facsimile: (208) 429-1925 
Attorneys for Claimant 
APPEALS BUREAU 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
HABIB SADID, 
BSN: 
Claimant, 
'v. 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, 
Employer 
and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
DOCKET NUMBER: 1777-2010 
CLAIMANT'S OPPOSITION TO 
EMPLOYER'S CLAIM FOR REVIEW 
COMES NOW Claimant, by and through his attorneys of record, and hereby 
submits his opposition to the Employer's Claim for Review. 
Wherefore, we respectfully submit the Employer's Claim for Review should be 
q,enied based upon the following grounds and reasons: 
~I' . 
CLAIMANT'S OPPOSITION TO EMPLOYER'S CLAIM FOR REVIEW - 1 
IdJ002/017 
/ 
Y 
1. The Decision of the Appeals Examiner, Janet C. Hardy, denying the 
Employer's request to re-open the hearing was based upon a sound application 
of law to the facts and therefore should not be disturbed. (A true and correct 
copy of the Appeals Examiner's Order to Deny Re-Opening is appended 
hereto as Exhibit "A "). 
2. The Affidavit of David J. Miller, refened to in the Employer's Claim for 
Review, misstates the record. In his affidavit, Mr. Miller acknowledges in 
paragraph five (5) that on "January 4, we received an email from Dr. Sadid's 
atto~'l1ey with attached exhibits, but the email did not state a date or a time for 
a hearing. (See Affidavit of David Miller in Support of Motion for Rehearing, 
~ 5, appended hereto as Exhibit "B")(Emphasis added). Mr. Miller's 
statement is not accurate. Mr. Miller fails to disclose that the List of 
Supplemental Exhibits attached to the January 4, 2010, email makes express 
reference to the fact that Claimant plans to use the exhibits "at the telephonic 
hearing scheduled for January 5, 2010." (A true and correct copy of the 
January 4, 2010, email together with Claimant's Supplemental Exhibit List is 
appended hereto as Exhibit "C")(Emphasis added). This email and the 
supplemental exhibit list, of course, supplied the factual basis for the Appeals 
Examiner's conclusion that, "additional documents submitted by the claimant, 
through his attorney, were emailed to the employer's human resource office 
on'Monday, January 4, 2010, which specifically referenced the hearing 
scheduled for January 5, 2010." (See Exhibit "A" appended hereto, p. 2 of 4). 
~LAIMANT'S OPPOSITION TO EMPLOYER'S CLAIM FOR REVIEW - 2 
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3. Worth noting as well is the fact that Mr. Steve Millward personally, hand-
delivered a copy of Claimant's Hearing Exhibit "F" to Ms. Shannon Carr, the 
designated representative from the Employer's Human Resource Office, on 
January 4, 2010, the day before the hearing scheduled for January 5, 2010. (A 
true and correct copy of Mr. Millward's Certificate of Hand-Delivery is 
appended hereto as Exhibit (lD "). 
4. Finally, the Claimant respectfully submits that if the tables were turned and 
Claimant had gone on vacation for two (2) weeks without making the proper 
arrangements for someone to check his mail and call to his attention an 
important date of hearing, it is unlikely the Commission would look favorably 
upon a request to reopen. 
For these reasons and from the record as a whole, Claimant respectfully asks that 
the Employer's Claim for Review be denied. 
DATED: This ~ day of January, 2010. 
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P. 
CLAIMANT'S OPPOSITION TO EMPLOYER'S CLAIM FOR REVIEW - 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING, DELIVERY, OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 
I CERTIFY that on January 26, 2010, I caused a true and C011'ect copy of the 
.. foregoing document to be: 
Q mailed Jolm A. Bailey, Jr. 
a hand delivered Racine Olson Nye Budge & Bailey, Chtd. 
Q CMlECF Electronic Filing 201 E. Center 
A:l. transmitted fax machine P. O. Box 1391 
to: (208) 232-6109 Pocatello,ID 83204-1391 
Q mailed Idaho State University 
, a hand delivered 921 S. 81h Itt. transmitted via e-mail STOP 8107 
to: carrshan@isu.edu Pocatello, Idaho 83209 
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P. 
S~~~ 
Attomey for laimant 
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HABIDSADID. 
SSN: 
Claim~t 
vs. 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
APPEAlS BUREAU 
317 WEST MAIN STREET 
BOISE, lDAHO 83735"()720 
(208) 332~35721 (800) 6214938 
FAJ(: (208)334-6440 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, 
Employer 
) DOCKET NUMBER 1777-2010 
) 
) -ORDER TO DENY RE-OPENING 
) 
) 
~d ) 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. » 
--------------------------
DECISION 
'I\,e. employer's request to re-open the hearing that was held on Tuesday, January 5, 2010 at 
11:30 a.m., is DENIED. 
mSTORY OF THE CASE 
The above-entitled matter was scheduled to be heard by J~et C. Hardy, Appeals Examiner for 
~)d~o Dep~ent of Labor, on Tuesday, J~uary 5, 2010, at 11:30 a.m., Mountain Time, by 
telephone in th~ City of Boise, in accordance with §72-1368 (6) of the Idaho Employment 
Security Law. 
TIle claim~t appeared for the hearing and provided testimony. 
The employer did not appear for the hearing. 
ISSUE 
The issue before the Appeals Examiner is whether the hearing should be re-opened in accordance 
with §72-1368 (6) of the Idaho Employment SeclJ!ity Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
B~~d on the exhibits and testimony in the record, the following facts are found: 
~UUt>1 Uoll 
, 
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1. A Noti<;e of Telephone Hearing was mailed to the parties on December 22, 2009. setting 
Tuesday, January 5, 2010 at 11:30 a,m., Mountain Time, as the date and time of hearing. 
The employer did not appear for the hearing. 
2. The Notice of Telephone Hearing and accompanying exhibits were mailed to two 
separate addresses for the employer - one at 921 S. 8th, Stop 8107, Pocatello, Idaho 
83209; and the other at P. O. Box 8219, Pocatello, Idaho 83209-0001. 
3. The employer, through their attorney, filed a request to re-open the hearing stating they 
did not appear because the employer's mailroom was closed from December 19, 2009 
until January 4, 2010 and therefore did not receive sufficient notice to pennit it to be 
present at the hearing. 
AUTHORITY 
Section 72-1368 (6), Idaho Code, states ill. part that the appeals examiner may, either upon 
application for rehearing by an interested party or on his own motion, rehear, affmn, modify, set 
aside or reverse any prior deCision on the basis of the evidence previously submitted or on the 
basis of additional evidence; provided, that such application or motion be made within ten (10) 
days after the date of service of the decision. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Service by mail is deemed complete on the date of mailing. Idaho Code §72-1368 (5) (2004). In 
Striebeck v. Employment Security Agency, 83 Idaho 531, 366 P.2d 589, (1961), the Idaho 
Supreme Court held "[i]t is clear that the legislature intended that for the purpose of perfecting 
~,appeal as proyided in §72-1368, service of a notice of detepnination or redetermination shall 
be regarded and adjudged complete when delivered to the person being served on the date of 
mailing if mailed to such person at his last known address." The Idaho Supreme Court has 
specifically interpreted the word "deemed" ill §72~1368 (5) as creating a "conclusive 
presumption." Striebeck v.. Employment Security Agency, 83 Idaho 531, at 536, 366 P.2d 589, 
591 (1961). ... absent a defect in the notice .. , the right to appeal does not extend beyond the 
time period provided by the statute . 
.-It,',' , .~ 
The same presumptions and guidelines apply to the service of a notice of hearing. The employer 
asserts the Notice of Telephone Hearln~ was not timely received, because their post office was 
Closed. The employer has not· asserted a defect in the notice; has not asserted that the notice was . 
improperly addressed to the employer; and has not asserted that the Notice was not timely 
received due to an error by the US Postal Service. 
In addition, the Appeals Examiner notes that additional documents submitted by the claimant, 
through his attorney, were emailed to the employer's human resource officer on Monday, 
Janriary 4, 2010~ which specifically referenced the hearing scheduled for January 5, 2010. 
Due process requires that a party be provided with an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful 
time and in a meaningful manner. City of Boise v. Industrial Commission, 129 Idaho 906,910, 
935 P.2d 169, 173, (1997). The employer was afforded that opportunity, but neglected to take 
advantage of it As such, the employer has not provided sufficient facts to warrant a re-openi:Q.g. 
The request to re.-open is depied. 
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':date of Mailing January 14, 2010 Last Day To Appeal January 28, 2010 
APPEAL RIGHTS 
; ¥ ou have FOURTEEN (14) DAYS FROM THE DAlE OF MAILING to file a written appeal with 
the Idaho Industrial Commission. The appeal must be mailed to: 
or delivered in person to: 
Or transmitted by facsimile to: 
Idaho Industrial Commission 
Judicial Division, IDOL Appeals 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0041 
Idaho Industrial Commission 
700 S Clearwater Lane 
Boise, ID 83712 
(208) 332-7558. 
If the appeal is mailed, it must be postmarked no later than the last day to appeal. An appeal fIled 
by facsimile tra,nsmission must be received by the Commission by 5:00 p.m., Mountain Time, on 
tb~ last day to appeal. A facsimile transmission received after 5:00 p.m. will be deemed received by 
the Commission on the next business day. A late appeal will be dismissed. Appeals filed by any 
means with the Appeals Bureau or a Department of Labor local office will not be accepted by the 
Cemmission. TO EMPWYERS WHO ARE INCORPORATED: if you file an appeal with the 
Idaho bulustrial Commission, the appeal must be signed by a corporate officer or legal counsel 
licensed to practice in the State of Idaho and the signature must include the individual's title. The 
Gommission will not consider appeals submitted by employer representatives who are not attorneys. 
If you request a hearing before the Commission or pennission to file a legal brief, you must make 
these requests through legal cormsellicensed t()practice in the Stqte of Idaho . . Questions should be 
djrected to the Idaho Industrial Commission,· Unemployment Appeals, (208) 334·6024. 
If no appeal is fIled, this decision will become fmal and cannot be changed. TO CLAIMANT: If 
u.us qecision is changed, any benefits paid will be subject to repayment. If an appeal is fIled, you 
should continue to'report on your claim as long as you are unemployed. 
ORDER TO DENY RE·OPENING - 3 of 4 
~008/017 
02/03/2010 WED 17: 07 FAX 
',,- , 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
APPEAlS BUREAU 
317 WEST MAIN STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83735-0720 
(208) 332-35721 (800) 621-4938 
FAX: (208) 334-6440 
CERTlJJ1CATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on JanuarY 14, 2010 , a true and correct copy of Order to Deny Re-
Opening was served by regular United States mail upon each of the following: 
" 
HABIBSADID 
1420 ASPEN DR 
P,pCATEILO ID 83209 
JOBNLYNN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
776 E RIVERSIDE DR, STE 200 
EAGLE ID 83616 
JOHNsON & MONfELEONE LLP , 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
405 S 8TH ST, STE 250 
~OISE ID 83702 
IDAHO STAlE UNIVERSITY 
921 S 8TH 
STOP 8107 
POCA1ElLO ID 83209 
IPAHO STAlE VNIVERSITY 
P'OBOX8219 
POCATEILO ID 83209-0001 
i6HN A BA1LEY JR 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
POBOX 1391 
POCATEILOID 83204-1391 
OJIDER TO DENY RE-OPENING - 4 of 4 
121009/017 
·.John A. Bailey, Jr. (ISB No. 2619) 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE 
& BAILEY, CHARTERED 
·,P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Telephone: (208) 232-6101 
.,Fax: (208) 232-6109 
Attorney for Employer 
'JAN 2 r 2010 
APPEALS BUREAU 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
HABIB SADID, an individual, 
"SSN: 
Claimant, 
vs. 
IDAHO STATE UNNERSITY, 
Employer, 
and 
. ,IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. 
STATEOFIDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Bannock ) 
Docket No. 1777-2010 
AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID MILLER 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
REHEARING 
COMES NOW DAVID MILLER, Director of Human Resources for the Employer 
herein, IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, and on his oath deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am the Director of the Human Resources Office for Idaho State University. The 
AFFJDA VIT OF DAVID J. MILLER - I 
Exhibil B 
.... ' 
• 
~OlO/017 
Human Resources Department has responsibility for matters involving unemployment benefits 
'for former ISUemployees, including the responsibility for responding to appeals pending before 
the Appeals Bureau of the Department of Labor. 
2. My office, as is true of all administrative offices of Idaho State University, was 
, closed from December 24,2009 through January 3,2010 by order of the President of the 
University as a cost-saving measure. 
3. As of our last working hours on December 23, my office had not received notice 
;"'ofthe scheduling of Dr. Sadid's appeal hearing. 
4. My office reopened on January 4,2010, and later that day we received almost two 
weeks worth of maiL Our copy of the Notice of Appeal Hearing shows that it was stamped by 
>.the Human Resources Department onJanuary 4, 2010. It was not addressed specifically to the 
attention of any person, and was placed in the inbox of a person not associated with the 
,. 
unemployment process. It was not found until the afternoon of January 5. 
5. In the afternoon of January 4, we received an email from Dr. Sadid's attorney 
with attached exhibits, but the email did not state a date or a time for a hearing. The same day, a 
"'person dropped off at our office a CD with no information except that it pertained to Dr. Sadid. 
On January 5, my staff called the local Department of Labor office to ask about the date and time 
, I < 
for the hearing of Dr. Sadid' s appeal, but the local staff was unaware of any scheduled hearing. 
"They referred us to the Department of Labor offices in Boise. 
6. At about 12:15 p.m. on January 5, my staff learned in a phone call to the Boise 
office that a hearing was scheduled forl1:30 that morning and that there was no option for ISU 
, to participate. I was not in the office at that time, and by the time I returned, the hearing was 
AFFJDA VIT OF DA VID J. MILLER - 2 
1dI011/017 
idJ012/017 
over. 
7. Had we been aware of the time and date of the hearing, we would have made 
arrangements to attend with counsel and with witnesses in support ofISU's claim that Dr. Sadid 
was terminated for misconduct. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT. 
1--2,J-DATED this ~ day ofJanuary, 2010. 
~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this fa day of January, 2010. 
(SEAL) NO!~Y PA;ICFOR !DAHO /y Resldmg at: '(J....A..AoCtL CoOA...: 
My Commission Expires: 2r7.~ 3
7 
::20 II 
'AFFIDAVITOFDAVID J. MILLER-3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1'3 ~ay of January, 2010, I served a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows: 
Sam Johnson 
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P. 
'4"05 South Eighth StJ;eet, Suite 250 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
John Lynn 
'Attorney at Law 
776 E. Riverside Dr., Ste 200 
Eagle, ID 83616 
AFFIDA YJT OF DAVID J. MILLER - 4 
U. S. Mail 
Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile (208) 947-2424 
U. S. Mail 
Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile (208) 429-1925 
V41 V.J( .G.UJ.U W1'!i:U J./: va lrA.)!. 
Cara Rice 
From: 
Sent: 
To: 
Subject: 
Cara Rice 
-Monday, January 04, 2010 2:15 PM 
'carrshan@isu.edu· 
Habib Sadid v. ISU and Idaho Dept. of Labor/Docket#: 1777-2010 
~014/o17 
Attachments: 20100104144511.pdf; 201 001 04144632.pdf; 201 00104144739. pdf; 20100104144910.pdf 
201001041'l4511.p 20100104144632.p 201001041'14739.p 2oiool041'1491O.p 
df (1 MB) df (1 MB) df (3 MB) df (1 MS) 
Dear Ms. Carr, 
Attached hereto is Claimant's Supplemental Exhibit List. 
CAM 
Cara D. Rice 
Legal Assistant 
Johnson & Monteleone, L.L.P. 
405 South;"Elghth Street, Suite 250 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 331-2100 
Facsimile: (208) 947-2424 
cara@treasurevalley1awyers.com 
www.treasureva11eylawyers.com 
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail is intended only for the personal and confidential use 
of the indfvidua1(s) named as recipients and is covered by the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§25l0-252l. It may contain information that is privileged, 
confidential, and/or protected from disclosure under applicable laws and/or privileges, 
including,but not limited to, the attorney-client privilege and/or the attorney work-
product doctrine. If you are not the intended recipient of this transmission, please 
notify the sender immediat'ely by telephone. Do not deliver, distribute, or copy this 
transmission, disclose its contents, or take any action in reliance on the information it 
contains'. 
Exhibit e. 
d,,, 
HABIB SADID, 
SSN: 
Claimant, 
APPEALS BUREAU 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
v. DOCKET NUMBER: 1777-2010 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, 
Employer 
CLAIMANT'S 
. EXHIBIT LIST 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
COMES NOW, Claimant, by and through his attorneys of record, Sam Johnson 
and Joh11 Lynn, and hereby submits the following supplemental exhibits to be used at the 
telephonic hearing scheduled for January 5, 2010. 
LIST OF SUPPLEMENTAL EXHIBITS 
C. Claimant's notes and documents submitted to ISU Internal Grievance. 
D. Claimant's Amended Complaint against ISU filed 10115109 with 
newspaper attictes. 
E. Claimant's 2008 evaluation dated 4/22/09. 
F. Taped grievance hearing dated October and November 2009. 
G. Claimant> s 2112/06 response to 1119/06, reprimand. 
H. Claimant's 4/27/09 response to 4/6/09 reprimand. 
I. Claimant's 4/27/09) response to 4115/09 reprimand. 
, CLAIMANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL EXHIBIT LIST • 1 
1dI015/017 
v_. v_, -V-'V . .,. ........ _f. \1;1 ... ·AA 
, , ' 
DATED: This ~ day of January, 2010. 
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P. 
~~ S ohIlson 
, AttoOleys for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING, DELIVERY, OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 
I CERTIFY that on January 4, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document to be: 
o mailed 
o hand delIvered 
o transmitted via e-mail 
to: caIl'shan@isu.edu 
Idaho State University 
921 S. gill 
STOP &107 
Pocatello, Idaho 83209 
CLAIMANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL EXHIBIT LIST - 2 
121016/017 
- -, - -, - '" - .. ..__ _. & V., 
" 
01-04-2016 01:37pm FrOl1l~ 
Certlftc.ne to ,¥tl!w~rd - Coogle Docs 
N9S P.DOI/001 HOg 
CERTIFICATE OF MAaING, DELIVERY, OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 
~U! IIU17 
I CERTIFY that on January 4t 2010, I caused a true and correct copy of Claimant's Exhibit F to be. 
served to ISU as fonows~ jtJjiiJi<;d"' .. : ... -.--~. ,._.-............... ""ldah~ -State""tJIiivers'jtY "" ............ -"" .......... .... . ............ ' .. '! 
/tllhand delivered 921 S. gUt j P m:nsmitted fax machine ~TOP 8107 I 
l to. /Human Resources - Office of Shannon Carr 
t !pocatello, Idaho 83209 
! ! ' 
... •• ................... ""~·· .. ··-·-__ ..... 1.,. •• •• ..... _ •• __ .......... ·_ .. _ ........ J .... « ... _ .. _ ..... _ ............... ~ ...... _ ............... 1 ... "' ..................... _ .... 1 .. _. __ •• _ ...... • ... • __ ••• .. _ .. ·_ .. ·: 
~~-
Steve Millward 
CLAIMANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL EXHIBIT LIST - t 
http;1 tdQt;5.gool1lc.eom/D(lC?ld .. dg6hb4mL7cv7rd6f1i&btf='Em<dllmpol'l' Pag!! 1 of 
Exhibit D 
' .... ". '., , . 
~ FEB-03 04: 03 PM G3 5' 38/1 17 RECE I VE OK * 
* ~ ~~***~**~~*****~*~**~~*~**~**~***~******~**~~*~*~*******~******************************************* 
LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRAIG G. BLEDSOE - ISB# 3431 
KATHERINE TAKASUGI - ISB# 5208 
TRACEY K. ROLFSEN - ISB# 4050 
CHERYL GEORGE - ISB# 4213 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Idaho Department of Labor 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83735 
Telephone: (208) 332-3570 ext. 3148 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
HABIB SADID, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, 
Employer, 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
---------------------------) 
TO THE ABOVE-NAMED PARTIES: 
IDOL NO. 1777-2010 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
F6 LED 
FEB .. , 4 2OfO 
INDUSTRIAL COMMiSSiON 
Please be advised that the undersigned Deputy Attorney General representing the 
Idaho Department of Labor hereby enters the appearance of said attorneys as the 
attorneys of record for the State of Idaho, Department of Labor, in the above-entitled 
proceeding. By statute, the Department of Labor is a party to all unemployment 
insurance appeals in Idaho. 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - 1 
DATED this ~ day of February, 2010. 
Tracey K. Rolf n ~ 
Deputy Atto y eneral 
Attorney for tate of Idaho, 
Department of Labor 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEARANCE, 
was mailed, postage prepaid, this Orcl day of February, 2010, to: 
HABIB SADID 
1420 ASPEN DR 
POCATELLO ID 83209 
JOHN A BAILEY JR 
PO BOX 1391 
POCATELLO ID 83204-1391 
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE - 2 
Sam Johnson, ISB No. 4777 
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P. 
405 South Eighth Street, Ste. 250 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 331-2100 
Facsimile: (208) 947-2424 
sam(ii),treasurevallevlawvers. com 
John C. Lynn, ISB No. 1548 
776 E. Riverside Drive, Ste. 200 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 685-2333 
Facsimile: (208) 429-1925 
Attorneys for Claimant 
2fJJO FEB ... 5 P 4: 2b 
IND/JS TRi~IEcl1lfD 
""' .. OMMtSSfON 
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
JUDICIAL DIVISION, IDOL APPEALS 
HABIB SADID, 
SSN: 
Claimant, 
v. 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, 
Employer 
and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
DOCKET NUMBER: 1777-2010 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that one the 5th day of February, 2010, a true and 
accurate copy of Claimant's Opposition to Employer's Claim for Review was served by 
first class mail addressed to the Office of the Attorney General, Idaho Department of 
Labor, 700 W. State Street, P. O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - 1 
::~/ 
Attorney for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - 2 
LAW OFFICES OF 
W. MARCUS W. NYE 
RANDALL C. BUDGE 
JOHN A. BAILEY, JR. 
JOHN R. GOODELL 
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE & BAILEY 
CHARTERED 
JOHN B. INGELSTROM 
DANIEL C. GREEN 
BRENT O. ROCHE 
KIRK B. HADLEY 
FRED J. LEWIS 
ERIC L. OLSEN 
CONRAD J. AIKEN 
RICHARD A. HEARN, M.D. 
LANE V. ERICKSON 
FREDERICK J. HAHN, III 
DAVID E. ALEXANDER 
PATRICK N. GEORGE 
SCOTT J. SMITH 
JOSHUA D. JOHNSON 
STEPHENJ.MUHONEN 
CANDICE M. MCHUGH 
CAROL TIPPI VOLYN 
BRENT L. WHITING 
JONATHON S. BYINGTON 
DAVE BAGLEY 
THOMAS J. BUDGE 
JONATHAN M. VOLYN 
MARK A. SHAFFER 
JASON E. FLAIG 
Industrial Commission 
Judicial Division, IDOL Appeals 
PO Box 8370 
Boise,ID 83720-0041 
Re: IDOL Docket No: 
Claimant: 
Employer: 
Dear Clerk: 
201 EAST CENTER STREET 
POST OFFICE BOX 1391 
POCATELLO, IDAHO 83204-1391 
TELEPHONE (208) 232-8101 
FACSIMILE (208) 232-6109 
www.racinelaw.net 
SENDER'S E-MAIL ADDREss:c1c@racinelaw.net 
February 4,2010 
1777-2010 
Habib Sadid 
Idaho State University 
BOISE OFFICE 
101 SOUTH CAPITOL 
BOULEVARD, SUITE 208 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702 
TELEPHONE: (208) 395~0011 
FACSIMILE: (208) 433 N 0167 
IDAHO FALLS OFFICE 
477 SHOUP AVENUE 
SUITE 107 
POST OFFICE BOX 50698 
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83405 
TELEPHONE: (208) S2B~6101 
FACSIMILE: (208) 528-6109 
ALL OFFICES TOLL FREE 
(877) 232-6101 
LOUIS F. RACINE (1917-200S) 
WILLIAM D. OLSON, OF COUNSEL 
Enclosed for filing please find a Certificate of Service in the above mentioned Docket No. 
Thank you for your attention to this matter. 
Enclosure 
Very truly yours, . 
( f, G~f\'l ~(L\J'-l.~. _llQJAJ~Q.) 
CARRIE CASTILLO, Assistant to 
David E. Alexander 
John A. Bailey, Jr. (ISB No. 2619) 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE 
& BAILEY, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Telephone: (208) 232-6101 
Fax: (208) 232-6109 
Attorney for Employer Idaho State University 
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
JUDICIAL DIVISION, IDOL APPEALS 
HABIB SADID, 
SSN:  
Claimant, 
vs. 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, 
Employer, 
and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
IDOL Docket No. 1777-2010 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on the 2, day of February, 2010, a true and accurate copy of 
Idaho State University's Reply To Memorandum in Opposition to Claim For Review was served by 
first dass mail addressed to the Office of the Attorney General, Idaho Department of Labor, 700 W. 
State Street, P.O. Box 83720j Boise, Idaho 83720-0010. 
DATED this -*-tAaay of February, 2010. 
RA INE, OLSON, N 
& B~ILEY, C . A ""'T'1rY'T'~'-,J 
JOHN A. BAILEY, JR. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - Page 1 
LAW OFFICES OF 
~ACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE & BAILEY 
CHARTERED 
20' E. CENTER STRe:ET 
POS;r.!,?FF'CEOilOX '39' 
POCATELLO. IDAHO 83204-,39' 
cc:: 
I 
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INDUSTRlAL COMMISSION 
JUDICIAL DIVISION, IDOL ApPEALS 
POBox 8370 
BOISE, ID 83720-0041 
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MAILED FROM ZIP CODE 83201 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
HABIB SADID, ) 
) 
Claimant, ) 
) 
IDOL #1777-2010 vs. ) 
) ORDER DENYING NEW IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, ) HEARING AND SETTING ) BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
Employer, ) FILE 0 ) 
and ) FEB - 9 2010 ) 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. ) INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Employer, Idaho State University, appeals to the Industrial Commission a Decision 
issued by an Appeals Examiner with Idaho Department of Labor ("IDOL" or "Department"). In 
that Decision, the Appeals Examiner denied Employer's request to reopen a hearing on 
Claimant's eligibility for unemployment benefits. Employer did not appear at the original 
hearing the Appeals Examiner held on January 5, 2010, and seeks a new hearing before the 
Commission. In the alternative, Employer asks that the Commission remand the matter back to 
the Appeals Examiner. Claimant opposes Employer's request for another hearing in this case. 
NEW HEARING 
Idaho Code § 72-1368(6), provides that the Department's Appeals Examin~r may, upon 
written application from an interested party, rehear a case or admit additional evidence, provided 
that the application is made within ten (10) days of the date of service of the original decision. 
Although Employer filed a timely request to re-open the hearing, the Appeals Examiner issued 
an Order denying Employer's request because Employer did not allege a sufficient supporting 
basis. Therefore, the Decision ruling Claimant eligible for unemployment benefits became final 
and appealable to the Commission. 
ORDER DENYING NEW HEARING AND SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE - 1 
Idaho Code § 72-1368(7) gives the Commission authority to "in its sole discretion, 
conduct a hearing to receive additional evidence or may remand the matter back to the appeals 
examiner for an additional hearing and decision." Unemployment insurance appeals are 
adjudicated under the principles and procedures of administrative law. Hearings at this level of 
review are not a matter of right, as in some other forums. The Commission takes the position 
that conducting a new hearing at this level of review is an extraordinary measure and should be 
reserved for those cases when due process or other interests of justice demand no less. 
Therefore, the threshold question underlying Employer's request for an additional hearing is 
whether Employer has been afforded due process. 
Due process of law as guaranteed by the United States Constitution and Idaho's 
Constitution envision the opportunity, after reasonable notice, for a fair hearing. Prather v. 
Loyd, 86 Idaho 45, 49-50, 382 P.2d 910, 912 (1963). "Procedural due process is an essential 
requirement of the administrative process." City of Boise v. Industrial Commission, 129 Idaho 
906, 910, 935 P.2d 169, 173 (1997). Under federal law, an appeals examiner as the hearing 
officer must provide the "opportunity for a fair hearing, before an impartial tribunal, for all 
individuals whose claims for unemployment compensation are denied." 42 U.S.c. 503(a)(3) 
(2003). 
The Appeals Bureau scheduled the hearing for 11 :30 a.m. Mountain Time on January 5, 
2010. The Appeals Bureau mailed the Notice of Hearing to Employer on December 22, 2009, 
informing interested parties of the date and time the hearing would take place. The Appeals 
Bureau mailed the Notice to Employer at its address of record. (Exhibit 1). Idaho Code § 72-
1368(5) provides, "A notice shall be deemed served if delivered to the person being served or if 
mailed to his last known address; service by mail shall be deemed complete on the date of 
mailing." Once the Notice of Hearing was delivered to Employer's last known address, 
ORDER DENYING NEW HEARING AND SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE - 2 
Employer's entitlement to notice and an opportunity for a hearing was complete. See Streibeck 
v. Employment Security Agency, 83 Idaho 589, 366 P.2d 589 (1961). Therefore, the Appeals 
Examiner was clearly within her discretion in denying Employer's request to re-open the matter. 
Employer asserts that its mailroom was closed for the Christmas holiday when IDOL 
served the Notice of Hearing and mail processing did not begin again until January 4,2010. The 
delivery of the Notice was further delayed because it was not addressed to a specific individual 
and therefore did not find its way to a human resources representative familiar with the matter 
until the afternoon of January 5, 2010. Nevertheless, counsel concedes that his office received 
on January 4, 2010, an email from Claimant's counsel regarding the hearing. Likewise, on 
January 4, 2010, Claimant's counsel delivered to Employer's counsel additional evidence for the 
hearing. Counsel's staff contacted the Appeals Bureau on the afternoon of January 5, 2010, for 
information, but learned that the hearing had already concluded. (Employer's Claim for 
Review). 
Clearly, the Notice of Hearing was delivered to the address of record for Employer in a 
timely manner. The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently ruled that an interested party's 
absence or other reasons that prevent that party from receiving and reading notices in a timely 
manner that were properly to the address of record is not a defect in due process. Faust v. 
Department of Employment, 97 Idaho 162, 540 P.2d 1341 (1975), Hacking v. Department of 
Employment, 98 Idaho 839, 573 P.2d 158 (1978). The U.S. District Court for the District of 
Idaho likewise arrived at the same conclusion in Gary v. Nichols, 447 F.Supp 320 (Idaho, 1978). 
We have carefully reviewed the record and can find no evidence that Employer was 
deprived of due process. The Notice of Hearing and documents were sent to Employer's address 
of record. Employer failed to participate in the hearing because for reasons other than the error 
on the part of the U.S. Postal Service or the Idaho Department of Labor. 
ORDER DENYING NEW HEARING AND SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE - 3 
The unemployment insurance program is intended to ease the economic burdens created 
when a worker loses ajob due to no fault of his or her own. The process for adjudicating claims 
for unemployment benefits is intended to provide the quickest possible disposition of these 
claims. Therefore, there must be compelling reasons to delay the ultimate disposition and allow 
an additional hearing after the Appeals Bureau initially noticed and attempted to conduct one. 
McNeill v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 
510 Pa. 574, 511 A.2d 167 (1986). We find no such circumstances in this case. Accordingly, 
Employer's request for a new hearing is DENIED. Likewise, Employer's request that this matter 
be remanded back to the Appeals Bureau for a new hearing is also DENIED. 
However, Employer's timely appeal of the Appeals Examiner's Decision Denying 
Employer's Request to Re-Open also constitutes a timely appeal of the Appeals Examiner's 
Decision ruling Claimant eligible for unemployment benefits. Employer is clearly an interested 
party to that Decision. Therefore, there is no basis on which to dismiss Employer's appeal on the 
underlying merits of the case. The Commission will review de novo the evidentiary record 
established during the Appeals Examiner's hearing and will issue a new decision upon the 
completion of that review. In lieu of granting Employer another hearing, the parties may argue 
their positions in written briefs. 
BRIEFING SCHEDULE 
As provided for under Rule 5 of the Rules of Appellate Practice and Procedure under the 
Idaho Employment Security Law, effective, as amended, March 1, 2009, the Commission 
establishes the following briefing schedule: 
Employer's brief will be due ten (10) days from the date of this Order 
Claimant and Idaho Department of Labor may reply within seven (7) days of the receipt 
of Employer's brief, if they so choose. 
ORDER DENYING NEW HEARING AND SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE - 4 
DATED this ~ day 
I 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION I i 
/ 
ATTEST: 
/ CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the Cl day of ~~ ft;/f\lJ~ / I, ' /;2009, a true and correct 
copy of Order Establishing Briefing Schedule was served by regtflar United States mail upon 
each of the following: l 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
STATE HOUSE MAIL 
317 W MAIN STREET 
BOISE ID 83735 
JOHN A BAILEY JR 
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE & 
BAILYCHTRD 
PO BOX 1391 
POCATELLO 83204-1391 
SAM JOHNSON 
405 SOUTH EIGHT ST STE 250 
BOISE ID 83702 
JOHNCLYNN 
776 E RIVERSIDE DRIVE STE 200 
EAGLE, ID 83616 
mcs 
ORDER DENYING NEW HEARING AND SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE - 5 
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
ADJUDICATION DEPARTMENT 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0041 
(208) 334-6000 FAX (208) 332-7558 
VITDD 1-800-950-2110 
FAX COVER SHEET 
DATE: February 9, 2010 
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roOL Docker No. 1777-2010 
EMPLOYER'S BRIEl? ON CLAIM l?OR 
REVIEW 
COMES NOW the Employer, Idaho State University, by and through counsel of record, and 
submits the following brief in suppol1 of its claim for review of the detcmlination by the Appeals 
Division of the Idaho Depmtment of Labor granting unemployment benefits to the claimant, Dr. 
Habib Sadid. 
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and 
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IDOL Docket No. 1777-2010 
EMPLOYER'S BRIEF ON CLAIM FOR 
REVIEW 
COMES NOW the Employer, Idaho State University, by and through counsel of record, and 
submits the following brief in support of its claim for review of the determination by the Appeals 
Division of the Idaho Department of Labor granting unemployment benefits to the claimant, Dr. 
Habib Sadid. 
EMPLOYER'S BRIEF ON CLAIM FOR REVIEW - Page I 
FACTS 
Dr. Sadid was a tenured professor of engineering at Idaho State University. His employment 
was terminated for cause last fall based on a recommendation by the Dean of Engineering and 
approved by the university president. The university followed proper procedures leading to the 
termination. The Dean of Engineering issued a notice of contemplated action to Dr. Sadid on May 6, 
2009. (Ex. 5, p.22) The notice cited a specific instance of "unprofessional, non-collegial, disruptive 
and insubordinate" behavior; a prior warning against such behavior; specific warnings at the time of 
the behavior; a long history of disruptive and defamatory behavior; and a similarly long history of 
refusing to comply with instructions and counseling from his superiors. The notice invited Dr. Sadid 
to meet with the Dean to discuss any reason, evidence or information in opposition or mitigation to 
the contemplated action. The requested meeting was held in July, 2009, but failed to reach any 
satisfactory conclusion. In the meantime, Dr. Sadid continued to engage in inappropriate behavior. 
In June, he informed College of Engineering staff members that the Dean had lied under oath in 
proceedings related to a lawsuit filed by Dr. Sadid. He then distributed to the entire College of 
Engineering faculty cartoons on the subject. (Ex. 3, pp. 12-15) He also engaged in unauthorized 
purchases in violation of University procedures, which he had twice previously been warned against. 
(Ex. 6, pp. 15-25) His response was to have his lawyers accuse the University of retaliating against 
him for attempting to enforce its purchasing policies. (Ex. 6. p 17) 
On August 4,2009, the ISU president accepted the recommendation of the dean and placed 
Dr. Sadid on administrative leave with pay. (Ex. 5,p. 2) Pursuant to University policy, Dr. Sadid was 
given a hearing in front of a panel of faculty members, which was authorized to give a nonbinding 
advisory opinion to the president. That hearing was held over several days in October. The panel 
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advised against termination. The president declined to accept the recommendation of the faculty 
panel, and terminated Dr. Sadid on November 8,2009. 
Dr. Sadid filed for unemployment benefits. The University submitted a response to his claim 
for benefits. (Ex. 7) By decision dated December 3,2009, the Department of Labor determined that 
Dr. Sadid was ineligible for benefits. (Ex. 8) The department held. on the basis of the 
documentation and written statement provided by ISU, that Dr. Sadid violated the University's 
policies and was terminated for good cause. Dr. Sadid requested an appeal hearing, not disputing the 
facts regarding his behavior, but, rather, asserting that the real reason he was fired was retaliation for 
his exercise of his right to freedom of speech. (Ex. 9, p.2) 
On December 18,2009, Sixth District Judge David Nye granted summary judgment in favor 
of Idaho State University and the other defendants in the lawsuit filed by Dr. Sadid in September 
2008. The court's opinion, a copy of which is attached, and of which the Industrial Commission is 
entitled to take judicial notice (Rule of Procedure 9.20), dismissed Dr. Sadid's claim that his rights to 
free speech were violated. The court found that it was necessary to determine whether the comments 
for which Dr. Sadid claimed he suffered retaliation were protected speech, or merely the kind of 
disruptive or insubordinate speech for which an employee may be punished or terminated. The court 
held that there are five questions a court must answer before it could find a valid First Amendment 
retaliation claim, citing Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009). The five questions are: 
1. 
2. 
') 
J. 
4. 
Whether the plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern; 
Whether the plaintiff spoke as a private citizen or a public employee; 
Whether the plaintiffs protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the 
adverse employment action; 
Whether the state had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently 
from other members of the general public; and 
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5. Whether the state would have taken the adverse employment action even absent the 
protected speech. 
Dr. Sadid claimed in his lawsuit against ISU that he was retaliated against for a series of 
public statements and newspaper articles in opposition to various plans of the previous 
administration. The Sixth District Court considered his factual allegations and held that, as a matter 
of law, the issues in question were not matters of public concern, but rather matters of internal 
administrative dispute. Having answered the first question in the negative, the court likewise 
answered the second question in the negative, holding that Dr. Sadid, in making these public 
pronouncements, presented himself not as a private citizen but as an ISU employee. There is no First 
Amendment protection for University employees speaking on matters of purely internal interest. 
Finally, the court determined that there was no evidence that Dr. Sadid's speech, even if it were 
protected, was a motivating factor in the employment decision. The court did not find it necessary to 
answer questions 4 and 5. 
Accordingly, it has already been determined in a court of law that Dr. Sadid had no "right" to 
make the statements for which he claims he has suffered retaliation. and that it was not a cause for 
the adverse employment actions, including his termination. 
On December 22, 2009, the Department Of Labor mailed out a notice of the appeals hearing 
scheduled for January 4. As Idaho State University was closed from December 23 until January 4, 
ISU did not receive notice of the hearing in time to participate. 
At the hearing, consistent with his notice of appeal, Dr. Sadid did not challenge the facts 
which ISU contends were cause for his termination. He asserted that the letters of reprimand and 
other complaints about his behavior were simply an attempt by ISU to lay a paper trail to cover lSU's 
retaliation against him. (Recorded hearing at approximately 22:00) In responding to the allegations 
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of disruptive and insubordinate behavior, Dr. Sadid generally acknowledged that it had occurred - he 
merely justified his behavior on various grounds, while continuing to assert that the real reason for 
his termination was retaliation for his protected speech. Essentially the only testimony directly 
addressing whether cause for termination existed came at the very end of his testimony, when the 
appeals examiner asked Dr. Sadid if he had done anything to warrant termination. Dr. Sadid 
answered, "no." (Recorded hearing at approximately 23 :45) 
The appeals examiner held in favor of Dr. Sadid on the grounds that all of the documents 
submitted by ISU were "hearsay," which could not support a factual finding, while Dr. Sadid's 
uncontroverted oral testimony, that he did not do anything to warrant termination, was sufficient to 
justifY a finding in his favor. 
ISU's request for a rehearing was denied. ISU filed a claim for review before the Industrial 
Commission and requested an evidentiary hearing, which was denied. 
LA W AND ARGUMENT 
The appeals examiner's decision was wrong for the following reasons: 
1. The documentary evidence submitted by ISU is not hearsay. 
2. The documentary evidence was sufficient to establish cause for tem1ination. 
3. Dr. Sadid did not challenge or deny the facts on the basis of which ISU asserted cause. 
4. Dr. Sadid claimed that lSD's cause was a sham to hide a constitutional violation, but this 
claim has already been dismissed by the Sixth District Court in Dr. Sadid's lawsuit 
against ISU. 
5. Accordingly, the evidence in the record is more than sufficient to establish cause for 
termination. 
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1. Documentary Evidence Submitted by ISU is Not Hearsay. 
The appeals examiner disregarded all of the documentary evidence submitted by ISU 
(Exhibits 1 through 7) on the grounds that it was "hearsay" and, as hearsay, could not support 
findings of fact. This is a clear error of law: documentary evidence is not necessarily hearsay. 
Furthermore, the appeals examiner misstated the law when she said that hearsay could not support a 
finding of fact. The case she cites, Application o.fCitizens Utilities Co., 82 Idaho 208,214 (1960), 
does indeed hold that an agency's findings "must be supported by substantial and competent 
evidence .... It cannot make a finding based upon hearsay." In context, the Court was saying that 
findings may not be based on hearsay alone, and, in fact, the cases cited by the Supreme Court in 
Citizens Utilities say exactly that: Carroll v. KnicMrbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435,440,113 NE 
507,509 (NY 1916); Williapoint Oysters v. Ewing. 174 F.2d 676, 691 (9th Cir. 1949); Can. Ed. Co. of 
NY v. NL.R. B., 305 U.S. 197,217,59 S.Ct. 206, 230 (1938). Indeed, all of these cases clearly state 
that hearsay documentary testimony is admissible into evidence in administrative proceedings ifit is 
corroborated by non-hearsay testimony. 
The documents submitted by ISU are not hearsay under a number of exceptions to the hearsay 
rule. First, a large number of the documents contained in Exhibits 1 through 7 are letters, reports and 
emails written by Dr. Sadid. Admissions by party opponents and prior statements by witnesses are 
excluded from the definition of hearsay. Idaho Rule Of Evidence 801 (d). Accordingly, all of those 
documents among the exhibits which were authored by Dr. Sadid are not hearsay. 
Second, the rules of evidence contain a number of exceptions to the hearsay rule, and thus the 
position of ISU is supported by competent evidence. First, a large number of the documents 
contained in Exhibits 1 through 7 are letters, reports and emails written by Dr. Sadid. Admissions by 
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party opponents and prior statements by witnesses are excluded from the definition of hearsay. Idaho 
Rules of Evidence 80 1 (d). Accordingly, all of those documents among the exhibits which were 
authored by Dr. Sadid are not hearsay_ 
Second, the rules of evidence contain a number of exceptions to the hearsay rule. These 
include an exception for public records and reports. (I.R.E. 803(8)) Many of the documents ignored 
by the appeals examiner were official statements of ISU, a public agency, made pursuant to its 
obligations under the governing regulations. These include: 
Exhibit 3, page 2; 
Exhibit 4, page 7; 
Exhibit 5, page 2, which is the official notice to Dr. Sadid that he was placed on an 
administrative leave; 
Exhibit 5, page 15, which is the official memorandum from the dean of engineering 
recommending Dr. Sadid's termination, and listing the grounds for cause; 
Exhibit 5, page 22, the official notice of contemplated termination given to Dr. Sadid on May 
6, 2009, which lists grounds for cause: 
Exhibit 6, page 2 and attachments, which is official correspondence from ISU to the South 
Dakota School of Mines apologizing for Dr. Sadid's personal attacks on the president of that school, 
a former ISU administrator, which Dr. Sadid circulated widely by email to faculty and media in 
South Dakota; 
Exhibit 6, pages 15 to 25, which is documentation regarding Dr. Sadid's repeated violations 
of University purchasing rules. 
All of these documents are excepted from the hearsay rule as public records and reports, and 
can be accepted by the Industrial Commission for such weight as they carry. 
2. The evidence establishes cause for termination. 
The evidence in the record establishes conclusively that Dr. Sadid was terminated for cause. 
First, there is no dispute that, for official purposes, the termination was "for cause." A tenured 
professor cannot be terminated except for cause, and there is simply no dispute that the documents in 
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the record accurately state the causes relied on by ISU during its internal proceedings and in the 
initial hearing before the Department of Labor (See Exhibit 7). 
Further, substantial and competent evidence exists in the record that Dr. Sadid was 
discharged for the causes stated by ISU in the record. The stated reasons are set forth in detail in the 
Notice of Contemplated Action of May 6,2009 (Exhibit 5, page 22), and the Recommendation of 
Dismissal of August 3, 2009 (Exhibit 5, page 15). There is no reason to go through them in detail in 
this brief other than to say that these documents recite a long history of unprofessional, disruptive 
and insubordinate behavior by Dr. Sadid. There is overwhelming evidence of this unprofessional 
behavior in Dr. Sadid's own writings and emails which are part of the record, and which constitute 
admissions by Dr. Sadid. Thus, to whatever extent that ISU's official documents might be 
considered merely hearsay evidence of Dr. Sadid's unprofessional behavior, they are corroborated by 
Dr. Sadid's admissions in his own documents and are therefore substantial and competent evidence. 
See Williapoint Oysters v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 691 (9 th Cir. 1949). A few examples: 
o Exhibit 3, page 10: Dr. Sadid's emails accusing the Dean of unethical behavior 
because Dr. Sadid disagreed with an entry in the draft minutes of a faculty meeting. 
o Exhibit 3, page 12: his email distributing cartoons regarding perjury after accusing 
the Dean of lying under oath. 
o Exhibit 3, page 18: accusation that various administration officials have engaged in 
"misuse of authority, misjudgment ... cronyism, empire building ... " 
o Exhibit 3, page 26: an email from a colleague of Dr. Sadid's to the new Provost of 
ISU apologizing for Dr. Sadid's embarrassing and "over-the-top offensive behavior" 
at a College meeting, 
EMPLOYER'S BRIEF ON CLAIM FOR REVIEW - Page 8 
o Exhibit 4, page 4: Dr. Sadid's letter to the Provost responding to a letter of 
reprimand, in which he attempts unconvincingly to justify his unprofessional 
behavior. For instance, his explanation ofthe minutes controversy is that the minutes 
he reviewed were not marked "Draft," as if a 22-year veteran of faculty meetings 
would be unaware that meeting minutes are always draft until reviewed and approved 
at the subsequent meeting. 
o Exhibit 4, page 30: In Dr. Sadid's response to his April 15,2009 letter of reprimand 
from Dean Jacobsen, he acknowledges that the incident complained of occurred and 
goes on to repeat his accusations of "colTuption and wrong-doings of a group of 
officials at Idaho State University. The individuals have been misusing their power, 
wasting taxpayer money, and creating an oppressive atmosphere here a campus in the 
United States of America." 
o Exhibit 6, page 4: Dr. Sadid's email to faculty members at the South Dakota School 
of Mines and to members of the media in Rapid City, S.D., accusing the school's new 
president of unethical, unprofessional and inappropriate behavior, for which ISU's 
Vice President for Academic Programming had to apologize. (See Exhibit 6, page 2) 
o Exhibit 6, page 12: An email Dr. Sadid sent to students in 2006 complaining 
inappropriately about a colleague and the then-Dean of the College, and accusing 
them publicly of unethical behavior. 
o Exhibit 6, page 17: The response by Dr. Sadid's lavy"yers to his letter of reprimand for 
violating University purchasing procedures. The letter fails to acknowledge that the 
University has any right to require that Dr. Sadid follow its purchasing rules. 
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This evidence, consisting of prior statements and admissions by the claimant, provides ample 
corroboration of a history of unprofessional, disruptive and insubordinate behavior, and is therefore 
substantial and competent evidence of termination for cause. 
3. Dr. Sadid Does Not Deny the Facts on Which Cause is Based. 
The Commission should note that neither in his request for an appeal (Exhibit 9, page 2) nor 
in his testimony did Dr. Sadid deny the facts of the various incidents which formed ISU's cause for 
termination. Rather, Dr. Sadid has always asserted that ISU's real reason for his termination was 
retaliation for his exercise of his First Amendment rights. Dr. Sadid does not deny that he has a long 
history of publicly accusing administrators and colleagues of unethical or criminal behavior without 
substantiation. He does not deny that he has repeatedly disrupted meetings with complaints about 
matters and appropriately handled elsewhere. He does not deny that he violated purchasing and other 
school policies and rules repeatedly after being warned not to do so. 
Accordingly, the Commission should find that the facts which form the basis for ISU's stated 
grounds for termination are established. There is significant evidence in the record, in the form of 
ISO's documents corroborated by Dr. Sadid's own documents, and Dr. Sadid has never denied the the 
underlying facts. The Commission should further find that the disruptive, unprofessional and 
insubordinate behavior shown by the evidence is adequate grounds for termination. 
4. Dr. Sadid's Claim that He was Dismissed in Retaliation for Exercise of Constitutional 
Rights Has Been Held Groundless. 
Dr. Sadid filed suit against Idaho State university and several employees in September 2008, 
alleging that the uni versity of retaliating against him for his exercise of his First Amendment rights. 
In October 2009, he filed an amended complaint which added allegations that his ten11ination, which 
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was then pending but was not complete, was also retaliation for exercise of his first amendment 
rights. 
On December 18, 2009, the sixth district court granted summary judgment in favor ofISU 
and its employees. The court specifically held that Dr. Sadid had no claim for retaliation because the 
statements for which ISU allegedly retaliated were not a protected exercise of his First Amendment 
rights. The court also held that there was no evidence that Dr. Sadid's speech was a motivating 
factor in his termination. 
According to rule 9.20 Of the Rules of Practice and Procedure adopted by the Commission, 
the Commission may take notice of official documents and decisions, such as court decisions. 
Dr. Sadid's sole basis for claiming that he was not terminated for cause was that his 
termination was unlawful retaliation for his protected speech. That basis has been expressly rejected 
by a court of law of the state of Idaho, in litigation between the employer and the claimant. The 
commission should not issue a determination that is contrary to a finding made by a competent forum 
after a complete opportunity for both parties to discover and present facts and arguments. 
5. The evidence in the record is more than sufficient to establish termination for cause. 
The Commission must deny benefits if there is substantial and competent evidence in the 
record to support a concl usion that the employee was terminated for cause. The documents provided 
by ISU conclusively demonstrate that ISU terminated Dr. Sadid for cause after following all of the 
procedures required for terminating a tenured professor for cause. Those documents establish 
without dispute what the claimed cause was and that it was adequate under these rules. The evidence 
of Dr. Sadid's own letters and emails corroborates ISU's evidence and proves that the complained-of 
incidents in fact occurred. 
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Dr. Sadid does not even attempt to deny his behavior; rather, he complains that his long 
history of unprofessional and disruptive behavior is really insignificant, contrary to the findings of 
the ISU administration, and that the true motivation for ISU's action was retaliation for a newspaper 
article he wrote years ago. Ludicrous on its face, this claim has been dismissed by a court in a case 
brought by Dr. Sadid, on the grounds that it has no basis in law or in fact. Neither in court nor in his 
appeals hearing did Dr. Sadid offer any evidence to support a conclusion that his termination was a 
result of anything other than his own unprofessional, disruptive and insubordinate behavior. 
The Commission should hold that the evidence in the record shows the claimant was 
terminated for cause. 
CONCLUSION 
Idaho State university respectfully requests that the Commission overturn the decision of the 
appeals examiner below. 
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IN THE DISTRIT COURT OF THE SIXTIf JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
~~\J 
'.' t --.. ..... _. ~ ...... , .. ,~_ 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIlE COUNTY OF BANNOCKr{;Tl~mr~-
HABm SADID, an individual, 
Plain~ 
v. 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, ROBERT 
WHARTON, JAY KUNZE, MICHAEL 
JAY LINEBERRY, MANOOCHEHR 
ZOGID, RICHARD JACOBSEN, GARY 
OLSON, AUTHUR- V AILAS and 
JOHN/JANE DOES I through X, whose 
true identities are presently unknown, 
Defendants. 
. Case No. CV-2008~3942~OC 
DECISION ON MOTION FOR 
Su:M1-v1ARY JUDGMENT 
This matter came before this Court for hearing on Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on November 2, 2009. The Plaintiff was represented by Sam 
Johnson. The Defendants were represented by John Bailey. Stephanie Morse was the 
court reporter. The Court reviewed the documents submitted by the parties, heard oral 
argument from counsel, and took the matter under advisement. Now, the Court issues its 
decision granting the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL mSTORY 
The Plaintiff, Habib Sadid, was an associate professor in the Department of Civil 
Engineering at Idaho State University ("ISV~). He began working for the University in 
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1991. In 1993, Sadid was given full tenure and he became an associate professor. In 
1999, he became a fun professor at ISD. 
In 2001, Sadid published a letter to ISU faculty and administrators. The letter 
criticized the ISU administration for its plan to merge the College of Technology with the 
College of Engineering. The administration eventually decided not to follow through 
with the merger for 2001 and the plan did not arise again until 2003. 
In 2003~ Sadid spoke to the Idaho State Jownal about the merger again. Sadid 
argues that the plan was designed in secret, which is deceptive to the community and to 
ISU faculty and staff. Some of Sadid's comments were published in the paper and some 
were published internally by lSD. Sadid contends that ISU retaliated against him for the 
comments made in 2001 and 2003. 
Sadid claims that some of the acts of retaliation are that ISU rod not perfoon its 
faculty evaluations of him from 2001 to 2006. Sadid alleges that m,ore acts of retaliation 
came in 2006 when he was not appointed as the chair of the College of Engi.neering and 
in 2008 when Michael Lineberry wrote an e-mail which referred to Sadid as a "nut case." 
Sadid claimed that the Lineberry statement defamed him and that it is part of the 
retaliation agai.nst him. Sadid claims that the 2006 retaliation led to an economic loss 
suffered by Sadid in the amount of $35,000 per year. On August 24, 2006~ Sadid was 
offered an opportunity to apply for the chair position, however~ he declined. The position 
was eventually given to a candidate outside of lSU. Additionally, Sadid alleges that ISU 
has further retaliated against him by increasing his salary at the lowest percentage. 
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On September 29, 2008, Sadid filed a non~verified Complaint against ISU and 
Lineberry that contains three counts: (1) violation of constitutional rights under 42 
U.S.C. §1983; (2) Breach of Employment Contract and the implied Covenant of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing; and (3) Defamation of Character. The Prayer for Relief seeks 
monetary damages, costs, and attorney fees. On August 27, 2009, Sadid filed a Motion to 
Amend Complaint and attached a proposed amended complaint to the motion. The 
motion states that it is based upon the grounds that Sadid needed to identify and include 
additional Defendants and needed to include additional factual allegations based upon 
discovery ensued to date. TIle Motion to Amend Complaint was set for hearing on 
October 5, 2009. The Defendants~ ISU and Lineberry, filed a motion for summary 
judgment based on the original Com.plaint and set it for oral argument on October 13, 
2009. In response to the motion for sUnlmary judgment, Sadid filed a motion for 
additional time under Rule 56(f), which the Court granted. The Court also granted the 
. motion to amend complaint and on October 15, 2009, Sadid filed his First Amended 
Complaint, which added six more defendants: Robert Wharton; Jay Kunze; Manoochehr 
Zoghi; Richard Jacobsen, Gary Olson; and Authur Vailas. I The amended complaint also 
added new factual allegations but retained the same three counts: (1) count one - claim 
under §1983; (2) count two - breach of employment contact and implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing; and (3) count three - defamation. Additionally, the Prayer 
I Nothing in the record suggests that the added defendants were properly served with the 
Amended Complaint. However; Defendants' Reply Memorandum rez Defendants; Motion for 
Summary Judgment states that it is filed on behalf of all defendants. Therefore, it appears that 
the added defendants have at least voluntarily appeared in this matter. 
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for Relief in the amended complaint still sought monetary damages, costs, and attorney 
fees. However, it also sought injunctive relief ordering ISU to instate Sadid as Chair of 
the College of Civil Engineering. No other relief is sought. 
After allowing Sadid the additional time he requested pursuant to IRCP 56(f), oral 
argument on Defendants' motion for summary judgment occurred on November 2,2009. 
The Court deems the summary judgment ,motion to be agaulst the Amended Complaint 
and against all defendants. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Rule 56( c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allows that summary judgment 
"shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions and admissions 011 file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Smith v. Meridian 
Joint School Dist. No.2, 128 Idaho 714, 718, 918 P.2d 583, 587 (1996) (quoting LRCP. 
56(c)); see ,also Idaho Building Contractors Association v. City of CoeW' d~lene, 126 
Idaho 740,890 P.2d 326 (1995); Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745) 890 P.2d 331 (1995). 
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at 
all times with the party moving for summary judgment. Pinholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 
894, 896-97, 155 P.3d 695,697"98 (2007). Generally, the record is to be construed in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, with all reasonable 
inferences dra'Wll in that party's favor. Id. If reasonable persons could reach different 
conclusions or inferences from the evidence, the motion must be denied. Id. However, 
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the nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of 
m.aterial fact exists to withstand summary judgment, TIle nonmoving party's case must 
be anchored in something more than speculation, and a mere scintilla of evidence is not 
enough to create a genuine issue of fact. Jd.; Tuttle v. Sudenga industries, Inc., 125 Idaho 
145,868 P.2d 473 (1994). 
Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of the moving party, when the 
nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's 
case upon which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. 
Agency. Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530-31! 887 P.2d l034~ 1037~38 (1994); Badell v. Beeks, 
115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126 (1988». The party opposing the summary judgment 
motion "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but 
the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.!! Id. (quoting IDAHO R. elV. 
P. 56(e); Nelson v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409, 797 P.2d 117 (1990». If the nonmoving party 
does not come forward as provided in the rule, then summary judgment should be entered 
against that party. State v, Shama Resources Ltd Partnership, 127 Idaho 267, 270, 899 
P.2d 977,980 (1995). 
DISCUSSION 
On or ahout September 14, 2007, Sadid filed a fonnal complaint with tbe Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC~') and claimed ISU discriminated against 
him for his national origin and/or religion and also retaliated against bim since 2001.. 
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Sadid asserts that claim was filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. He 
acknowledges that he received a "right to sue~' letter from the EEOC and he was 
infonned that he must file a Title VII civil action for illegal discrhninatiOll within 90 days 
of receiving the letter. Sadid admits he abandoned any claim under Title VII and is now 
pursuing the claims under § 1983 and he claims that the only time barring for filing 
Section 1983 claim is the statute of limitation as discussed below. Therefore~ this matter 
does not concern Title VII but concerns 42 U.S.C. § 1983, breach of contract Iaw~ and the 
Idaho Tort Claims Act The Court will first address the § 1983 Claim. 
1. Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim 
Sadid claims that the Defendants have violated his right to freedom of speech 
under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1 Sections 9 and 
10 of the Idaho Constitution along with his property rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1 Section 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution. Sadid seeks relief for these alleged violations under Title 42 Section 1983 
of the United States Code. 
Sadid alleges that in his capacity as a faculty member and full professor of ISD, he 
has~ from time to time, openly and publicly expressed his views regarding matters of 
public concern relating to ISU and its standing in the academic and local community. 
See, First Amended Complain,. pg. 5, para. 13. Sadid further specifically identifies two 
separate incidences in which he claims he exercised his protected right to free speech. 
First, he alleges that in 2001 he published a letter to his fellow faculty members and to 
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ISU administrators criticizing ISU's decision to merge the College of Technology with 
the College of Engineering. Id" at para. 14. Secon.d, Sadid alleges that in 2003, he 
publically spoke out against ISU's renewed plan, designed in sect.:et, to merge the two 
colleges and that some ofms comments were published in the Idaho State Journal while 
other of his comments were published intemally at ISU. [d., at para. 15. Sadid claims 
that the University retaliated against him for the expression of protected speech. 
There are five questions the court must answer to determine whether under § 1983 
there is a valid First Amendment retaliation claim. Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1070 
(9th Cir. 2009). The questions are: 
1. whether the plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern; 
2. whether the plaintiff spoke as a private citizen or public employee; 
3. whether the plaintifP s protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in 
the adverse employment action; 
4. whether the state had an adequate justification for treating the employee 
differently from other members of the general public; and 
5. whether the state would have taken the adverse employment action even absent the 
protected speech. 
ld. If the plaintiff did not speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern then the 
plaintiff does not have a First Amendment cause of action based on his employer's 
reaction to the speech. Brewster v. Bd Of Educ., 149 F.3d 971. (9th Cir. 1991). The 
plaintiff has the burden of proof on the first three tests. That is, Plaintiff has the burden 
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of showing that: (1) lithe speech addressed an issue of public concern"; (2) "the speech 
was spoken in tbe capacity of a private citizen and not a public employee"; and (3) lithe 
state took adverse employment action" and the speech "was a substantial or motivating 
factor in the adverse action. II Jacobson v. Schwarzenegger, --- F .Supp.2d ----, 2009 WL 
2633762 (C.D.Cal. 2009). Only if plaintiff passes these three tests does the burden shift 
to the defendants to show that the government's interests outweigh the pla.intiffs First 
Amendment rights, or that it would have taken the same action even in the absence of the 
protected conduct. Id 
1. Matter of Public Concern. A public employee's speech is protected under the 
First Amendment only if it falls within the core of First Amendment protection .. ~speech 
on matters of public concern. Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agr., --~ u.s. ----, 128 S.Ct. 
2146,2152, 170 LEd.2d 975 (2008); Connick v. Myers~ 461 U.S. 138, 1.46-47; 103 S.Ct. 
1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 108 (1983). The Supreme Court has made Clear that public employees 
do not surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason of their employment Rather~ 
the First Amendment protects a public employee's right, in certain circumstances, to 
speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 
410, 41.7, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006); see Connick~ 461 U.S. at 143, 103 
S.Ct. 1684; Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 173 t 20 L.Ed.2d 811 
(1968). 
The question of whether the matter was a public concern is a question of law. 
Ben]! v. Dept. of Soc. Sen-'s., 447 F 3d 642~ 648 (9th Cir. 2006). If the speech in question 
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does not address a matter of public concern then it is unprotected. Eng at 1071. 'When 
the speech is a political, social or other concern to the community, then it is a matter of 
public concern. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 128, 103 S.Ct 1684 (1983), Alternatively, 
if the speech deals with '(individual personnel disputes and grievances~' and it is not 
related to the "relevance to the pubJic's evaluation of the performance of governmental 
agencies" then it is not a matter of public concern. McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705, F.2d 
1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983). Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public 
concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as 
revealed by the whole record. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-148. The plaintiff bears the 
burden of showing the court that the speech is a matter of public concern. Eng citing 
Connick. 
Sadid claims that he was speaking of a matter of a public concern. In two of the 
letters (Exhibit A, ","ritten February 9, 2003 and March 9, 2003) the Court infers that 
Sadid is arguing that tills is a. matter of public concern because it is an issue of interest to 
the tax paying public. However, "[tJo presume that all matters which transpire within a 
government office are of public concern would mean virtually every remark and certainly 
every criticism directed at a public official would plant the seed of a constitutional case." 
Connick at 149, 103 S.Ct. 1684. Thel'efore, to simply claim that all matters relating to 
lSU's plans of department mergers are matters of pub lie concern is overly broad. 
The Defendant directed the Court to a case that is similar to this one, Hong v. 
Grant, 516 F.Supp.2d 1158 (C.D. Cal. 2007). In Hong, the defendant (among several 
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others named) was Grant, who was the Chair of the Department of Chemical Engineering 
and Materials Sciel1ce at the University of California-Irvine. The plaintiff was Hong, 
who was an engineering professor at the unjversjty. He made several critical statements 
about the hiring and promotion of other professors. He claimed his First Amendment 
rights were violated when the university retaliated against Iris statements by denying him 
a salary increase. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which the district court 
granted in their favor. 
The dismct court analyzed whether Hong's statemellts were matters of public 
concern and concluded that they were not by stating: ~IWhile Hong argues that his 
statements are of public concern because they exposed government waste and 
mismanagement, they are more properly characterized as internal administrative disputes 
which have little or no relevance to the community as a whole." ld. at 1169, The court 
followed the rule set out in Connick that a statement by an employee is not the public's 
concern if it "cannot fairly be considered as relating to any matter of political, social or 
other concern to the community." Hong at 1169 quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, 103 
S.Ct. 1684. 
TIle Hong Court also related its decision to a 7th Circuit case, Colburn v. Trustees 
of Indiana University, 973 F.2d 581 (7tJ1 Cir. 1992). In Colburn, two professors claimed 
that they were denied tenure and a promotion because the university retaliated against 
their claimed protected speech. In the letters that the professors wrote they claimed that 
the "integrity of the University was being threatened." Id. at 586. The court held that 
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even though the public would have appreciated the knowledge of the alleged wrongdoing 
of the departmen~ it noted that simply because the matter would be interesting to the 
public does not make it a matter of public concern. Id. As a result~ the court granted the 
defenda.nt's motion for summary judgment against the two professors. 
After reviewing the a.rgument of Sadid, the case law, and the entire content, form 
and context of his letters, the Court disagrees with Sadid's claim that this was a matter of 
public concern. The Court finds that the letters contain nothing more than personal 
grievances against ISU regarding matters that relate directly to Sadid's interest in his' 
employment. The content and opinions may in fact be interesting to the public; however, 
the value of interest alone does not make the matter a public concern. Furthermore, 
simply because it involves a matter that may have occurred behind close governmental 
doors does not make it a public concern. Sadid's statements go more to matters of an 
internal administrative dispute than a matter of public COnCelTI. Here, Sadid has failed to 
show that the statements made were a public concern. He cannot pass the 1 at test under 
Eng. As a result~ Sadid does not have a valid First Amendment claim for protected 
speech. 
2. Spealcing as a Public Employee or Private Citizen. When a person enters the 
government employee workforce, by llecessity~ he must accept certain limitations on his 
freedom, Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.s. 661, 671, 114 S.Ct. 1878 (1994). Government 
employers need a significant degree of control over their employees' words and actions, 
much like private employers do. Connick at 143, 103 S.Ct. at 1684. If the government 
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employer did not have control "there would be little chance for the efficient provision of 
public services." [d. 
To this end, the Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion 
and control over the management of its personnel and internal affairs. This 
includes the prerogative to remove employees whose conduct hinders 
efficjent operation and to do so with dispatch. Prolonged retention of a 
disruptive or otherwise unsatisfactory employee can adversely affect 
discipline and morale in the work place, foster disharmony, and ultimately 
impair the efficiency of an office or agency, 
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168,94 S.Ct. 1633, 1651, (1974). Also, governmental 
employees "often occupy trusted positions in society" and therefore, when they speak out 
in public "they can express views that contravene governmental policies or impair the 
proper performance of governmental functions." Id. 
Sadid asserts that he was speaking as a private citizen when he wrote the articles 
for the newspaper.2 He argues that because his job description does not mention anything 
to the fact of a duty to write newspaper articles that critique the ISU administration is 
evidence that he was speaking as a citizen. The Court disagrees with Sadid's argument. 
Whether his job description requires him to write articles is not the detennining factor of 
him being in the role of a citizen or a public employee. After reviewing Sadid's letters 
that were published, the Court finds that the tone of the letters is that of an employee of 
lSU. Additionally, Sadid should understand that he has limitations of his speech that he 
accepted '\-vhen becoming a state employee. Furthennore, Sadid continuously argues in 
his brief and even in the published article itself that he was speaking as a private citizen, 
2 This at'guttlent is directly contrary to his assertion in the Amended Complaint that he spoke in 
"his capacity as a Faculty Member and Full Professor of ISU". 
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yet in both of the published articles he identifies himself as an ISU employee. Therefore, 
due to the tone and language of the letter the Court finds that Sadid was speaking as an 
employee and not as a private citizen,. As a result, Sadid has also failed to meet the 2nd 
test under Eng. 
3. Whether the Protected Speech waJ a Substantial or Motivating Factor in 
ISU's Action. As found in the discussion above, the Court fInds in favor of the 
Defendants on this issue for two reasons: 1) the letters "'Titten by Sadid were not 
protected speech and 2) nothing in the evidence provided by the Plaintiff proves that ISU 
had any motivation for not hiring Sadid as the Chair. In fact, the Court finds that there is 
nothing in the record to suggest that Sadid even applied for the position of Chair. 
Without such an application, Sadid could have no reasonable expectation that he would 
be hired for the position. Sadid has failed to meet the 3rd test under Eng. 
In light ofllie foregoing analysis, Sadid's First Amendment claim fails each of the 
first three questions under the Eng test and the Court fInds that there is not a valid First 
Amendment claim. Therefore~ Defendants are granted summary judgment on Count One. 
II. Breach of Contract and Implied Warranty 
Sadid alleges, in Count Two of his Amended Complaint~ that ISU breached his 
employment contract and breached the implied warranty of good faith and fair dealing 
associated with that contract. Specifically, Sadid alleges that ISU and its employees 
failed to perform annual evaluations of Sadid for the years 2001 through 2006 and that 
this failure constitutes a breach of ISU policy and his employment contract. Defendants 
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allege, in their motion for summary judgment, that they are entitled to summary judgment 
on Count Two because the contract claim is time barred, plaintiff has failed to establish a 
breach, plaintiff has failed to establish any damages, and because he failed to fonow the 
grievances procedures set forth in the Faculty Handbook. 
In response to defendants' summary judgment motion as to Count Two, Sadid 
argues that breaches occurring in 2003 through 2006 are not barred by the five year 
statute of limitatiol1s and breaches occurring in 2001 and 2002 are not time balTed 
because they are "captured" by the continuing violation doctrine. Additionally~ Sadid 
argues that he did file a grievance under the Fa.culty Handbook and that it was denied. 
1. Whether The Contract Claim Is Time Barred. An action for a written 
contract must be brought within five years. Ie. § 5-216. The statutory time period does 
not begin to run until a cause of action has accrued. Saddlehom Ranch Landowner's, 
Inc. v. Dyer, 146 Idaho 747~ 750, 203 P.3d 677, 680 (2009); citin.g Simon.s v. Simons, 134 
Idaho 824; 830, 11 P.3d 20, 26 (2000). Sadid is claiming that ISU had a contractual 
obligation to perfonn annual evaluations and ISU breached the contract because from 
2001 until 2006 ISU did not complete his an11ual evaluations. 
Sadid argues that because the Complaint was filed on September 29, 2008, the 
five year statute of limitations allows the Court to look back to September 29,2003, for 
any alleged breach of contract. Sadid further argues that the "continuing violatioll'1 
doctrine applies to his breach of contract claim and would allow hhn to attach the 2001 
and 2002 alleged breaches. Sadid did not provide any law that supports the argument that 
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the "continuing violation" doctrine applies to contract actions as opposed to § 1983 
actions or state tort actions. The Court did not find any law that states that the doctrine 
relates to claims of breach of contract, similar to this situation. 
In the absence of any case law on this issue~ this Court finds that each incidence -
each time an evaluation was not performed - constitutes a separate breach and not an 
ongoing breach. To find othelWise would effectively render the limitation period for any 
cause of action alleging failure to perform meaningless when the perfonnance is to be 
done on a regular basis. The purpose of a statute of limitations is to bar stale claims and 
avoid problems of proof arising from stale memories. Accepting Sadid's continuing 
violation theory on a breach of contract claim would hinder and fiustrate the ultimate aim 
of limitations periods. The breach of contract claim does not involve an ongoing breach 
but multiple separate breaches. Therefore, the statute of limitations bars any alleged 
breach occurring more than five years prior to the filing of the Complaint. Sadid cannot 
purse a breach of contract claim for any event-occurring prior to September 29,2003. 
2. Whether Plaintiff Has Shown a Breach of Contract. Sadid claims that tbe 
failure of ISU to do the evaluations caused him damages because he did not receive an 
annual salary increase or the Chair position. Sadid directs the Court to section (B)(1) of 
the ISU Handbook, which states: 
Each year the chair of a department must submit to the Dean of the Chair's 
college an evaluation of each faculty member in that department. .. the 
evaluation, together with the opinion of higher administrators, will be used 
as one (1) basis for the final recommendation relative to reappointment, 
nonreappointment~ acquisition or tenure~ or as other personnel action, 
whichever is appropriate. 
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FACULTY/STAFF HANDBOOK, Part 4, Section IV, (B)(I). The Defendants argue th.at 
(B)(7) actually app1ies~ which states: 
It is the policy of the Board that at intervals not to exceed five (5) years 
following the award of tenure to faculty members, the performance of 
tenured faculty must be reviewed by members of the department or unit and 
the department chairperson or unit head. The review must be conducted in 
terms of the tenured faculty member's continuing performance in the 
following general categoties: (a) teaching effectiveness, (b) research or 
creative activities, (c) professional related services, (d) other assigned 
responsibilities, and (e) overall contributions to the department. 
FACULTY/STAFF HANDBOOK, Part 4. Section IV, (B)(7). Overall, after reviewing the 
T.SU faculty handbook provisions that counsel has provided, the Court does not agree with 
Sadid.'s argument of a breach of contract by ISU by failure to conduct an annual 
evaluation of Sadid. The Court recognizes that Defendant Kunze acknowledged that he 
had a re..r;;ponsibility to conduct faculty evaluations and that he did not complete the 
performance evaluation process with Sadid on an annual basis. Kunze's Deposition, 
Exhibit A to the Affidavit a/Counsel, p. 46, Ll. J 1-22; p. 49, LI. 9-14; p. 56; LI. 1-10)' p. 
62, Ll. 2-22. However, Sadid received his tenure in 1993, and according to the ISU 
Faculty Handbook, annual evaluations of a tenured professor are not required. What 
matters in this ca.se is whether Sadid received an evaluation every 5 years after receiving 
tenure. For the five year period immediately preceding the filing of the Complaint Sadid 
. testified that he did not receive an evaluation in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006. See .. 
Affidavit of Plaintiff in Opposition to Defenndants I Alotion for Summary Judgment, para. 
5. There is nothing in the record relating to 2007 or 2008. If Sadid received an 
CV-2008-3942-0C 
DECISION ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Page 16 of 25 
12/18/2009 17:35 208235 JUDGE NYE PAGE 17 
evaluation in either of these years, his breach of contract claim fails. Sadid, as plaintiff, 
carries the burden of proof on the issue of breach of contract. His failure to provide any 
evidence that ISU failed to evaluate him at any time during the five years immediately 
preceding the filing of his Complaint warrants summary judgment against him on the 
breach of contract claim. 
Alternatively, the Court does not need to determine whether or not the evaluations 
were completed at least every five years for a tenured professor because Sadid did not 
provide any evidence that shows he had a contract for a yearly salary increase. 
Additiollally~ at the hearing for this motion, Sadid did not rebut the Defendant's claim 
that he could not receive the Chair position simply because he did not apply for the 
position. Sadid's contract does not guarantee annual evaluations, yearly salary increases, 
or the Chair position. He has not shown any injury from the alleged breach of contract. 
The Court grants Defendants summary judgment on Count Two of the Amended 
Complaintp th.e breach of contract claim, on the grounds that the statute of limitations has 
terminated any claim for breach occurring prior to September 29, 2003, and that the 
Plaintiff has not shown that ISU failed to evaluate him at any time within the five years 
immediately preceding the filing of the Complaint. Alternatively, Sadid has not shown a 
contractual requirement that in which the parties agreed to assign Sadid the Chair 
position, a yearly salary increase, or an annual evaluation. ISU did not breach the 
contract. Defendants are granted sUinmary judgment on Count Two. 
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'ill. The Defamation Claim 
Sadid alleges, in Count Three of his Amended Complaint, that Lineberry and ISU 
defamed him. This is a tort claim under state law. Specifically, Sadid alleges that 
Lineben-y sent an e-mail on the ISU email system on August 1, 2008, and it addressed 
matters regarding the operation of the College of Engineering. Also in the e ... mail was a 
statement about Sadid that refelTed to him as a "nut case." Sadid aUeges that the contents 
of the email were defamatory to his character and that the e-mail constituted retaliation. 
Lineberry and ISU moved for summary judgment on Count Three on the grounds that 
Sadid failed to file a Notice of Tort Claim prior to commencing litigation, that defendants 
are entitled to immunity under I.C. § 6-904(3)~ and that no defamation OCCUlTed. 
In response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Count Three, 
Sadid argues that his Notice of Tort Claim was timely filed because it was filed before 
the filing of the Amended Complaint, that Lineberry was not acting within his official 
capacity at ISU when he made the "nut~case" statement, and that Lineberry acted with 
malice such that the immunity under I.C. § 6-904(3) does not apply. 
1. Whether the Plaintiff's Defamation Claim is Barred by the Idaho Tort 
Claim Act. Sadid filed his original Complaint on September 29~ 2008. He served the 
Complaint and Summons on ISU and Lineberry on October 15, 2008. See, Affidavit of 
Service signed by Eric Hansen and filed on October 31, 2008, and Affuiavit of Service 
signed by Jamie Hansen andfiled on October 31, 2008. Two copies ofthe Summons and 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial were served on the Attorney General 011 October 6, 
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2008. See, Affidavit of Service signed by Tri-County Process Serving and filed on 
October J 5, 2008. Defendants ISU and Lineberry filed a Motion to Dismiss on 
November 26, 2008, alleging that Plajntiffhad not properly served the Secretary of State 
as required by the ITeA. On December 3, 2008, Plaintiff served the Summons, 
Complaint and Notice of Tort Claim on the Secretary of State. See, Affidavit of Service 
signed by Tri-County Process Serving and filed on December 8, 2008 . .3 Sadid filed his 
Amended Complaint on October 15, 2009. It alleges that "A written Notice of Tort 
Claim has been flled in compliance with the Idaho Tort Claims Act, with the Secretary of 
State for the State of Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code § 6~905 and § 6-907." See paragraph 
32 qfthe Amended Complaint. 
Lineberry's e-mail that Sadid claims is defamatory was sent in August 2008. 
"Whether his defamation claim is barred is an issue that ':'can be decided as a matter of law 
via the notice requirement of the Idaho Tort Claims act." McQuillen v. City of Ammon, 
113 Idaho 719, 722, 747 P.2d 741, 744 (1987). 
Idaho Code § 6·905 reads: 
All claims against the state arising under the provisions of this act and all 
claims against an employee of the state for any act or omission of the 
employee within the course or scope of his employment shall be presented 
to and filed with the secretary of state within one hundred eighty (180) days 
from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered, 
whichever is later. 
3 Th.e Notice of Tort Claim is ·not in the Court's file. However, the Affidavit of Plaintiff in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment states that" A written Notice of Tort 
Claim has been filed in compliance with the Idaho Tort Claims Act, with the Secretary of State 
for the State ofIdaho pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-905 and, § 6-907:' See paragraph 20 of the 
Affidavit; 
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I.C. §6-905. The statutory period begins to run at the occurrence of the wrongful act 
even if th.e full extent of damage is unknown. McQuillen, 113 Idaho, at 722. 
''Knowledge of facts which would put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry is the 
equivalent to knowledge of the wrongful act and will stalt the running of the 120-day 
period." Id. The IrCA states that the claim must be "presented and filed within the time 
limits." I.C. § 6-908. The State or its employee has 90 days to resp011d to the claim. 
I.e. § 6~909. If the claim is denied~ the claimant may institute an action in the district 
court. I.C. § 6-910. Compliance with the Idaho Tort Claims Act's notice requirement is 
a mandatory condition precedent to bringing suit, the failure of which is fatal to a claim, 
no matter how legitimate.t' McQuillen (citing Overman v. Klein.~ 103 Idaho 795, 654 P.2d 
888 (1982); I.e. § 6-908), The notice requirement is in addition to the applicable statute 
of limitations. Jd. 
In the original Complahlt filed on September 29, 2008, the Plaintiff did not allege 
the he had filed a written notice in compliance "with the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The 
Plaintiff argues that this was remedied by his Amended Complaint filed on October 15, 
2009, which does note the filing of the notice with the Secretary of State. Plaintiffs First 
Amended Complaint And Demand For Jury Trial, p. 9. However~ the Plaintiffs 
argument is misleading, whether the Amended Complaint corrects the problem is 
irrelevant. The focus should be that the Plaintiff filed suit before he filed the notice with 
the Secretary of State, "vWch is a mandatory condition precedent to bringing the suit 
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In Euclid Ave. Trwt v. City of Bozse, 146 Idaho 306~ 193 P.3d 853 (2008), Euclid 
filed a Complaint, Petition for Judicial Review and Request for Jury Trial on December 
12, 2005. The pleading sought judicial review of the City's actions~ a declaration that an 
emergency ordinance was invali~ mandatory relief and civil damages. A few days after 
the complaint was filed, Euclid filed a tort claim. Euclid filed an amended complaint in 
January, adding a due process claim. The City filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for 
summary judgment. The trial court granted the City summary judgment and Euclid 
appealed. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that the trial court had granted 
summary judgment to the City on Euclid's claim under the ITCA because Euclid did not 
comply with the notice requirements of the ITCA. The Supreme Court affinned the 
summary judgment without any discussion of whether the amended complaint cured the 
failure to file the notice before filing suit 
Plaintiff, in effect, asks the Court to ignore the filing of the original camp laint and 
to look only to the filing of the amended complaint to detennine if notice was timely 
given. However, plaintiff also argues that for purposes of deciding the statute of 
limitations issues, the filing of the amel1ded complaint relates back to the date of filing of 
the original complaint. These are inconsistent positions. A plaintiff cannot "cure" a 
failure to give proper notice prior to filing suit by giving such notice after filing suit. To 
do so defeats the purpose of the notice requirement. SOOid's original Complaint alleged a 
claim for defamation. This claim clearly falls under the ambit of the ITCA. ISU and 
Lineben-y had the right to receive a notice of this claim before litigation began. ISU and 
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Lineberry had the right to have 90 days to decide whether to accept or reject the claim 
before litigation began. Those rights, granted under the ITCA~ were denied when Sadid 
served the notice of tort claim with the complaint on the Secretary of State. By then, the 
complaint for defamation had been filed and the purposes for the notice requirement 
frustrated. 
The purposes of the notice of claim requirement under the rrCA are to: (1) save 
needless expense and litigation by providing opportunity for amicable resolution of 
differences among parties, (2) allow authorities to conduct a full investigation into the 
cause of the injury in order to determine the extent of the state's liability, if any, and (3) 
allow the state to prepare defenses. Driggers v. Grafe, --- PJd ~---, 2009 WL 4067998 
(Ct App. 2009). Therefore~ using its discretion, the, Court finds that the alleged 
defamation claim is batted by the Idaho Tort Claim Act as to any claim against ISU or 
against Lineberry alleging he acted within the scope of his official capacity at ISU.4 
In reaching this conclusion~ the court is aware of Madsen v. Idaho Dept. of Health 
and Welfare, 114 Idaho 624, 759 P.2d 915 (Ct. App. 1988)~ in which the Court of 
Appeals suggested that a plaintiff could dismiss his complaint without prejudice, serve 
his notice under tbe ITCA, and then file a new complaint - if the time period for serving 
notice had not yet expired. However, Sadid did not dismiss his Complaint but merely 
filed an Amended Complaint, thus frustrating the purposes of the notice requirement. 
Sadid even filed a Notice of Intent to Take Default prior to the flling of the Amended 
4 These are the only two defendants against whom. the defamation claim is assf:llted. 
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Complaint and within 90 days of the time he claims the notice of tort claim was served on 
the Secretary of State. Obviously, Sadid had 110 intent to stay litigation while the State 
investigated his claim or the other purposes of the notice requirement were met. 
2. Whether Immunity Applies. Defendants argue that even if the defamation 
action is not barred by the notice requirements of the ITCA, they have immunity under 
LC. § 6-904(3). That statute states: 
A government entity and its employees while acting within the 
course and scope of their employment and without malice or 
criminal intent shall not be liable for any claim which: 
3. Arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment; false 
arres~ malicious prosecution~ abuse of process, libel, slander~ 
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights. 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint asserts that Lineberry acted with malice when he sent the 
e~mai1. Sadid further argues in opposition to summary judgment that Lineberry did not 
act within his course and scope of employment when he sent the e-mail. I.C. § 6-903(a) 
states that the State is only liable for '\vtongful acts of its employees if they were acting 
'\vithin the course and scope of employment. Therefore, Sadid cannot bring this 
defamation action against lSD. Lineberry, on the other hand., cannot claim the immunity 
afforded by I.e. § 6-904(3) for conduct failing outside the scope of his employment and 
done with malice. 
3. Whether Defamation Occurred. If the comments do not harm the reputation 
of the plaintiff in the community or deter third parties from associating with him then 
they are not defttmatory comments, even if they are derogatory. Ru.benstein v. University 
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of Wisconsin Ed. Of Regents, 422 F.Supp. 61, 64 (B.D. Wis. 1976). Additionally, if 
comments are not made to the general community then the community cannot "lower its 
estimation" of the plaintiff. [d. In Rubenstein, the plaintiff fIled a claim of defamation 
for the defendant~s comment of "old biddy" referring to the plaintiff, along with an 
additional opinion that the plaintiff was not suitable for the promotion at issue and also 
commenting that the plaintiff was ':just out i'O make trouble.'~ Id. The court dismissed the 
plaintiffs defamation claims because the remarks did .uot harm her reputation. Id. 
The issue of defamation in this case is much like that of Rubenstein. Sadid claims 
that the comments made by Linebeny were defamatory and resulted in him not getting 
the Chair position. The e~mai1 was not sent to the general public and therefore it could 
not affect his reputation in the community or deter any third parties from associating with 
him. Furthermore, Sadid has failed to provide any evidence that any opinion of Sadid 
was affected by the email. Therefore~ the Court finds that even though the e-mail's 
language is derogatory, the term ''nut case" is not defamatory because Sadid's reputation 
was not affected. Lineberry is entitled to his opinion. 
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Count Three. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on each count in the Amended 
Complaint. Both parties raised issues not addressed in this decision; however, those 
issues were not addressed because the above issues are dispositive. Defendants are 
hereby granted summary judgment in this matter. Defense counsel is instl'Ucted to submit 
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a proposed final judgment. Plaintiff's counsel will have three days to file any objection 
to the proposed judgment. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: December 18,2009. 
<::::~ 
DAVID C. NYE 
District Judge 
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FACTS 
It is apparent that Claimant's claim for unemployment benefits and the 
Employer's response follows a long and contentious dispute over the reasons behind 
Claimant's termination of employment. The Employer alleges that Claimant's conduct in 
the workplace was "Unprofessional, disruptive and non-collegial" which support' 
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adequate cause' for termination under Idaho State University ("ISU") policy (Exhibit 7). 
Claimant, in tum, maintains that the ostensible grounds for termination are mere pretext, 
and that the true reason for discharge stems from Claimant's criticism of ISU 
administrators, much of which was published in the local newspaper (Exhibit D). 
The Employer has taken great pain and considerable liberty with its rendition of 
the facts to convince this tribunal that Claimant committed misconduct as contemplated 
by Idaho Code § 72-1366 (5). However, the facts upon which this tribunal must decide 
are limited. The Commissioners must conduct a de novo review of the record here 
which consist of the documents admitted during the proceeding below and the testimony 
of Dr. Sadid at the January 5th hearing. 
Given the state of this record, the Commission is not in a position to determine 
whether Claimant was rightfully or wrongfully terminated. The only determination that 
can be made by this tribunal is whether the Employer has met its burden or proof, on this 
record, that Claimant committed some form of misconduct. The Employer cannot meet 
its burden of proof because it had not offered substantial and competent evidence 
supporting its case. The documents presented by the Employer (Exhibits 3-7) are 
hearsay and hearsay evidence, standing alone, is not sufficient to support fmdings of fact 
(Application of Citizen's Utilities Company, 82 Idaho 208,213,351, P. 2d 
487,492 (1960)). On the other hand, the positive, uncontradicted testimony of a credible 
witness must be accepted as true even if the witness is an interested party. Thus the 
Claimant's sworn testimony must be given greater weight and consideration over 
allegations of misconduct contained in the documents. Here the Claimant not only 
testified that the alleged claims of misconduct were false, but that the numerous 
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documents submitted corroborate his position. 
For example, the Employer cites many alleged transgressions committed over a 
lengthy period of time up to and including certain events in April of 2009 and thereafter 
(Exhibit 3-7), culminating in Dean Jacobsen's recommendation for dismissal (Exhibit 5, 
pp 15-20). What the Employer did not reveal, however, is the fact that all of these 
transgressions were the subject of a Faculty Appeal Board grievance hearing. This 
hearing transpired over several days with numerous witnesses sworn under oath and 
cross-examine; a recording of this hearing has been provided as Exhibit 10, F. This 
grievance process culminated in a decision dated October 23, 2009, whereby four of the 
five Board members l found insufficient evidence to justify tennination. Not only did the 
Faculty Appeal Board find inadequate cause for tennination, but opined "In view of the 
gravity of the recommended action, the majority found the absence of required 
documentation disturbing" (Exhibit 9, A). Moreover, there is nothing in the record that 
explains or justifies the President's decision to overturn the recommendation of the 
Faculty Appeal Board. Therefore, even if the Commissioners were inclined to give 
credence to the documentary evidence here, there is nothing in this record to undetmine 
the findings of the Faculty Appeal Board. Consequently, the Employer's proof of 
misconduct is wholly lacking particularly in the face of Claimant's uncontradicted sworn 
testimony. 
THE CIVIL LITIGATION 
The Employer places import on the civil proceedings before Judge Nye 
(EMPLOYER'S BRIEF, p.3, 4). Judge Nye has granted ISU's Motion for Summary 
1 The lone dissenting member was appointed by the Provost 
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Judgment and has found that Claimants alleged 'protected speech' in his pending civil 
lawsuit against ISU is not protected. However, the Employer neglected to advise the 
Commission that this is not a fmal decision. 2 The question as the whether Claimant 
engaged in 'protected speech' is and will remain highly contested. An example of this 
speech can be found in the record (Exhibit 10, D) where an article dated November 10, 
2008, posits the question: "Are President Vailas' Policies Damaging ISU"? A review of 
this article may shed light on why this claim is so hotly contested; but whether Claimant 
engaged in 'protected speech' and retaliated for it is not within purview of this tribtmal 
and is better left to the civil court to decide. Moreover, the 'protected speech' inquiry 
does not address the issue of misconduct as the two are separate and distinct. Even if the 
speech reviewed by Judge Nye is ultimately deemed unprotected, it may still explain why 
President Vailas countermanded the Faculty Appeal Board decision and the Board's 
concern over a "disturbing" termination process (Exhibit 9, B). The fact that Claimant's 
speech may not be protected does not, in any way, prove misconduct. 
THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE 
Having no substantial or competent evidence to reply upon, the Employer makes 
claim that its documents are not hearsay. The Claimant concedes that the documents 
authored by him may be excepted by the hearsay rule, however, these documents support 
Claimant's position (Exhibit 4. pp 4-6, 29-31; pp 12, 13 and 10 C, G, H, I). 
The Employer represents that its documents authored by its agents are admissible 
under the public record and reports exception to the hearsay rule (LR.E. 803 (8)). This 
assertion is disingenuous. These self-serving documents were not records or reports 
setting forth 'regularly conducted and regularly recorded activities'. Their veracity and 
2 A decision on Plaintiff's (Claimant's) Motion for Reconsideration is pending. 
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trustworthiness is challenged, highlighting, precisely, the reason for the hearsay rule. 
The only document that could fall within this exception would be the Faculty Appeal 
Board findings as they followed from an investigation pursuant to authority granted 
by law, ISU policy (Exhibit 5, pp 11-13). 
Likewise, in no way do lSD's one-sided documents establish termination for 
cause. The documents as a whole establish nothing except that the parties strongly 
disagree as to why Claimant was terminated a matter better left to the civil court for 
resolution. Suffice it to say that lSD's leitmotif, its sweeping claim that these documents 
"recite a long history of unprofessional, disruptive and insubordinate behavior" 
(EMPLOYER'S BRIEF, P.8) flies directly in the face of Claimant's last three 
performance evaluations (Exhibit 10, C (2006, 2007); Exhibitl0, E (2008)). The 
documents thoroughly impeach lSD's justification for termination. 
DR. SADID'S DENIAL OF MISCOi'-JTIDCT 
As if existing in a parallel universe, the Employer suggests that Claimant didn't 
deny, and therefore admits, misconduct. The appeal hearing held January 5th speaks for 
itself. Claimant clearly stated that he committed no misconduct. Claimant also testified 
and outlined the course of history with ISD including his lengthy and distinguished 
service (Exhibit 10, C, attachment 6 (CV)). Claimant testified that all of the nonsense 
leveled against rum culminated in a grievance hearing where ISU threw everything at him 
ad nauseam including new charges that surfaced during the hearing (Exhibit 10, F). It is 
not necessary to do so, but Claimant invites the Commissioners to listen to this hearing 
for it reflects Claimant's denial of any wrongdoing and provides insight as to why the 
Faculty Appeals Board found that the tennination process was not only without merit but 
CLAIMANT'S BRIEF P.5 
disturbing. 
CONCLUSION 
As the Commission may well sunnise, this dispute goes far beyond eligibility for 
unemployment benefits. The narrow focus here, however, is easily resolved. The 
Employer has not offered substantial and competent evidence supporting its case and, 
therefore, cannot meet its burden of proof. The proof evidence by the Employer consists 
of self-serving documents and uncorroborated hearsay. Claimant, on the hand, testified; 
he denied doing anything that would constitute misconduct, corroborated his own 
documents filed in response to the numerous accusation brought against him and 
explained the context from which this dispute arose- a context which surely raise 
concerns over ISU's good faith. 
But Claimant's testimony does not stand alone. Claimant's peers reviewed all the 
alleged transgressions in detail and found a disturbing termination process lacking in 
merit. In short, the Employer's effort to justify a denial of employment benefits rings 
hollow - full of hyberbole, silliness and zeal. The true significance of the Employer's 
position here is that it shows, again, the arrogance and conceit with which it destroyed the 
career of one of its most accomplished professors. This is but one chapter in a long story 
that is far from over. 
Dated this 23rd day of February, 2010 
CLAIMANT'S BRIEF P.6 
John C. Lynn 
Attorney for Claimant 
o~ 
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Q'Enclosed please find Employer's Reply Brief on Claim for Review for filing in the above~ 
captioned matter. 
Thank you for your assistance and if you have any questions, please give me a call. 
~ 
JO~ A. BAILEY. JR. 
JAB~riic 
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JUDICIAL DIVISION, IDOL APPEALS 
HABIB.,SADID~ 
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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. 
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IDOL Docket No. 1777-2010 
EMPLOYER'S REPLY BRIEF ON 
CLAIM FOR REVIEW 
F f L E 
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Comes now. the Employer, Idaho State University, by and through its counsel of record, and 
submits the following reply brjefin response to the Claimant's brief in the above captioned case. 
1. ",The Commission May Considel' All of the Documents on Record 
A~ discussed in the Employer's Brief on Claim for Review, the Appeals Officer in this case 
erroneously held that all documentary evidence is hearsay, which is insufficient to support findings 
I,; 
EMPLO,Y£Jl'S ru;PLY BRIEF ON CLAIM FOR REVIEW • Pag~ 1 
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of fact. ·In.o~r previous brief, we demonstrated her error; documents authored by the claimant are not 
. . i 
hearsay. official documents and records ofISU are not hearsay for these purposes. And even hearsay 
\ 
documents arc sufficient to support a finding of fact if they are corrobora.ted by non~hearsay 
evidence/such as the letters and cmails authored by the Claimant. Viewed in light of the correct 
underst~ding of law, the evidence in the record is more than sufficient to establish cause for 
tennination. 
The documents submitted by ISU conclusively establish that the Dean of Engineering, Dr. 
ruchartf·Jacobseo, began proceedings to terminate Dr. Sadid's employment for cause; namely, a 
long history of unprofessional and disruptive behavior that was deemed to be detrimental to the 
H;I\ , ., 
Col1ege of Engineering. Numerous examples of that behavior are noted in the documents and 
testified to in the recording of the faculty semlte hearing which Dr. Sadid submitted as Exhibit 10 F. 
The official records submitted by ISU are excluded from the hearsay rule pursuant to the business 
records ex.ception. They are direct evidence that the reason given by ISU at the time of the 
r,! , 
tcnnination was cause, namely, the particular behavior of Dr. Sadid recited in those documents. 
In ~ther words, the evidence is undisputed that ISU cited cause as the reason for Dr. Sadid's 
termination. There is no contention that the reason given at the time was retaliation or some other 
reason other than cause. The questions before the Industrial Commission are whether this cause 
cited is suflicient, and whether the stated cause is merely a pretext tor unlawful retaliation, as alleged 
by Dr~"'S'adid. 
Wppe the official records of 18U are non~hearsay evidence of the reasons for termination, the 
Claimant argues they should be considered hearsay for purposes of determining whether that 
behavior actually occurred. Even if that were correct hearsay for that purpose, they arc richly 
EMPLOYER'S llEPLY BRIEF ON CI..A.Il\l FOR REVIEW· PaJe 1 
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I' 
corroborated by the letters and emaiisauthoredbyDr.Sadid.whicharcnothearsay.This 
Commission may consider hearsay evidence that is corroborated by non-hearsay evidence. Carroll v. 
Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435,440. 113 NE 507,509 (NY 1916); Williapoint Oyslers v. 
Ewing, 174 f.2d 676, 691 (9th Cir. 1949); ConEd. Co. ojN.Y. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197,217,59 
S.Ct. 206. 230 (1938). 
z. TIle Doc~mentary Evidente establishes Suffictent Cause for Termination. 
At page four of his briet: the cl~\imant concedes that the documents authored by him are not 
\: 
hearsay. He argues, however~ that they support his position. A review ofthe~e documents shows 
precisely the opposite. For instance, Dr. Sadid cites Exhibit 4, pages 4 to 6, as documents that 
suppoIt'his position. ISU submits that his letter is a perfect example of the lmprofessional and 
disruptive behavior that led to his termination. This letter is Dr. Sadid's response to a letter of 
'1';, 
reprimand from his department chair (Ex. 4, p. 7) for Dr. Sadid's statements about the Dean of 
Engineering in a widely disseminated e-mail (Ex. 4. p.9). The email shows that Dr. Sadid became 
upset, Gf claimed to be upsel, when he reviewed the dral1 minutes of a faculty meeting. He accused 
the dean of having changed the minutes to reflect badly on Dr. Sadid. As anyone who has ever 
attended a committee meeting knows, minutes arc a)ways draft until they are approved at a 
,1\"'", j 
subsequent meeting. Dr. Sadid, however, assumed foul play. Rather than merely asking for a 
correctjon of the Pattieular item. he launched into an unnecessary tirade in an e-mail to an 
administrative assistant which he copied to all members of the engineering facuHY: 
I never said the faculty shotlld be consulted about decisions at all levels. Yes, I did express 
. my dissatisfaction with Dr. Jacobson's perfonnance. Dr. Jacobson has done nothing for the 
I~I I I. ' , .. " ,; , ' 
College in three years except, hiding behind three chairs who do not know what they are 
doing and a spokesman who has been defending him for some time. Dr. Jacobson ignores 
the faculty, has no focus on the college issues, manipUlation [sic] faculty all the time and 
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creates friction among faculty. The faculty in the I College of Engineering] do agree with 
what I a~ saying. 1 truly believe that Dr. Jacobson and his three chairs should step down 
immediately, if we want the college to move forward and be prepared for ABET .... 
'Priscilla; was someone else involved in writing the minu~es? I would like to know who was 
involved (if any) in preparation ofthe minutes. 
(Ex. 4, p. 9) When he was mildly reprimanded by the chair of his department for this unprofessional 
behavior (See letter by Dr. Zoghi, Ex. 4, p.7). Dr. Sadid responded with additional invective in a 
letter t(l~he TSU Provost, Dr. Gary Olson. (Ex. 4, ppA-6) He makes the disingenuous argument that 
he did not know they were a draft ofthe minutes, and that he was not "accusatory." He then goes on: 
Have I q'llestioned the dean's honesty? Yes, I cannot trust this man based on many untrue 
statements he has made to me. The majority of the faculty would support my claim. The 
\\dean's behavior has been reported to the administration long ago through his job 
performance evaluations by the engineering faculty_However. the administration has 
'"ignored taculty complaints. This has forced some people to take the case to the public; which 
pays our salaries. 
'.' My su~picions that Dr. Jacobsen intentionally changed the minutes of the March 11 faculty 
'"~ 
meeting stems from my previous knowledge of what had happened to the minutes of 
[College of Engineering] chairs' meetings. Apparently, the minutes taken in some chairs' 
i'meetings do hal accurately describe the discussions that took place during the meetings-
Important discussions are sometimes eliminated from the minutes. Some raculty members 
" .will attest to these claims. 
... My distrust of Dr. Jacobsen is nol new. I am not alone in this distrust, and it has been 
. reporte~ to the upper administration many times tl"U'ough several channels. Unfortunately, 
, the administration has not responded to these complaints. JSU is a public institution; when 
the system does not respond to complaints, isn't it any citizen's obligation to report misuse of 
":"power and waste of money? 
Dr. Sadid cites the!ie documents to the Commission as evidence tending to prove that he was 
tel1l1inated in retaliation for his exercise of free speech. ISU submits to the contrary that these 
documents are examples of Dr. Sadid's unprofcss.ional and disnlptive behavior. He turned a 
q~stion about the wording of meeting lllinutes into an occasion for a public tirade against his dean, 
EMI'I.OYU'S REPLY BRlEF ON eLM'" FOR REVltW - Puat 4 
1'· I " <\ 
MAR-05-2010 FRI 04:05 PM LAW OFFICE FAX NO. 2 6109 P. 07/18 
and when reprimanded for it, he used his response for a further opportunity to accuse his superiors of 
dishonesty, 1raud, misuse of power, and waste of money. In most workplaces, sLlch insubordination 
as this \'IibuId be adequate grounds for tennination by itself. In the case of Dr. Sadid, this 
unprofc~sional outburst was merely one of many incidents. 
3. Dr. Sadid's Denial of Misconduct is Insufficient Evidence to Disprove cause. 
Clearly, Dr. Sadid does not recognize this behavior as misconduct of any kind. Apparently, he 
leels he is privileged to accuse any administrator who disagrees with him offraud and corruption. It 
was therefore to be expected that Dr. Sadid would testify to the appeals officer that he committed no 
misGonduct. That is his conclusion, but it is not evidence. Dr. Sadid made no effort to deny the 
behaviors shown in the documentary evidence, in particular as shown in his own writings. He goes 
;',k', , ' 
so far as to hold up this evidence of his own indviHty as proof of the bad behavior of his ~uperiors in 
the TSUAdministration. The evidence, th~reforc, is undisputed that Dr. Sadid engaged in the 
behaviors which ISU round to be unprofessional and disruptive. 
4. The Opinion of the Fac,dty Senate 15 Insuffident Evidence to Disprove cause. 
ISU submits that Dr. Sadid's behavior would be cause for tennination in any workplace. In Dr. 
Sadid'~'case. because he was a tenured member of the faculty ofISU, he was entitled to a hearing 
before ,a committee of the faculty senate. This committee was empowered to advise the university 
!C.b·', 'I,', 
president of its opinion whether there were sufficient grounds for termination of a tenured faculty 
member .. However. under the applicable rules, this opinion is advisory only. It should be noted by 
, . 
the Commission that the faculty committee made no findings about Dr. Sadid's behavior; it fOlmd 
that thF procedures followed by ISU were inadequate, in that it should have given Dr. Sadid more 
time 19 remediate his behavior. Thus, the committee did not make a finding that Dr. Sadid did not 
1,.".\(" r" i I." " _ ' 
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engage in misconduct, in fact, the clear conclusion !i.-om their decision is that his behavior was bad 
enough 'ktrequire remediation. Further. its one page advisory opinion to Dr. Vailas is not evidence 
thal his. tennination was not for cause. 
if.!J' 
S. Dr. Sadid Presented No Evidenc:e of Pretext or Retaliation. 
The evidence in the record, as discuS$ed above, establishes that Dr. Sadid engaged in behavior 
that ISlfconsidered tobe misconduct, and thatISU considered them to be cause for termination. Dr. 
Sadid ~Ueges that the cause cited by JSU is a pretext, and that ISU really tem1inated him in 
retaliation for his exercise of free speech. As discussed in our previolls brief, Dr. Sadid makes little 
effort to argue that the ~<cause" did not OCCUT. He simply argues that it was not the real reason for his 
tel111ina:tion. But. neither in his testimony to the appeals officer, nor in his documentary evidence, 
nor in hl,s eyidence to the faculty ~enate. nor in his evidence to the SiXlh District Court, did Dr. Sadid 
ever submit a single piece of proof that the real reason for his termination was retaliation over his 
i. 'I 
letters to the editor and editorials in the local newspaper. Although. Dr. Sadid states repeatedly that 
he beHaves it to be tme, he has never presented any evidence in support ofthat belief. 
, .. As we noted before, Dr. Sadid has pursued this claim in a lawsttit against ISU and several 
'(" " , ' 
coUeagues and superiors in the university. His claim was dismissed on summary judgment. We 
previously provided to the commission a copyofthe decision by Judge Nye dismissing Dr. Sadid's 
case. ", 
In his response briet~ the claimant dismisses Judge Nye's decision on the grOtmds that it is not 
I, . 
fina1~ as a decision on Dr. Sadid's motion for reconsideration was pending. However, Judge Nye 
, .,;1.'1' , . 
issued his decision denying the motion for reconsideration on February 24, the day before the 
c\a.imantfiledhis brief. A copy of Judge Nye's decision on motion for reconsideration is attached 
~MPLOYER'S REPLY BRIEF ON CLAIM I~OR REVIEW - Pnge Ii 
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tor the~ommission's consideration. 111e Cl)mmission nlay take notice of this decision, and 
consider it to be conclusive 011 this issue. 
6. eotaclusion. 
'J11, 
In summary> the evidence is undisputed that Dr. Sadid' s tennination was for cause. The evidence 
is undisputed that the misconduct ciled by ISU as cause for termination actually occurred. Dr. Sadid 
adm~ts.th~t the behavior occurred but attempts to claim that it does not amount to misconduct, and 
, t.;':{",'.. , 
further alleges that the "cause" stated by ISU is a pretext jor rctaJiatjon agains.1 him for a exercising 
his Ilrst amendment rights. He presents no evidence beyond his own opini<.m that his tennination 
was in ,t:utal iati on for his letters and editori€lls. The courts of Idaho have already dismissed his 
retaliation claim on the grounds that he has no evidence to support it. 
Thus, what is left before the Commission is to detemlinc whether the undisputed behavior of 
Dr. S'aChd as shown by the evidence in the record is sufficient misconduct to be considered adequate 
causefQ,rt~nnination. ISU respectfuHy submits that Dr. Sadid would have been fired fclTcause fnml 
any workplace in which he exhibited similar behaviors. 
For this reason, ISU respectfully requests that the Commission overturn the decision of the 
appealS'Jofficet at th~ Department of Labor granting unemployment benefits to the claimant. 
, "\, 
r-- ~~C\.... 
RESPEC1FULLY SUBMITTED this :> day of~lttMY, 2010. 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE. BUDGE 
& BAILEY. CHARTERED 
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Tracey,:K,. ~olfsen 
Deputy Attorney General 
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STATE OF IDAI-IO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
HABIB SADID, an individual. 
Plaintiff: 
v. 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, 
RQBI~,RTWHARTON, JAY KUNZE, 
MICHAEL JAY LINEBERRY, . 
MANOOCHEHR. ZOGHI, RICHARD 
JA'COBSEN, GARY OLSON, 
AUTHUR V AILAS and JOHN/JANE 
D~E$ I through X, whose true 
identities are presently unknown, 
Defendants. 
DECISION ON MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
This matter came before this Court for bearing on Plaintiffs Motion for 
Reconsideration on January 19, 2010. The Plaintiff was represented by Sam 
Johnson. The Defendants were represented by lohn Bailey. The Plaintiffs 
, 1\.'.,', 
Motion was filed in response to the Court's Decision on Motion for ~ummary 
.Jj'1 
Judgment dated December 18, 2009. The Court reviewed the documents 
submitted bytbe parties, heard oral argument from counsel, reviewed its Decision 
'. Oll.,~ummary ,udgment and due to the complexity of the case, the Court took the 
" i 
matter under advisement. Now, the Court issues its decision denying the 
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. 
CV-2008-3942-0C 
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DISCUSSION 
1. Whether the Court Applied the Proper Test. The Plaintiff asks the Court to 
apply Karr v. Bermeos%, 142 Idaho 444, 129 PJd 88 (2005) rather than Gareett! 
v.''Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425(2006) when analyzing protected speech. Plaintiff 
asserts that the Idaho Supreme Court in Karr uses the Pickering balancing test~ 
:which better applies to academic settings. See, Plaintiffs Memorandum On 
~ \ ~ 
Motion for Reconsideration; p. 4. It should be noted that Karr did not involve an 
a~~emic setting in that Maureen Karr was employed by the Idaho State Veterans 
Home as a registered nurse manager .. Karr wrote a letter to the Governor of Idaho 
a.s,~g him to address issues at the. Veterans Home. She was disciplined for 
writing the letter. Ultimately, Kerr was terminated from employment. She filed 
suit alleging that she was wrongfully tenninated. The District Court granted all 
defendantS sunllnary judgment on the basis that the letter was not protected speech 
under the First ft-mendment and th~re was no evidence linking ilie termination to 
.tn,e letter. The Supreme Court affumed the summary judgment. 
liIJ.'r> , I "" 
In light of Plaintiffs request; the Court has reviewed Karr, in which the 
Id.~o Supreme Court stated tile four part test for determining whether speech is 
c6nstitutionally protected as follows: 
First, the court must detennine whether the speech lUay be fairly 
characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern. 
If the speech' involves a matter of public concern, then the court must 
balance the employee's interest in commenting upon matters of 
public concern against the interest of the state, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it perfonns. ·Third, if 
C'V':'2008-3942'-OC 
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the balance favors the employee, then the employee must show that 
the protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the 
detrimental employment decision. Finally, if the employee meets 
this burden, then the employer is required to show by a 
preponderance of the evidenc~ that it would have reached the same 
decision even in the absence of protected speech. 
Frtdenstine v. Idaho Dept. of Admin., 133 Idaho 188, 194, 983 P.2d 
842, 848 (1999) (quoting Lockhart v. Staie, Dept. of Fish & Game, 
127 Idaho 546~ 552, 903 P.2d 135, 141 (Ct.App.l995)). "[T]he 
inquiry into the protective status of the speech is one of Jaw. not 
fact." Lubcke v. Boise City/Ada County Hous. Auth, '124 Idaho 450, 
466~ 860. P.2d 653, 668 (1993) (quoting Connick v_ Myers, 461 U.S. 
138, 148 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1691, 75 LEd.2d 708; 720 (1983»; 
see also Farnworth v. Femling, 125 Idaho 283, 286) 869 P.2d 1378, 
1382 (1994). The Court makes an independent judgment of whether 
the statement is of public concern taking into consideration the 
manner, tiple and place in which it was made. Lockhart, 127 Idaho at 
552, 903 P.2d at 141 (citing ConniCk, 461 U.S. at 152, 103 S,Ct. at 
1692-93, 75 L.Ed.2d at 723). 
"Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern 
must be; determined. by the content; form, and cOntext of a given 
statement, as revealed by the who'le record." ConniCk, 461 U.S. at 
147-48, 103 S.Ct. at 1690-91, 75 L.Ed .. 2d at 720-21. TIlis 
determination turns on the nature of the employee's speech-whether 
it concerns matters involving political, social or other concerns to the 
communitY. Gardner 1J. Evans~ 110 Idaho 925, 933, 719 P.2d 1185, 
1193 (1986) (citing Connick; 461 U.S. at 146. 103 S.Ct at 1689-90, 
75 L.Ed.2d at 719-20). A public employee still enjoys First 
'\ Amendment protection even if his or her views are expressed 
privately. Givhan v. W. Line Consolo Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-
16, 99 S.Ct. 693, 696, 58 L.Ed.2d 619, 624-25 (1979). However, 
K ' spe~ch focused on internal policy and personnel grievances does 
not implicate 1~le First Amendment. Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d 
1129. 1137 (9thCir.l992). (emphasis added) 
Karr v. Bermeosolo, 142 Idaho 444 (2005). 
", 
This Court is not 'convinced that the Karr test is the correct test to apply. 
J... 
Karr was decided by the Idaho Supreme Court on October 5,2005. Garcetti was 
CV-200B-3942-0C 
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decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2006. Although there is some discussion in 
Garcetti that "expression related to academic scholarship or classroom 
instruction" may be outside the Gareetti test, the Supreme Court expressly did not 
carve, out an academia exception. I This Court will not carve out such an 
e~ception" but ,,,ti111eave it to the appellate courts to address. Garcerti is more 
'),'1';", I ' , ' I, 
recent thall Karl' and this Court believes it is the test to be applied. 
Alternatively. even though the Plaintiff asserts Karr is the correct test to 
use'regardlng academics and protected speech, the results are the same. The Court 
still, must detennine whether the speech at issue may be characterized as public 
.sl'eeph. The Court delved into this discussion in its Decision on Motion for 
, M,,_, 
Summary Judgment. The result in the Court's Decision was that there was no 
matter of public concern because the statements Sadid made went to matters 
involvingintemal administrative disputes and relayed personal grievances. As 
such, Sadid does not pass the first prong of the Karr test and therefore no more 
fA,'>i ! ' n. , 'j- ;., 
analysis needs to be done under this test. 
Furthermore, the Court agrees with the Plaintiff in that 'Tt]he guarantees of 
th~ First Amendment 'share a common purpose of assuring freedom of 
ct)nununication ~m matters relating to the functioning of govenll11ent. ", McKinley 
v~ City of Eloy, 705 F.2d IllO, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575, 65 L. Ed. 2d 973, 100 S.Ct. 2814 
I Additionally, this Court perceives a distinction between speech in the classroom setting and speech in a 
newspaper. Even if there is an academia exceptioIl, this Court would not apply it to the facts of tllis case . 
. CV·2008 .. 3942.0C 
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(1980») (plaintiffs Memo In Supp. Of Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 5-6). 
However, the very case that Sadid asks this Court to review clearly states that 
"speech focused on internal policy and personnel grievances does not implicate 
the.,First Amendment." Karr (citing Hyland), This rule) when applied to the 
fio,dings from the Court's earlier decision, again results in the Court holding that 
'l);!I' .,.' , 
the Plaintiffs argument of protected speech does not rise to the level of 
implicating the First Amendment protections because it was personal and not 
public. 
2.' Multiple letters. Plc;tintiff argues that the Court focused on only two letters 
he wrote to the newspaper when the Court held that Plaintiffs speech was not 
protected speech. While the Court only referenced two letters in the recitation of 
fa~ts, the Court's holding was that all of the challenged speech was made by a 
public employee rather than a private citizen. Additionally, it is the Court's 
h~!4iDg ~at n~:>ne of the challenged speech was "a matter of public concern." 
" , 'j 
Instead~ the Court determined that all of the speech dealt with "individual personal 
,! Ii 
disputes and grievances," The Court's intent was to apply this holding to all of 
Professor Sadid's expressions of record. 
3 • ., l3.reach of Contract: Plaintiffs Argument of Failure to Complete 
Evaluations. Plaintiff asked the Court to reconsider the contract claim as he 
"',;" 
asserts that the Court committed error in reaching its conclusion that annual 
evaluaticms of a tenured professor are not required. Sadid's argument relies on 
C\i'!'2008 .. 3942 ... 0C 
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. , 
the "section of the Handbook favorable to Plaintiff which on its face compels the 
annual evaluation of 'each faculty member in that department.,.'" See, Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration. p, 7. Sadid asserts that 
the"annual evaluations cited in the handbook in section (B)(I) are a separate 
responsjbility to the periodic tenure evaluations that should be done every five 
years cited in (B)(7).2 After reconSidering and reviewing the file and arguments, 
th~'Court again fmds that the language of the handbook is clear and unambiguous 
andi,thererore it again applies (B)(7) as the relevant provision for the evaluation 
re~~itements o~ a tenured faculty. 
Furthermore, Plaintiff contends that he has not received a performance 
evaluation since 1999, and therefore when following the five year rule of (B)(7) 
the hext evaluation is due in 2004. Plaintiff asserts that 111e evaluations during that 
tim~. were not 90P1pleted.~ However, in Exhibit A, attached to Defendant's 
Memorandum in Opposition of Reconsideration, the copies of the evaluations 
show that evaluations were done for 2000 (signed by Sadid), 2003 (evaluation 
completed but not delivered to Sadid due to a "contentious situation"), 2005 (copy 
of evaluation sent to Sadid), 2006 (signed by Sadid) and 2007 (signed by Sadid). 
2 :sciili."Ofthe h~dbo~i, citations are found in the FACULTY ISTAFF HANDBOOK under Part 4. Section 
. IV. 
3 ~ jts Decision on Motion for SUlJ:!lllaJY Jlldgltlent" the Court fO'UJld mar the Statute of Limitations bars any 
alleg~r! bre~ occun'ing n+orc i:h.an five years prior to the filing of the Complaint. 'The Court reaffirms this 
fmding and therefore considers only tbose alleged breaches that took place after 2003. In Defendant's 
Exhibit A, attached to the Defendant'S memorandum in Opposition of Reconsideration, copies of the 
eval\l~o1l5 for JIilluar.Y 2006 - December 2006 and January 2007 - December 2007 are both signed and 
datad by the Plaintiff. this shows that evaluations were completed within a 5 year span from 2003 to 2008, 
and ultimately eliminates the breach of contract claim by the Plaintiff. 
C:V~~,908-394~·qC ' 
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The,efore, the Court ,finds that the. Plaintiffs contentions are misleading as 
evaluations were completed at least withIn five years of each other. The Court, 
"'A 
therefore, reiterates that there was no breach of contract by the Defendant and its 
deci~ion is affirrned. 
Redress of Grievances. The Decision on the Motion for Summary 
J\.l~~ellt issued by this Court was I'against the Amended Complaint and against 
all defendants." Decision, p. 4. The Court recognizes that Plaintiff filed this 
action on September 29.2008 and that he petitioned for redress of his grievances. 
rl~ Court also'recognizesthe Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants have continued 
to;,x:ctaliate agai.n,st him after the flling of this claim. That is One of the reasons he 
filed a Motion to Amend Complaint on August 27, 2009. The Decision on 
"t. ," " Ii'
Swnmary Judgment deals only with those allegations of retaliation that come 
~: i . 
before August 27.2009. 
CONCLUSION 
"The Court has reconsidered the issues raised by Plaintiff. Based upon the 
; ., ~" ' , • r ' " 
above discussion, the Court stands by its prior decision. Therefore, the Plaintiff s 
Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. 
1'1'18 SO ORDERED. 
, DATED: February 24,2010. ~-=:: 
District Judge 
.01 ,"/, 
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I HEREI),Y CERTIFY that on thetl2 day of February, 2010, I serve,d a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing documellt upon each of the following individuals in the 
manner indicated. 
Sam Johnson 
J oHhson &. Monteleone, LLP 
405 S. Eighth Street, Suite 250 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
,'j,. < • 
John A. Bailey 
Rabine, Oison; Nye, Budge & Bailey, Chtd. 
P.O. Box 1391 
PQcatello, Idaho 83204 
I • 4~ . , 
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Sam Johnson, ISB No.4 777 
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P. 
405 South Eighth Street, Ste. 250 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 331-2100 
Facsimile: (208) 947-2424 
sam@treasurevalleylawyers.com 
John C. Lynn, ISB No. 1548 
776 E. Riverside Drive, Ste. 200 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 685-2333 
Facsimile: (208) 429-1925 
Attorneys for Claimant 
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IfiDUS Tf1! A, L COMMISSION 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
JUDICIAL DIVISION, IDOL APPEALS 
HABIB SADID, 
SSN:  
Claimant, 
v. 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, 
Employer 
and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
DOCKET NUMBER: 1777-2010 
MOTION TO STRIKE EMPLOYER'S 
REPLY BRIEF ON CLAIM FOR 
REVIEW 
COMES NOW Claimant, by and through his attorney, Sam Johnson of the law 
firm of Johnson & Monteleone, L.L.P., and hereby moves to strike the "EMPLOYER'S 
REPLY BRIEF ON CLAIM FOR REVIEW", filed by counsel for the Employer, on or 
about March 5,2010. 
MOTION TO STRIKE EMPLOYER'S REPLY BRIEF ON CLAIM FOR REVIEW - 1 
THIS MOTION is made and based upon the grounds that Rule 5 of the Rules of 
Appellate Practice and Procedure Under the Idaho Employment Security Law expressly 
prohibits the filing of a reply brief. The Rule plainly states, "No reply brief shall be 
allowed." (Emphasis added). The Employer here should not be able to gain an unfair 
advantage in this proceeding by ignoring the governing rules of procedure and submitting 
a "reply brief' in flagrant violation thereof. The act of doing so here by the Employer is 
particularly egregious in light of the fact the reply brief contains an abundance of 
inaccurate information. 
WHEREFORE, Claimant respectfully asks that the "EMPLOYER'S REPLY 
BRIEF ON CLAIM FOR REVIEW" be immediately stricken from the record. 
DA TED: This ----'"'--_ day of March, 2010. 
Sam Jolmson I, 
Attorney for Clafmant 
MOTION TO STRIKE EMPLOYER'S REPLY BRIEF ON CLAIM FOR REVIEW - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING, DELIVERY, OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 
I CERTIFY that on March 10, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document to be: 
o mailed 
o hand delivered 
o CMIECF Electronic Filing it transmitted fax machine 
to: (208) 232-6109 
John A. Bailey, Jr. 
Racine Olson Nye Budge & Bailey, Chtd. 
201 E. Center 
P. O. Box 1391 
Pocatello,ID 83204-1391 
Sam\ hnson 1/ Atto~ey for Claimant 
MOTION TO STRIKE EMPLOYER'S REPLY BRIEF ON CLAIM FOR REVIEW - 3 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
HABIB SADID, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, 
Employer, 
and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
IDOL # 1777-2010 
FILE 
MAR 1 5 2010 
iNDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 15 day of March, 2010, a true and correct copy of Claimant's 
Attorney's Motion to Strike Employer's Reply Brief on Claim for Review, filed March 10, 
2010 was served by regular United States mail upon the following: 
JOHN A BAILEY JR 
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE & 
BAILYCHTRD 
PO BOX 1391 
POCATELLO 83204-1391 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
STATEHOUSE MAIL 
317WMAIN ST 
BOISE ID 83738 
mcs 
Cc: SAM JOHNSON 
405 SOUTH EIGHTH ST 
BOISE ID 83702 
JOHN C LYNN 
776 E RIVERSIDE DR 
EAGLE ID 83616 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
HABIB SADID, 
SSN: , 
Claimant, 
vs. 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, 
Employer, 
and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
IDOL # 1777-2010 
DECISION AND ORDER 
F LE D 
4 2010 
iNDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Appeal of a Decision granting Claimant unemployment insurance benefits and an Order 
denying Employer's request to reopen issued by an Idaho Department of Labor Appeals 
Examiner. AFFIRMED in part, and REVERSED in part. 
Employer, Idaho State University, appeals the Idaho Department of Labor's ("IDOL" or 
"Department") Decision finding Claimant eligible for benefits as well as IDOL's Order denying 
Employer's request to reopen the hearing. The Appeals Examiner found in her Decision that 
Employer discharged Claimant, but not for misconduct. Employer failed to appear for the 
hearing. On August 8, 2008, Employer submitted a request to re-open the hearing. The Appeals 
Examiner denied that request because Employer failed to provide sufficient facts to warrant re-
opening. Employer appeals the Order to Deny Re-Opening to the Commission. We will address 
both that Order and the Decision below. 
Employer also specifically requested a new hearing before the Commission, or in the 
alternative, to remand back to the Appeals Bureau. (Employer's Claim for Review, filed January 
19,2010; Employer's Reply to Memorandum in Opposition to Claim for Review, filed January 
29,2010). The Commission denied both requests, however the Commission granted the parties 
DECISION AND ORDER - 1 
parties the opportunity to file briefs regarding the matter. (Order Denying New Hearing and 
Setting Briefing Schedule, filed February 9, 2010). Both Employer and Claimant submitted 
briefs. (Employer's brief, filed February 22, 2010, Claimant's brief, filed February 25, 2010). 
Employer further submitted a reply brief, to which Claimant moved to strike. (Employer's reply 
brief, filed March 5, 2010, Claimant's Motion to Strike, filed March 10,2010). 
The undersigned Commissioners have conducted a de novo review of the record in 
accordance with Idaho Code § 72-1368(7). Super Grade, Inc. v. Idaho Depart. of Commerce and 
Labor, 144 Idaho 386, 390, 162 P.3d 765, 769 (2007). The Commission has relied on the audio 
recording of the hearing held before the Appeals Examiner on January 5, 2010, along with the 
Exhibits [1 through 10] admitted into the record during that proceeding. 
Employer's Brief 
According to the Commission's February 9, 2010, Order Setting Briefing Schedule, 
Employer's brief was due no later than February 19,2010. Employer's brief is date stamped as 
"filed" with the Commission on February 22, 2010. Therefore, whether Employer timely filed 
its brief with the Commission pursuant to the Rules of Appellate Practice and Procedure under 
the Idaho Employment Security Law ("RAPP"), effective as amended March 1, 2009, is at issue. 
"Appeals before the Commission are governed by the Rules of Appellate Practice and 
Procedure Under the Idaho Employment Security Law." Vernon K. Smith v. Idaho Dept. of 
Labor, 148 Idaho 72, 218 P.3d 1133, 1135 (2009). Rule 2 of the RAPP defines "filing" as either 
personal delivery, mailing or faxing a document to the Commission. Rule 2(D) further provides 
that when faxing, the document must be received by 5:00 p.m. to be considered filed on that 
date. Documents filed thereafter are deemed filed on the next business day. According to the 
facsimile time stamp found on the top of Employer's brief, Employer faxed the brief at 5:35p.m. 
on Friday, February 19, 2010. (Employer's brief). Because Employer filed its brief after 5:00 
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p.m., it is deemed filed on Monday, February 22, 2010. Employer did not timely file its brief 
with the Commission. Employer's brief will not be considered in this decision. 
Motion to Strike 
Claimant moved to strike Employer's reply brief on the basis that the Commission's rules 
expressly forbids reply briefs. (Claimant's Motion to Strike). RAPP Rule 5(A) states in 
pertinent part that "No reply brief shall be allowed." Therefore, Claimant's Motion to Strike 
Employer's reply brief is GRANTED. Since the Commission's rules do not allow reply briefs, 
Employer's reply brief will not be considered. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission concurs with and adopts the Findings of Fact set forth in the Appeals 
Examiner's Order to Deny Re-Opening. The Commission sets forth additional findings of fact 
as follows: 
1. Claimant worked for Employer on two occasions. During his last period of 
employment, Claimant worked as a full professor from August 1991 until he 
was discharged on October 23, 2009. Claimant was suspended on August 4, 
2009 pending the University President's ruling on the recommended 
termination notice. 
2. Claimant had a history of voicing concerns via emails and at faculty meetings. 
On April 6, 2009, Claimant received a warning letter from the Chair of the 
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering informing Claimant to 
raise his concerns via the proper procedure. Claimant was to first discuss the 
matter with the Chair of the Department, then to the Dean of the College of 
Engineering, then to Employer's upper administration. 
3. Employer sent another letter on April 15, 2009, again warning Claimant that 
voicing his concerns at faculty and campus-wide meetings and through widely 
disbursed emails and communication intended to expose another individual to 
public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to impeach his or her integrity or 
reputation was not appropriate. The letter, again, reminded Claimant to utilize 
proper procedures from raising his concerns. 
4. At an April 21, 2009 faculty meeting, Claimant again raised personal matters 
and expressed criticism of the administration. 
5. Dean Jacobsen issued a Notice of Contemplated Action due to Claimant's 
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continued pattern of behavior. 
6. After further review, the University President, Dr. Vailas, discharged 
Claimant. 
DISCUSSION 
Order to Deny Re-Opening 
After failing to appear for the hearing conducted by the Appeals Examiner on January 5, 
2010, Employer timely requested that the Appeals Examiner re-open the hearing. The Appeals 
Examiner denied Employer's request finding that Employer received adequate due process and 
had an opportunity to participate in the hearing. The Commission previously dealt with whether 
the Order to Deny Re-opening was proper in its February 9, 2010, Order to Deny New Hearing. 
The Commission agreed that Employer had received adequate due process and therefore was not 
entitled to a new hearing. Therefore, the analysis in the Commission's February 9, 2010 Order 
to Deny New Hearing is incorporated herein. Employer was provided adequate due process and 
had an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time, in a meaningful place. The Appeals 
Examiner's Order to Deny Re-opening was proper and is AFFIRMED. 
Decision of the Appeals Examiner 
Claimant worked as a full professor for Employer from August, 1991 until October 23, 
2009. Employer discharged Claimant for a myriad of reasons, including insubordination and for 
being disruptive and unprofessional. (Exhibit 5, pp. 19-20). Due to Claimant's ongoing 
behavior, Employer believed that it had adequate cause to discharge Claimant. Employer points 
to several emails and letters Claimant sent showing criticism to the administration, as well as 
statements made by Claimant at faculty meetings and an awards banquet that Employer contends 
were unprofessional and disruptive. Employer's decision to discharge Claimant was based on its 
policies which state that discipline is warranted if acts or omissions directly and substantial affect 
or impair an employee's performance of his or her profession or assigned duties or the interest of 
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the Board; or constitutes conduct that is seriously prejudicial to the University. (Exhibit 5, p. 
15). In April, 2009, Employer supplied Claimant with two letters, each stating to use the proper 
protocol in expressing his concerns, and that failure to follow the protocol could lead to 
discipline. (Exhibit 3, p. 28; Exhibit 4, p. 32). Employer contends that Claimant again expressed 
previously raised personal concerns during a staff meeting that had a designated agenda. 
Claimant does not dispute that he authored the emails and letters found in the record or 
that he made the comments in the staff meeting. Instead, Claimant denies that his actions 
constitute misconduct and maintains that his actions were not disruptive or unprofessional. 
(Audio Recording). 
Idaho Code § 72-1366(5) provides that a claimant is ineligible for unemployment 
insurance benefits if that individual's unemployment resulted from the claimant's discharge for 
employment-related misconduct. What constitutes "just cause" in the mind of an employer for 
dismissing an employee is not necessarily the legal equivalent of "misconduct" under Idaho's 
Employment Security Law. The two issues are separate and distinct. In a discharge, whether the 
employer had reasonable grounds for dismissing a claimant is irrelevant. The only concern is 
whether the reasons for discharge constituted "misconduct" connected with the claimant's 
employment such that the claimant can be denied unemployment benefits. Beaty v. City of 
Idaho Falls, 110 Idaho 891, 892, 719 P.2d 1151, 1152 (1986). 
The burden of proving misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence falls strictly on 
the employer. Appeals Examiner of Idaho Dept. of Labor v. l.R. Simplot Co., 131 Idaho 318, 
320, 955 P.2d 1097, 1099 (1998). A "preponderance of the evidence" simply means that when 
weighing all of the evidence in the record, the evidence on which the finder of fact relies is more 
probably true than not. Edwards v. Independence Services, Inc., 140 Idaho 912, 915, 104 P.3d 
954, 957 (2004). 
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The Idaho Supreme Court has defined misconduct as a willful, intentional disregard of 
the employer's interest; a deliberate violation of the employer's rules; or a disregard of standards 
of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of its employees. Gunter v. Magic Valley 
Regional Medical Center, 143 Idaho 63, 137 P.3d 450 (2006) (citing Johns v. S. H. Kress & 
Company, 78 Idaho 544, 548, 307 P.2d 217, 219 (1957)). In addition, the Court requires the 
Commission to consider all three grounds in determining whether misconduct exists. Dietz v. 
Minidoka County Highway Dist., 127 Idaho 246, 248, 899 P.2d 956, 958 (1995). We have 
carefully considered all three grounds for determining misconduct. 
Before analyzing each of the following grounds, the Commission must clarify the hearsay 
evidence found in the record. Employer did not appear at the hearing. Instead, Employer 
supplied a significant amount of correspondence from individuals regarding the alleged adverse 
affects of Claimant's criticisms. The written statements made by those other than Claimant are 
considered hearsay. "Hearsay is defined as testimony in court, or written evidence, of a 
statement made out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion of the truth of the 
matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court 
asserter." State v. Woodbury, 127 Idaho 757,759, 905 P.2d 1066, 1068 (Ct.App. 1995). 
The Commission holds discretionary power to admit or exclude hearsay evidence. As 
stated by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
The Commission has the discretionary power to consider any type of reliable 
evidence having probative value, even if that evidence is not admissible in a court 
of law. Stolle v. Bennett, 144 Idaho 44, 49-50 (2007). The Commission has the 
discretion to admit evidence if "it is a type commonly relied upon by prudent 
persons in the conduct of their affairs." Id.; I.C. § 67-5251. This does not mean, 
however, that the Commission is required to admit such evidence. Rather, the 
Commission is given latitude to exclude hearsay evidence. 
Higgins v. Larry Miller Subaru-Mitsubishi, 145 Idaho 1, 175 P.3d 163 (2007). 
However, hearsay evidence, alone, is insufficient to support findings of fact. Application 
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of Citizen Utilities Company, 82 Idaho 208, 214, 351 P.2d 487, 493 (1960). The Commission's 
findings must be supported by substantial and competent evidence. Id. at 213, 351 P.2d at 492. 
Substantial and competent evidence is defined as "relevant evidence that a reasonable mind 
might accept to support a conclusion." Henderson v. Ecclipse Traffic Control and Flaggin Inc., 
147 Idaho 628, 213 P.3 718, 722 (2009). 
Employer's hearsay evidence is admitted into the record based on its probative value and 
is afforded appropriate weight. Since Employer was absent from the hearing, the information 
contained therein provides insights into Employer's arguments. However, because the authors of 
the statements and those allegedly adversely affected by Claimant's emails/letters/public 
statements did not testifY, that evidence is afforded a lesser degree of weight and persuasion in 
the face of sworn testimony provided during the proceeding in direct contradiction to it. The 
hearing examiner, as the trier of fact, is entitled to place greater or less weight on any particular 
piece of evidence according to its relative credibility. Morgan v. Idaho Dept. of Health and 
Welfare, 120 Idaho 6, 8, 813 P.2d 345, 347 (1991). Therefore, to the extent that Employer relies 
on written assertions of individuals other than Claimant, those written statements are considered 
hearsay and carry less weight than Claimant's assertions. 
The analysis proceeds to determine whether Claimant's conduct constitutes misconduct. 
Under the "standards-of-behavior" test, the employer must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the claimant's conduct fell below the standard of behavior it expected and that the 
employer's expectation was objectively reasonable under the particular circumstances. Harris, 
141 Idaho at 4, 105 P.3d at 270. As the Idaho Supreme Court has pointed out, an "employer's 
expectations are ordinarily reasonable only where they have been communicated to the 
employee." Folks v. Moscow School District No. 281, 129 Idaho 833, 838, 933 P.2d 642, 647 
(1997). Therefore, the employer must communicate expectations and duties that do not naturally 
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flow from the employment relationship. Pimley v. Best Values, Inc., 132 Idaho 432,974 P.2d 78 
(1999). Notably, there is no requirement that the employer must demonstrate that the 
employee's behavior was subjectively willful, intentional, or deliberate in his or her disregard of 
the employer's expectations. Welch v. Cowles Publishing Co., 127 Idaho 361, 364, 900 P.2d 
1372, 1375 (1995). 
Employer contends that Claimant's conduct of openly criticizing the administration in 
widely dispersed emails, faculty meetings, and social functions constitutes misconduct. 
Employer informed Claimant of the proper protocol to raise his concerns. In an April 6, 2009 
letter to Claimant, Employer wrote "In the future, you are directed to follow proper protocol in 
expressing your concerns (first to the Chair of the Department of Civil and Environmental 
Engineering, then to the Dean of the College of Engineering, then to Idaho State University's 
upper administration)." (Exhibit 3, p. 28). Again, in an April 15, 2009 letter, Employer stated 
"Y ou should not use such channels as campus-wide meetings, engineering faculty meetings, and 
widely-distributed email communications to make negative comments about the performance 
and/or character of current and former university staff and employees ... Communications 
intended to expose another individual to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to impeach his or 
her integrity or reputation are not appropriate. You have previously been counseled to observe 
collegiality in the workplace and to follow the protocol of meeting first with your department 
chair, next with the dean of engineering, and then, if necessary, with other ISU administrators 
regarding your concerns. Continuing failure to follow these guidelines will be cause for 
disciplinary action." (Exhibit 4, p. 32.). 
Claimant did not rebut that he received the letters at hearing, and referred to receiving the 
letters in his correspondence with Employer. (Exhibit 4, pp. 29-33, Exhibit 10, p. 146). This 
information clearly shows that Employer informed Claimant of the proper procedure to express 
DECISION AND ORDER - 8 
his concerns and that making statements that "expose another individual to public hatred, 
contempt or ridicule, or to impeach his or her integrity or reputation are not appropriate" and 
should not be made in faculty or campus-wide meetings or in widely distributed emails. 
Employer's expectation is objectively reasonable under these circumstances. Employer 
contends that actions, such as Claimant's, impair or affect the interest of the college and 
university by creating a negative and disruptive atmosphere in the college, and that fundraising 
efforts are hampered by negative publicity generated by Claimant's criticisms. (Exhibit 7, p. 3). 
Employer's concerns are well taken and the adverse affect of openly criticizing administration 
can have the above effect. It is important to note that Employer did not forbid Claimant from 
raising his concerns. Rather, Employer required Claimant to raise his issues through a certain 
procedure. There is also nothing inherently inappropriate about the procedure required by 
Employer, nor does Claimant directly attack the validity of the procedure at hearing. Therefore, 
Employer's expectation is reasonable. 
Therefore, the analysis turns to whether Claimant's conduct at an April 21, 2010, staff 
meeting violated the "standard-of-behavior" expressed and warned of in Employer's previous 
letters. Claimant provided a transcribed copy of the meeting for the record. (Exhibit 10, pp. 36-
47). According to that transcription, at the meeting Claimant stated that the University was 
corrupt for 20 years, that the administration is absolutely corrupt, and that nothing has changed 
since the University president arrived. (Exhibit 10, p. 38). Further, Claimant told the members 
of the meeting that the administrators are lying with bold face, that they have isolated the faculty 
and done nothing except when needed. (Exhibit 10, p. 38). Claimant further stated that the 
administration refuses to communicate with faculty at all levels and that it is doing whatever it 
wants. (Exhibit 10, p. 41). When discussing leadership of the administration, Claimant said that 
he had documents to show that those people are unethical and are just "power hungers". (Exhibit 
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10, p. 43). They were working to protect their own interest and not the public. Claimant stated 
that he truly questioned the integrity and honesty of the administration in the College and the 
University. (Exhibit 10, p. 44). 
There is little doubt that these statements represent the type of conduct that Employer 
warned Claimant of in the April 6 and 15, 2009 letters. Claimant's statements raised personal 
concerns and attack members of the administration in a faculty meeting. Employer contends that 
the faculty meeting had a set agenda, which did not include Claimant's statements or the subject 
matter. (Exhibit 10, p. 11). Employer's expectation was clear that such matters should be raised 
through proper channels and not at faculty meetings, the record demonstrates that Claimant's 
conduct during the April 21, 2009, faculty meeting fell below Employer's reasonable and 
communicated expectation. 
This case is analogous to an Idaho Supreme Court case were a claimant continued to 
criticize employer and its polices despite the employer's clear directive to express those criticism 
in private. Gatherer v. Doyles Wholesale, 111 Idaho 470, 725 P.2d 175 (1986). The claimant in 
that case continued to express his criticism vociferously and in front of other employees. Id., 
111 Idaho at 178, 725 P.3d at 473. The Court ruled that the claimant's repeated failure to 
comply with the employer's directives was viewed as both an intentional disregard of the 
employer's interest and violated the employer's standard of behavior. Id. In this case, 
Claimant's criticism continued despite Employer's clear warning. 
Claimant may argue that his actions did not constitute misconduct and were for the 
benefit of the College and faculty. However, Claimant's subjective state of mind for making the 
comments is irrelevant. Mattews v. Bucyrus erie co., 101 Idaho 657, 659, 619 P.2d 1110,1112 
(1980.). Employer clearly informed Claimant that his critical comments should not be raised at 
the faculty meetings. Because Claimant is ineligible for benefits under the "standards-of-
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behavior" test, it is unnecessary to analyze this matter under the other two grounds. Claimant is 
ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Employer discharged Claimant for employment-related misconduct. 
ORDER 
Based on the forgoing analysis, the Decision of the Appeals Examiner is REVERSED. 
Employer discharged Claimant for employment-related misconduct. This is a final order under 
Idaho Code § 72-1368(7). 
DATED this ~ day of rY\(L,v c1h ,2010. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Thomas E. Limbaugh, Commissioner 
~D~ 
Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner 
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ReCEIVED 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
HABIB SADID, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, 
Employer, 
and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR, 
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IDOL #1777-2010 
MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
COMES NOW the above-named Claimant, by and through his attorney of record, 
JOHN C. LYNN, and hereby moves the COMMISSION to reconsider its DECISION 
AND ORDER filed March 24, 2010. Claimant sincerely believes that two 
COMMISSION members who signed this DECISION erred in the findings of fact and 
the application of law. This Motion is based on the file herein and the specific factors set 
forth below. 
As an introduction, the COMMISSION cites the appropriate burden of proof, that 
is, "the burden of proving misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence falls strictly on 
the employer [citation omitted]. A 'preponderance of evidence' simply means that when 
weighing all the evidence in the record, the evidence on which the fmder of facts relies is 
more probably true than not [citation omitted]" (DECISION, p. 5). Moreover, the 
COMMISSION recognized that "to the extent that Employer relies on written assertions 
of individuals other than Claimant, those written statements are considered hearsay and 
carry less weight than Claimant's assertions" (Id. p. 7). With these principals of law in 
mind, the COMMISSION should reconsider the evidence upon which its DECISION 
rests; this evidence is insufficient to find in favor of the Employer. 
First, it is apparent that Claimant's termination is not a typical case. Claimant's 
dispute with Idaho State University ("ISU") has been long and contentious. The back 
and forth documentation on the issues reflects a "stand-off' on who is right. For 
example, the April 6, 2009 reprimand (Exhibit 3, p. 28), which the COMMISSION holds 
as significant in terms of establishing ISU's "standards of behavior", is countered by 
Claimant's response (Exhibit 4, p. 5) that Chair Zoghi's accusations are "baseless and 
untrue". In the Exhibit, Claimant further admits that he has questioned the Dean's 
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honesty as did "a majority of the faculty". Further, Claimant questioned the timing, and 
therefore the sincerity, of Zoghi's letter. The allegations in Zoghi's letter dated April 6, 
2009, were not mentioned in Claimant's April 7th Annual Evaluation, which raises further 
concerns about credibility. 
It is highly unfair and contrary to the principles of law mentioned above to 
assume that Zoghi's April 6th Reprimand is true on this record. Likewise, ISU's April 
15, 2009 letter signed by Dean Jacobsen (Exhibit 4, p. 32) is countered by Claimant's 
April 27, 2009 letter to Provost Olson (Exhibit 10, 1). Claimant refutes the accusations as 
baseless, untrue and fabrications: 
I have served ISU for twenty-two years and performed my job very well, earned 
many awards, and more importantly, I have earned the respect of all of my 
students, the majority of my colleagues, and my fellow community members. I 
work hard to promote ISU and its engineering program everywhere, and my 
contributions to ISU and the community are well recognized and documented. 
Dr. Jacobsen's accusations are totally baseless and untrue. I would hope that Dr. 
Jacobsen would offer some evidence to prove his claim; I would certainly like the 
opportunity to respond. I have never threatened anybody in my life, here on 
campus or elsewhere. Dr. Jacobsen's comments are false accusations and 
fabrications designed and systematically executed in an attempt to provide me and 
create misleading evidence of supposed wrong-doings and violations on my part. 
I believe his actions are retribution for my ongoing lawsuit against ISU. 
(Id. at p. 2) 
There is no way the COMMISSION can resolve the opposing assertions in the 
extensive documentation involving the many issues in this case without a full-blown 
evidentiary hearing. ISU's "evidence" establishing any wrongdoing here is all hearsay; 
it is of questionable admissibility and value because Claimant has not had a chance in 
these proceedings to challenge these assertions through cross-examination of witnesses. 
Unresolved issues of fact do not run to the favor ofthe Employer. 
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Second, the termination arose out of an academic setting which has its own 
peculiar form of management a two-headed management system where tenured faculty 
have considerable say in how the University is fUll. Concurrent with that power is the 
concept of "academic freedom" which provides considerable protection to faculty against 
reprisals from administrators who, from time to time, must face criticism from faculty. 
Here, Professor Sadid, a senior and highly accomplished member of the faculty 
(see Exhibit 10, C, Attach. 6), has been critical of ISU administrators. For example, on 
November 16, 2008, Claimant published an article entitled "Are President Vailas' 
Policies Damaging ISU?" (Exhibit 1 0, D). The following is an excerpt from this article: 
Many professors are choosing to leave ISU because they realize there is no future 
here under V ailas' "blood from tumips" policies. 
Vailas speaks of "honesty, transparency and accountability" without holding 
administrators accountable for their actions and performance. Hiring unqualified 
faculty for administrative positions, Vailas continues shuffling his fishing and 
hunting buddies from one administrative position to another. 
Claimant had published many such articles over the years and eventually filed suit 
against ISU claiming retaliation over the expression of First Amendment "protected 
speech"l, including the above quote. Claimant contends that his termination is the direct 
result of "protected speech" and his lawsuit. The COMMISSION cannot determine, and 
should not detennine, these issues, but it surely must have occurred to the 
COMMISSION that a retaliatory motive may be behind the termination. If so, then 
ISU's sincerity over enforcement of what it presents as fair "standards of behavior" 
would be seen in a much different light. Claimant testified at length as to his "protected 
speech" and the role he believes it played in his termination. This testimony has gone 
1 Judge Nye's decision holding the Claimant's speech was unprotected is now on appeal to Idaho Supreme 
Court. 
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unrebutted. Whether Claimant was the victim of retaliation is, at most, an unresolved 
issue. Again, this undeveloped and unresolved issue is not a factor that runs in favor of 
the Employer. 
Third, the chain of events leading to Claimant's termination is highly unusual and 
suspect. No doubt the COMMISSION is aware that for state employees, the Notice of 
Contemplated Action ("NOCA") is designed to give the employee an opportunity to rebut 
specific charges supporting discipline. Here, the May 6, 2009 NOCA (Exhibit 5, p. 22) 
sets out one specific accusation of wrongdoing the April 21, 2009 faculty/staffmeeting. 
The NOCA was followed by Claimant's July 17, 2009 meeting (Exhibit 10, C, Attach. 2) 
with Dean Jacobsen to discuss, supposedly, all the accusations against him. 
ISU policy states: 
2. General 
This process is intended to assure a faculty member of his or her rights and 
to resolve the grievance at the earliest moment possible. Therefore, the 
following procedures include: 
a. an informal opportunity to meet with the person( s) making 
the recommendation of suspension, dismissal or termination 
to present any reasons, evidence, or information in 
mitigation or opposition to the recommendation before a 
recommendation is sent to the President recommending a 
faculty member's suspension, dismissal, or termination, and 
b. a formal grievance procedure. 
(Exhibit 5, p. 7) 
The two April reprimands and the April 21 st meeting were the specific issues 
discussed at the July 17th meeting (a written outline of this discussion is set forth in 
Exhibit 10, C, p. 10). The COMMISSION should take note of the many mitigating 
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factors identified with respect to Claimant's conduct at the April 21 5t faculty/staff 
meeting. Notwithstanding the intent and scope of this July 17th meeting, the August 3, 
2009 Recommendation of Dismissal (Exhibit 5, p. 15) is far more expansive, a tactic ISU 
employed during the subsequent grievance hearing when additional, new charges were 
advanced. The scope of ISU's claims greatly expanded from the events in April of 2009 
to what ISU's attorney now claims is a "long history of unprofessional, disruptive and 
insubordinate behavior by Dr. Sadid" (EMPLOYER'S BRIEF ON CLAIM FOR 
REVIEW, p. 8). 
The COMMISSION should be troubled by this obvious piling on of charges, 
particularly when no ISU witness has offered any explanation for this deviation from 
policy. Based on this record, it would be fair to conclude that ISU did not believe that 
Claimant's conduct at the April 21, 2009 meeting was egregious enough to justify 
termination. Claimant's conduct at the meeting was not at all inappropriate given the 
context of the meeting, the subjects discussed and the tradition of frank discussion. 
Fourth, the COMMISSION's [mdings of fact with respect to Claimant's conduct 
at the April 21, 2009 faculty/staff meeting is based on a synopsis (Exhibit 10, pp. 33-44) 
submitted by Claimant; this is not a transcription of the actual meeting. This is double 
hearsay and highly unreliable. The actual recording of tIns meeting is found on the CD 
marked as Exhibit 10, F2. To do justice to this case, the COMMISSION should listen to 
the actual comments made by all attendees. It was a lengthy meeting (two hours plus). 
It was not a pubic meeting, but a private faculty/staff meeting. Dean Jacobsen and 
2 This CD has two types offiles - a standard audio recording of the Claimant's April 21 sl faculty/staff 
meeting and eleven compressed MSV files of Claimant's Grievance hearing. Some computers may need to 
download the free software "sonyplugin129" from the internet to allow a Windows Media Player to play 
the MSV files. 
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Provost Olson encouraged the participants to speak their mind. In fact, the Provost 
openly disparaged the Board of Education (minute 43l Professor Ellis told the Dean 
personally that he had major issues with his performance (minute 30). Claimant, on more 
than one occasion, expressed the idea that faculty and the administration should work 
together. Dean Jacobsen ends the meeting with a comment to the effect that he was not 
offended by anything said and he appreciated candor. 
The point here is that the COMMISSION, if it truly believes that Claimant's 
conduct at this meeting was somehow below the "standards of behavior" expected by 
ISU should digest the actual meeting and the context from which it arose a university 
faculty/staff meeting - an open, candid and frank discussion, including the criticism of 
Dean Jacobsen by Claimant and others which is typical of this type of meeting. 
Fifth and most important, the COMMISSION has completely disregarded the 
most significant aspect of the evidence presented. After the Recommendation of 
Termination was issued, Claimant initiated a formal grievance (Exhibit 10, C, pp. 3-6) 
under ISU policy (Exhibit 5, pp. 3-14). This is the "due process" protection afforded ISU 
tenured faculty. Under the policies, ISU must establish "adequate cause" which is 
defined rather expansively (Exhibit 5, p. 3). Moreover, the "adequate cause" standard is 
a lower standard that the "misconduct" standard under Idaho's Employment Security 
Law. 
The gnevance process under ISU policy is extensive. An Appeals Board is 
established, composed of five persons: a Chair appointed by the Faculty Senate, two 
appointees from the Executive Committee of the Faculty Senate, one faculty appointee by 
the Provost and one faculty appointee by the grievant. A formal hearing is held (Exhibit 
3 The time scale may differ depending on the player. 
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5, p. 11). In this case, the hearing consumed several days of testimony; witnesses were 
sworn under oath and the parties were represented by counsel. All of the myriad of 
allegations against Claimant were addressed ad nauseum, including Claimant's conduct 
at the April 21, 2009 meeting. The entire proceeding was tape-recorded and has been 
presented to the COMMISSION as part of Exhibit 10, F, as mentioned above. It is by far 
the best evidence to discern whether Claimant's conduct at the April 21, 2009 meeting, or 
any other alleged misconduct, suffices for purposes of "misconduct" as contemplated by 
these proceedings. 
The COMMISSION might want to review the testimony of tenured Professor 
Ellis who was present at the April 21 st faculty/staff meeting 4. Professor Ellis testified that 
in ten (10) years, he never witnessed Claimant threaten anyone. With respect to 
Claimant's conduct at the April 21 st meeting, he did not believe Claimant was 
unprofessional other university meetings had been a lot more contentious and these 
meetings were supposed to be open and frank. He recalled the remark by Dean Jacobsen 
that the meeting had been good. 
The COMMISSION should also review the testimony of Professor Delehante, 
former Chairman of the Faculty Senates. Professor Delehante testified about the 
importance of professors speaking the truth as he or she sees it. He testified about the 
importance of "academic freedom". Part of a professor's service obligation to a 
university is to criticize the administration. Heated discussions with strong language are 
commonplace in the academic setting. Professor Delehante specifically testified that 
4 "Grievance 4th B" at 1: 11 :50. 
5 "Grievance 5th A" at 41 :00. 
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accusations by faculty to the effect that administrators are "incompetent" or are 
"destroying the university" are protected by "academic freedom". 
The Appeals Board findings are set out in Exhibit 9, p. 4. Four of the five 
Appeals Board members "found that sufficient evidence has not been presented to justify 
termination .... " (The lone dissenter was the Provost's appointee). Noteworthy in these 
findings is the following comment: 
Furthermore, a significant factor influencing the decision was the majority's 
belief that due process was not followed. In view of the gravity of the 
recommended action, the majority found the absence of required documentation 
disturbing. 
(Id.) 
The ISU Faculty Senate followed these findings with a Resolution dated October 
26, 2009, in complete support of Claimant and expressed in the strongest of terms: 
Whereas: Dr. Habib Sadid, ISU Professor of Engineering, ISU Distinguished 
Teacher, ISU Distinguished Award recipient, ISU research-active scholar and 22-
year member of the ISU faculty has reported to the faculty the findings of the 
Faculty Grievance Appeals Board. 
Whereas: The Faculty Grievance Appeals Board, a panel of ISU faculty peers 
duly selected using long-established principles and procedures to provide 
reasoned judgment, has found the dismissal actions against Dr. Sadid to be 
without merit. 
WHEREAS: The recommendation for and pursuit of dismissal action against Dr. 
Sadid calls into question the administrative judgment regarding due process of 
ISU Provost Dr. Gary A. Olson and ISU College of Engineering Dean Dr. 
Richard Jacobsen, and has resulted in highly uncomplimentary depictions of ISU 
in the national higher education process. 
Be it Resolved: The Ida.ho State University Faculty Senate, in the strongest 
possible terms, requests and expects that ISU President Dr. Arthur C. Vailas 
concur with the Faculty Grievance Appeals Board [mdings and restore Dr. Sadid 
to his position as Professor of Engineering with all due rights and responsibilities. 
(Exhibit 9, p. 5) 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 9 
Despite the above findings from the Appeal Board and the resultant Resolution 
from the Faculty Senate, President Vailas terminated Claimant anyway. Nothing in these 
proceedings explains or sheds light on this peculiar happenstance President Vialas 
turned ISU policy and process on its head. Given the principles of law to be applied 
here, the fact that the best evidence before the COMMISSION runs in favor of the 
Claimant should not be ignored. 
The COMMISSION need not resolve whether Claimant has been systematically 
set up to fail with phony and pretextual reprimands or whether ISU has acted in good 
faith. What is important to recognize here is that this case is complex and will need to be 
resolved in the courts. The COMMISSION should be mindful of the limitations of its 
process and should not focus too narrowly on one event, the April 21, 2009 meeting, for 
the simple reason the voluminous hearsay record before it suggests that Claimanfs 
termination was flawed. Moreover, the COMMISSION has ignored or glossed over the 
most important evidence before it. Further, no witness has testified on behalf of ISU 
whereas Claimant, on the other hand, has testified and made an effort to describe the 
history and context from which the termination arose. 
The credibility of ISU is more relevant to a fair determination than anyone 
alleged transgression, particularly when all have already been reviewed in exhausting 
detail. Claimant encourages the COMMISSION to respect the burden of proof when 
difficult and underdeveloped cases corne before it. When there is doubt, it must run to 
the favor of the employee rather than the employer for obvious reasons. The Appeals 
Examiner recognized the limitations of this process as well as the burden of proof. The 
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COMMISSION should reconsider its DECISION in light of the true nature of the 
evidence here. 
DATED This /l..--day of April, 2010. 
J9¥N C. LYNN 
~orney for Claimant jI 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this ~day of April, 2010, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document, by depositing the same in the US Mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
John A. Bailey 
Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, Chtd. 
P. O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
Deputy Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
Idaho Dept. of Labor 
317 W. Main S1.. 
Boise, ID 83735 
Jf)P 
-17 /vvl C:...J/p/r 
JOHN c. LYNN ( 
. Attorney for Claimant 
[/1 
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W. MARCUS W. NYE 
RANDALL C. BUDGE 
JOHN A. BAILEY, JR. 
JOHN R. GOODELL 
JOHN B. INGELSTROM 
DANIEL C. GREEN 
BRENT O. ROCHE 
KIRK B. HADLEY 
FRED J. LEWIS 
ERIC L. OLSEN 
CONRAD J. AIKEN 
RICHARD A. HEARN, M.D. 
LANE V. ERICKSON 
FREDERICK J. HAHN, III 
DAVID E. ALEXANDER 
PATRICK N. GEORGE 
SCOTT J. SMITH 
JOSHUA O. JOHNSON 
STEPHENJ.MUHONEN 
CANDICE M. MCHUGH 
CAROL TIPPI VOLYN 
BRENT L. WHITING 
JONATHON S. BYINGTON 
DAVE BAGLEY 
THOMAS J. BUDGE 
JONATHAN M. VOLYN 
MARK A. SHAFFER 
JASON E. FLAIG 
LAW OFFICES OF 
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE Be BAILEY 
CHARTERED 
201 EAST CENTER STREET 
POST OFFICE BOX 1391 
POCATELLO, IDAHO 83204-1391 
TELEPHONE (208) 232-6101 
FACSIMILE 1208) 232-6109 
www.racinelaw.net 
SENDER'S E-MAIL ADDREss:jab@racinelaw.net 
April 20, 2010 
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Attn: Unemployment Appeals 
P. O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0041 
Re: Sadid v. ISU and IDOL 
IDOL Docket No: 1777-2010 
Claimant: Habib Sadid 
Employer: Idaho State University 
Dear Clerk: 
BOISE OFFICE 
101 SOUTH CAPITOL 
BOULEVARD. SUITE 208 
BOISE, IDAHO 83702-
TELEPHONE: (208) 395-0011 
FACSIMILE: (208) 433-0167 
IDAHO FALLS OFFICE 
477 SHOUP AVENUE 
SUITE 107 
POST OFFICE BOX 50698 
IDAHO FALLS, 10 83405 
TELEPHONE: (208) 528-6101 
FACSIMILE: (208) 528-6109 
ALL OFFICES TOLL FREE 
(S77) 232-6101 
LOUIS F. RACINE (1917-2005) 
WILLIAM O. OLSON, OF COUNSEL 
Enclosed please find Employer's Objection to Claimant's Motion For Reconsideration 
for filing in the above-captioned matter. 
Thank you for your assistance and if you have any questions, please give me a call. 
JAB:mc 
Enclosure 
c: Tracey K. Rolfsen 
Sam Johnson 
John C. Lynn 
Best regards, 
vt~ 
A. BAILEY, JR. 
John A. Bailey, Jr. (ISB No. 2619) 
RACmE, OLSON,NYE, BUDGE 
& BAILEY, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Telephone: (208) 232-6101 
Fax: (208) 232-6109 
Attorney for Employer Idaho State University 
APPEAL,S BlJREAU 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR . 
HABIB SADID, 
SSN:  
Claimant, 
vs. 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, 
Employer, 
and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Docket No. 1777-2010 
EMPLOYER'S OBJECTION TO 
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERA TION 
CONiES NO\\! the Ernployer, Idaho State University, by and through its counsel of!ecord~ 
John A. Bailey, Jr., of the firm of Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, Chtd., and hereby states its 
OBJECTION to the Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration filed April 12, 2010. 
The comments to Rule 8(F) of the Rules of Appellate Practice and Procedure state that a 
request for reconsideration "will ask that the Commission reexamine its decision in light of additional 
legal arguments, a change in law, a misinterpretation oflaw, or an argument or aspect of the case that 
was overlooked." The comment explains that requests based on legal arguments that could have been 
EMPLOYER'S OBJECTION TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION-1 
raised earlier will not ordinarily be granted; "the intent is ... to discourage reactionary motions when 
a party merely wants the Commission to "think it over again."" 
The Claimant's Motion to Reconsider merely asks the Commission to "think it over again." 
The Commission's decision on March 24 finding that the Claimant was terminated for cause applied 
the proper legal standard to the appropriate facts in the record. 1 Claimant confuses the standard 
applicable before the Commission - whether the termination was the result of employment-related 
misconduct - with that applicable in the administrative appeals of his termination, and with the 
standard applicable in his wrongful termination, retaliation and other claims now pending in the 
courts. The Claimant concedes that the Commission cannot decide whether there was "just cause" 
for termination under University rules, or whether the University may be liable in the various claims 
he has filed in Court actions. But he then argues that the Commission therefore cannot determine 
whether Claimant's misconduct resulted in his termination. As the Commission found in its decision 
in this case, what constitutes 'Just cause" for dismissing an employee is not necessarily the legal 
equivalent of "misconduct" under the employment security law. Thus, there is no reason why the 
Commission cannot decide this issue. 
The Claimant's Motion points the Commission toward evidence which is not relevant to the 
Commission's resolution of this case, because it deals with whether his termination was proper under 
University procedural rules, or constituted unlawful retaliation for his First Amendment activities. 
This evidence, which was fully before the Commission at the time of its March 24, 2010 decision, 
1 The Commission made its decision without reference to the brief filed by the Employer, 
holding that it was not timely because it was filed by fax after 5 p.m. on the date it was due. The 
Employer respectfully brings to the Commission's attention that the brief was also filed by mail on 
the same day, which, under Rule 2(D)(2), is timely filing. 
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does not change the core of relevant facts on which the Commission properly focused. They are: 
1. The Claimant was warned on April 9 and April 15, 2009, to follow the chain of 
command in voicing complaints, and not to attack administrators in widely-
disseminated emails and meetings. 
2. On April 21, 2009, in a faculty meeting that was open to persons outside of the 
Department of Engineering, the Claimant made numerous scurrilous attacks on 
administrators, accusing them of criminal activity, waste, fraud and abuse, among 
other things. 
3. The Employer's expectations as to Claimant's behavior were objectively reasonable 
and clearly communicated to the Claimant, and the Claimant's behavior on April 21 
fell below those standards. 
The Motion to Reconsider does not address these facts, but merely attempts to obscure them 
by raising other issues. In any event, these other issues go primarily to the Claimant's subjective state 
of mind, which is irrelevant in this proceeding. Matthews v. Bucyrus Erie Co., 101 Idaho 657, 659 
(1980). 
The Motion to Reconsider raises no argument not addressed below, and should be denied. 
DATED this /0 day of April, 2010. 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE 
& BAILEY, CHARTERED 
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CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the '2!2.- day of April, 2010, I served a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing document to the following person(s) as follows: 
Sam Johnson 
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P. 
405 South Eighth Street, Suite 250 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(Attorney for Claimant) 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
776 E. Riverside Drive, Suite 200 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
(Attorney for Claimant) 
Tracey K. Rolfsen 
Deputy Attorney General 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
3 17 W. Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83735 
(Attorney for Idaho Department of Labor) 
/ [ v{ U. S. Mail 
Postage Prepaid 
] Hand Delivery 
] Overnight Mail 
] Facsimile (208) 947-2424 
r """'-:/TT S 1\".f",;1 l J L. ...l .lU..i..l 
Postage Prepaid 
] Hand Delivery 
] Overnight Mail 
] Facsimile (208) 429-1925 
[~U. S. Mail 
Postage Prepaid 
] Hand Delivery 
] Overnight Mail 
] Facsimile (208) 334-6125 
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LAW OF"FICES OF 
RACINE OLSON NYE BUDGE & BAILEY 
CHARTERED 
201 E. CENTER STR£E;:T 
POST OFFICE BOX 1391 
POCATELLO, IDAHO 83204-1391 
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RONALDO A. COULTER 
Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law Group, PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
776 E. Riverside Drive, Suite 200 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 672 6112 
Facsimile: (208) 672 6114 
Idaho State Bar No.3850 
ron@cmc1awgroup.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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RECEIVED 
fRDUSTRIA! COMMISSION 
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
HABIB SADID 
Claimant, 
vs. 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY 
Employer/Respondent 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
Respondent 
) 
) 
) 
) NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL 
) AND SUBSTITUTION OF 
) COUNSEL 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Docket No: 1777-2010 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Claimant, Habib Sadid has retained the law firm of 
Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law Group, PLLC to substitute as counsel for Sam Johnson. The 
following specific attorneys of the law firm of Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law Group, PLLC 
will serve as counsel for Plaintiff in this matter: 
RONALDO A. COULTER 
Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law Group, PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
776 E. Riverside Drive, Suite 200 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 672 6112 
Facsimile: (208) 672 6114 
ron@cmclawgroup.com 
NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL 
ROBERT G. TEFFETELLER 
Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law Group, PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
776 E. Riverside Drive, Suite 200 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 672 6112 
Facsimile: (208) 672 6114 
ron@cmc1awgroup.com 
1 
All notices, pleading and other correspondence in the above-captioned matter should hereafter be 
directed to Ronaldo A. Coulter and Robert G. Teffeteller at the above address 
Dated __ &---'!--'~"'-'-!-"-~-=-",-""IO,--- c;;d~~ 
RA. (Ron) Coulter 
Substituting Attorney 
Dated __ S-----'--f_"5--L'_1-_O_(_O __ (l~ 
Robert G. Teffeteller 
Dated 01uly) I )[J (() 
NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL 2 
\0J 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this '5A..Ji day of May, 2010, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
JOHN A. BAILEY, JR 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE,BUDGE & BAILEY 
CHTD. 
PO BOX 1391 
POCATELLO, IDAHO 83701 
DEPUTY ATTORNEYS GENERAL 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
317 WEST MAIN STREET 
BOISE, IDAHO 83735 
NOTICE OF SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL 
(x) U.S. Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt 
Requested 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Statehouse Mail 
(x) U.S. Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt 
Requested 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Statehouse Mail 
3 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
HABIB SADID, 
SSN:
v. 
Claimant, 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, 
Employer, 
and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
IDOL # 1777-2010 
ORDER GRANTING 
RECONSIDERATION 
Request for reconsideration of a decision from the Industrial Commission finding 
Claimant was ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits. The request for reconsideration is 
GRANTED. 
Claimant filed a Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Code §72-1368(7). 
Claimant requests reconsideration of the Idaho Industrial Commission's Decision and Order filed 
on March 24, 2010. The Commission affirmed in part and reversed in part the Decision issued 
by an Appeals Examiner with the Idaho Department of Labor ("Department"). The Commission 
found that Employer discharged Claimant for employment-related misconduct, thus Claimant 
was ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits. 
Claimant worked for Employer as a full professor from August 1991 until he was 
discharged on October 23, 2009. Claimant has a history of voicing concerns via emails and at 
faculty meetings. In April 2009 Claimant received a two warning letters from the Chair of the 
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering informing Claimant to raise his concerns 
via the proper procedure. Claimant was to first discuss the matter with the Chair of the 
Department, then to the Dean of the College of Engineering, then to Employer's upper 
administration. At an April 21, 2009 faculty meeting, Claimant again raised personal matters 
ORDER GRANTING RECONSIDERATION 1 
and expressed criticism of the University's administration. Dean Jacobsen issued a Notice of 
Contemplated Action, and after further review, University President Vailas discharged Claimant. 
The Commission decision found that Employer communicated it standard of behavior to 
Claimant and his conduct fell below that standard when, at a the April 21, 2009, staff meeting, 
Claimant stated that the University was corrupt for 20 years, that the administration is absolutely 
corrupt, and that the administrators are lying with bold face. (Exhibit 10, p. 38). The 
Commission concluded that Employer discharged Claimant for employment-related misconduct 
and Claimant was ineligible for benefits. 
Claimant requests reconsideration of the Commission's conclusions because Claimant's 
comments were not inappropriate given the context of the April 21, 2009 meeting. Claimant 
argues that the audio recording of the April 21, 2009 meeting (Exhibit 10F), when taken as a 
whole, demonstrates that Claimant's comments were accepted and appreciated by Employer's 
administration. 
Employer's objection to Claimant's motion avers that Claimant is merely asking the 
Commission to reweigh the evidence and arguments already presented to the Commission. 
Employer also argues that while its brief in the underlying matter was faxed after 5 p.m. on the 
date it was due, February 19,2010, the brief was also mailed on the same day, which means the 
briefwas timely filed. 
For clarification and to assist with future filings, the Commission will briefly address 
Employer's argument regarding its untimely brief. The envelope in which Employer's brief 
arrived has a meter mark dated February 19, 2010, but does not contain a postmark from the 
United States Postal Service. The Commission does not recognize meter marks for the 
determination of filing time. As noted by the Idaho Supreme Court, the "USPS routinely 
postmarks stamped mail but does not ordinary postmark metered mail. Thus, to ensure that a 
ORDER GRANTING RECONSIDERATION 2 \(J; 
mailed notice is timely filed, parties should always either use an ordinary postage stamp to 
ensure that the mailpiece is postmarked or specifically request a postmark on metered mail to 
verify when the USPS took custody." Smith v. Idaho Department of Labor, 148 Idaho 72, 218, 
222 P.3d 1133, 1137 (2009). In the absence of a postmark the Commission looks to the date 
Employer's briefwas filed by the Commission, which was February 22,2010. Thus, both filings 
of Employer's brief were untimely. 
In the motion for reconsideration, Claimant argues that when the CD of the April 21, 
2009 meeting is reviewed it is apparent that Claimant's remarks were not inappropriate. 
Claimant states that the audio recording was admitted as a CD labeled Exhibit 1 OF. In reviewing 
the record, the Commission finds that Exhibit 10F is a single piece of paper. The lower right 
hand comer is labeled Exhibit 10, page 130, Exhibit F. The Commission file does not include 
any audio recording, other than the recording of the hearing held by the Appeals Examiner. 
Reviewing the file as whole, it appears that Exhibit 10F was an audio recording that was 
admitted into evidence by the Appeals Examiner at the hearing. To further the interests of 
justice, Claimant is entitled to a review of the complete evidentiary record. The Commission 
will review a duplicate CD as was designated as Exhibit 10F by the Appeals Examiner. 
ORDER 
I 
Claimant's request for reconsideration is GRANTED. Claimant will serve a duplicate 
CD, Exhibit 10F, on the Commission and all interested parties within 10 days of the date of this 
order. The Commission will not accept any additional evidence other than a duplicate of Exhibit 
10F. 
II 
The parties will be afforded an opportunity to argue their positions based on Exhibit 10F 
ORDER GRANTING RECONSIDERATION 3 
in briefs. Claimant will have 10 days from the date of service of Exhibit 10F to file a brief. 
Employer and IDOL will have 7 days from the date Claimant's brief is filed in which to file 
responding briefs, if they so choose. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
~ 
DATED this v:J day of_~_--:---"r---!.._ 
istai\t Commission Secretary 
'\. 
STRIAL COMMISSION 
(Thomas E. Umbaugh, mm ss ner 
~~)~ 
Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner 
"\ CERTIFICATE OF SER'rCE~«~ 
\, .~ her:Jy certify that on the Sday o~;;' true and correct copy of 
ORD~~NTING RECONSIDERATION w~s ~~ed by regular United States Mail upon: 
\ \ 
JOHN A BAILEY JR DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
PO BOX 1391 IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
POCATELLO ID 83204-1391 STATE HOUSE MAIL 
317 W MAIN STREET 
RONALDO COULTER BOISE ID 83735 
776 E RNERSIDE DR, SUITE 200 
EAGLE ID 83616 
mcs 
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RONALDO A. COULTER 
Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law Group, PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
776 E. Riverside Drive, Suite 200 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 672 6112 
Facsimile: (208) 672 6114 
Idaho State Bar No.3850 
ron@cmclawgroup.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
HABIB SADID, 
SSN: , 
v. 
Claimant, 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, 
Employer, 
and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. 
) 
) 
~ IDOL # 1777-2010 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF 
DUPLICATE CD, EXHIBIT 
10F, PURSUANT TO ORDER 
GRANTING 
RECONSIDERATION 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Claimant, Habib Sadid, through his counsel, R.A. 
(Ron) Coulter, of the law firm of Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law Group, PLLC, has served a 
duplicate CD, Exhibit 10F, on the Commission and all interested parties pursuant to the ORDER 
GRANTING RECONSIDERATION (attached hereto as Exhibit A) dated August 5, 2010. For 
the convenience of the parties, and in case the parties use multiple operating systems or hardware 
platforms, the file on the disc is in four formats: MP3, WAV, WMA, and AAC. 
Because the ORDER GRANTING RECONSIDERATION requires service of the CD 
within ten (10) days of the date of the order (August 5, 2010), and because ten (10) days from the 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DUPLICATE CD, EXHIBIT 10F, PURSUANT 
TO ORDER GRANTING RECONSIDERATION 1 
date of the order is August 15,2010, a Sunday, Claimant is serving this CD on all interested 
parties by mail, or personal delivery to the Commission by 5:00 p.m., on Monday, August 16, 
2010, pursuant to the following administrative rule of the Department of Labor: 
... In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by the 
Employment Security Law or the Claims for Wages Act, the day of the act, 
event, or default is not to be included. Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays shall 
be counted during the period unless the last day of the period is a Saturday, 
Sunday, or legal holiday in which event the period shall not expire until the 
next business day following the Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. 
See ID ADC 09.01.06.090 
Claimant also notes that if the day of the ORDER GRANTING RECONSIDERATION, 
August 5,2010, is excluded, ten (10) days from the 6th of August, 2010 is the 16th of August, 
which is a Monday. By either computation, the serving of the CD on Monday, August 16,2010 
is timely. 
Dated this 16th day of August, 2010. ~Lt 
R.A. (Ron) Coulter 
Attorney for Claimant 
NOTICE OF SERVICE OF DUPLICATE CD, EXHIBIT 10F, PURSUANT 
TO ORDER GRANTING RECONSIDERATION 2 
\~ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 16th day of August, 2010, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
700 S. CLEARWATER LANE 
BOISE, ID 83712 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
HABIB SADID, ) 
SSN: ) 
) 
Claimant, ) IDOL # 1777-2010 
v. ) 
) 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, ) ORDER GRANTING 
) RECONSIDERATION 
Employer, ) 
F I LED and ) 
) AUG 05 2010 IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. ) 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Request for reconsideration of a decision from the Industrial Commission finding 
Claimant was ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits. The request for reconsideration is 
GRANTED. 
Claimant filed a Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-1368(7). 
Claimant requests reconsideration of the Idaho Industrial Commission's Decision and Order filed 
on March 24,2010. The Commission affirmed in part and reversed in part the Decision issued 
by an Appeals Examiner with the Idaho Department of Labor ("Department"). The Commission 
found that Employer discharged Claimant for employment-related misconduct, thus Claimant 
was ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits. 
Claimant worked for Employer as a full professor from August 1991 until he was 
discharged on October 23, 2009. Claimant has a history of voicing concerns via emails and at 
faculty meetings. In April 2009 Claimant received a two warning letters from the Chair of the 
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering informing Claimant to raise his concerns 
via the proper procedure. Claimant was to first discuss the matter with the Chair of the 
Department, then to the Dean of the College of Engineering,then to Employer's upper 
administration. At an. April 21, 2009 faculty meeting, Claimant again raised personal matters 
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and expressed criticism of the University's administration. Dean Jacobsen issued a Notice of 
Contemplated Action, and after further review, University President Vailas discharged Claimant. 
The Commission decision found that Employer communicated it standard of behavior to 
Claimant and his conduct fell below that standard when, at a the April 21, 2009, staff meeting, 
Claimant stated that the University was corrupt for 20 years, that the administration is absolutely 
corrupt, and that the administrators are lying with bold face. (Exhibit 10, p. 38). The 
Commission concluded that Employer discharged Claimant for employment-related misconduct 
and Claimant was ineligible for benefits. 
Claimant requests reconsideration of the Commission's conclusions because Claimant's 
comments were not inappropriate given the context of the April 21, 2009 meeting. Claimant 
argues that the audio recording of the April 21, 2009 meeting (Exhibit lOF), when taken as a 
whole, demonstrates that Claimant's comments were accepted and appreciated by Employer's 
administration. 
Employer's objection to Claimant's motion avers that Claimant is merely asking the 
Commission to reweigh the evidence and arguments already presented to the Commission. 
Employer also argues that while its brief in the underlying matter was faxed after 5 p.m. on the 
date it was due, February 19, 2010, the briefwas also mailed on the same day, which means the 
briefwas timely filed. 
For clarification and to assist with future filings, the Commission will briefly address 
Employer's argument regarding its untimely brief. The envelope in which Employer's brief 
arrived has a meter mark dated February 19, 2010, but does not contain a postmark from the 
United States Postal Service. The Commission does not recognize meter marks for the 
determination of filing time. ' As noted by the Idaho Supreme Court, the "USPS routinely 
postmarks stamped mail but does not ordinary postmark metered mail. Thus, to ensure that a 
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mailed notice is timely filed, parties should always either use an ordinary postage stamp to 
ensure that the mailpiece is postmarked or specifically request a postmark on metered mail to 
verify when the USPS took custody." Smith v. Idaho Department of Labor, 148 Idaho 72,218, 
222 P.3d 1133, 1137 (2009). In the absence of a postmark the Commission looks to the date 
Employer's briefwas filed by the Commission, which was February 22,2010. Thus, both filings 
of Employer's brief were untimely. 
In the motion for reconsideration, Claimant argues that when the CD of the April 21, 
2009 meeting is reviewed it is apparent that Claimant's remarks were not inappropriate. 
Claimant states that the audio recording was admitted as a CD labeled Exhibit IOF. In reviewing 
the record, the Commission finds that Exhibit 10F is a single piece of paper. The lower right 
hand comer is labeled Exhibit 10, page 130, Exhibit F. The Commission file does not include 
any audio recording, other than the recording of the hearing held by the Appeals Examiner. 
Reviewing the file as whole, it appears that Exhibit 10F was an audio recording that was 
admitted into evidence by the Appeals Examiner at the hearing. To further the interests of 
justice, Claimant is entitled to a review of the complete evidentiary record. The Commission 
will review a duplicate CD as was designated as Exhibit 10F by the Appeals Ex~er. 
ORDER 
I 
Claimant's request for reconsideration is GRANTED. Claimant will serve a duplicate 
CD, Exhibit lOF, on the Commission and all interested parties within 10 days of the date of this 
order. The Commission will not accept any additional evidence other than a duplicate of Exhibit 
lOF. 
IT 
The parties will be afforded an opportunity to argue their positions based on Exhibit 10F 
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in briefs. Claimant will have 10 days from the date of service of Exhibit 10F to file a brief. 
Employer and IDOL will have 7 days from the date Claimant's brief is filed in which to file 
responding briefs, if they so choose. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
/.. 
DATED this fQ day of_-,--_~_-,--" 2010. 
/j)~d 
R.D. Maynard, Ch~~ 
Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERY.ICE 
I here y certify that on the Sday of lOa true and correct copy of 
ER G TING RECONSIDERATION w rved by regular United States Mail upon: 
JOHN A BAlLEY JR 
POBOX 1391 
POCATELLO ID 83204-1391 
RONALDO COULTER 
776 E RIVERSIDE DR, SUITE 200 
EAGLE ID 83616 
mes 
ORDER GRANTING RECONSIDERATION 
D ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
STATE HOUSE MAIL 
317 W MAJN STREET 
BOISE ID 83735 
4 
RONALDO A. COULTER 
Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law Group, PLLC 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
HABIB SADID 
SSN:  
Claimant, 
vs. 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY 
Employer/Respondent 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
Respondent 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
IDOL# 1777-2010 
CLAIMANT'S BRIEF ON 
EXHIBIT 10F PERMITTED 
BY ORDER GRANTING 
RECONSIDERATION OF 
AUGUST 5, 2010 
COMES NOW, The Claimant Habib Sadid (Professor Sadid), by and through his 
attorney of record, Ronaldo A. Coulter, and hereby submits his BRIEF ON EXHIBIT 10F 
PERMITTED BY ORDER GRANTING RECONSIDERATION OF AUGUST 5, 2010. 
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I 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On October 30,2009, Claimant was discharged from his position at Idaho State 
University and subsequently applied for unemployment benefits for which he was initially found 
ineligible on December 3, 2009. On December 16,2009, Claimant appealed the original 
determination. On January 5, 2010, a telephonic hearing was held to consider the appeal of 
Claimant. On January 6, 2010, the Appeals Examiner reversed the original decision of 
ineligibility of December 3,2009 and fOlmd that the Employer failed to meet its burden of 
proving by a preponderance of evidence that the Claimant had engaged in inappropriate conduct. 
On or about January 13,2010, the Employer through counsel requested that the hearing be re-
opened as through no fault of the Employer, the Employer did not receive adequate notice of the 
telephonic hearing and therefore was unable to participate. On or about the January 14,2010, the 
Appeals Bureau denied the request to re-open the hearing. 
On or about January 18, 2010, the Employer through counsel tiled an appeal to the 
Industrial Commission requesting that the Commission hold a hearing that would allow the 
Employer to provide evidence which it could not previously provide at the telephonic hearing or 
remand the case to the Appeals Examiner for an additional hearing and decision. On February 9, 
2010, the Employer's request for a hearing before the Idaho Industrial Commission was denied. 
Additionally, the Employer's request that the matter be remanded to the Appeals Bureau for a 
new hearing was denied. However, The Industrial Commission ruled that the Employer's timely 
appeal of the Appeals Examiner's decision denying a rehearing was also an appeal of the 
decision of the Appeals Examiner's decision aw-arding unemployment benefits to Claimant. 
Wherefore, the Industrial Commission infonned the parties that it would review de novo the 
evidentiary record established during the Appeals Examiner's hearing of January 5, 2010, 
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established a briefing schedule for both the Claimant and the Employer, and infol1ned both 
parties that it would then issue a new decision upon completion of its review. 
On March 24, 2010, the Industrial Commission issued its Decision and Order wherein it 
reversed the decision of the Appeals Examiner awarding unemployment benefits to Claimant and 
declared that Claimant was discharged for employment-related misconduct and therefore 
ineligible for unemployment benefits. On April 12, 2010, Claimant through counsel filed a 
Motion for Reconsideration with the Industrial Commission. On or about April 20, 2010, the 
Employer filed an Employer's Objection to the Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration. 
On August 5,2010, the Industrial Commission issued an Order Granting 
Reconsideration. It further ordered the Claimant to serve a duplicate CD, Exhibit 10F on the 
Commission and all interested parties within ten (10) days of the date of the Order. It further 
ordered that Claimant would be afforded the opportunity to submit a brief arguing its position 
based on 10F; said brief to be submitted ten (10) days from the date of service of Exhibit 1 OF. 
Lastly, the order called for the Employer and IDOL, if they desired, to submit briefs within seven 
(7) days of the date Claimant's brief was filed with the Industrial Commission. On August 16, 
2010, Exhibit 10F was filed with the Industrial Commission, mailed to the IDOL and mailed to 
the Employer. 
II 
THE APPLICABLE LAW 
In reviewing Exhibit 10F, the Industrial Commission must decide whether the speech and 
conduct of Professor Sadid at the April 21, 2009, Idaho State University, College of Engineering 
Faculty Staff meeting constituted "misconduct" connected with the Claimant's employment such 
that the Claimant can be denied unemployment benefits. Beaty v. City of Idaho Falls, 110 Idaho 
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891,892,719 P.2d 1151, 1152 (1986)." See March 24,2010 Decision and Order of the 
Industrial Commission pages 5 and 6: 
The burden of proving misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence falls strictly on 
the employer. Appeals Examiner a/Idaho Dept. a/Labor v. JR .. Simplot Co., 131 Idaho 
318,320,955 P.2d 1097,1099 (1998) The Idaho Supreme Court has defined misconduct 
as a willful, intentional disregard of the employer's interest; a deliberate violation of the 
employer's rules; or a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has a right 
to expect of its employees. Gunter v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 143 Idaho 
63, 137 P.3d 450 (2006) (citing Johns v. S. H Kress & Company, 78 Idaho 544, 548, 307 
P.2d 217, 219 (1957)). 
See March 24, 2010 Decision and Order of the Industrial Commission pages 5 and 6 
III 
ANALYSIS 
A. Professor Sadid Did Not Engage In Any Conduct Sufficient to Disqualify Him From 
Receiving Unemployment Benefits As His Conduct was not a Willful, Intentional 
Disregard Of His Employer's Interest; A Deliberate Violation Of The Employer's 
Rules; Nor A Disregard Of Standards Of Behavior Which The Employer Had A 
Right To Expect Of Him 
1. During the April 21, 2009 College of Engineering Faculty Staff Meeting, Professor 
Sadid's Conduct Was Not In Disregard of the Standards of Behavior that His 
Employer Had a Right to Expect. His Employer Expressed Satisfaction With The 
Meeting, The Employer Expressed That the Employer Valued the Discussion, And 
the Employer Publicly Expressed That the Employer Was Not Offended By Any 
Remarks Made During the Meeting 
The Notice of Contemplated Action (NOCA) (Exhibit 5., pp. 22-23) specifically alleges 
that during the April 21 , 2009 College of Engineering F acuIty IStaff meeting (hereinafter referred 
to as "the Meeting" or Meeting), Professor Sadid was unprofessional, non-collegial, disruptive 
and insubordinate. The NOCA also alleged that Professor Sadid disrupted the meeting in 
complete disregard of an established agenda by "revisiting personnel issues" that had previously 
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been discussed in an appropriate forum and by labeling some Idaho State University personnel as 
corrupt and untruthful. Lastly, the NOCA alleged that Professor Sadid falsely asselied that for 
the past fourteen years that the Deans of the College of Engineering had failed in their fund 
raising responsibilities, as the Deans were deficient in their duties to raise funds for College of 
Engineering. 
An analysis ofthe 2 hour, 17 minute 21 second Meeting reveals that Professor Sadid's 
behavior was that which could be expected of an academic fully engaged in discussions of 
significant importance in a precise, forceful, professional and appropriate manner. A recording 
of this meeting is captured on Exhibit 10F. A review of this recording reveals that Professor 
Sadid was candid but in no way was Professor Sadid engaged in behavior that could be described 
as misconduct especially in light of the academic setting in which the meeting took place. 
Preliminarily, it must be noted that the first paIi of the published agenda was a Call to Order aI1d 
Introduction and Comments by the Provost, Gary Olson. (Exhibit A) Rather than following the 
established agenda, it is clear from listening to Exhibit 10F that Professor Sadid did not disregard 
the established agenda; rather, it was Dean Jacobsen who departed from the agenda and began an 
earnest discussion of the Faculty Workload Policy. What follows is an analysis of relevant 
sections of the recording where Professor Sadid and others are engaged in discussions in the 
meeting. For ease of identification, the specific place on the recording is marked in bold: 1 
Recording: 3:20 -13:34 sec. 
In a discussion prior to the arrival of Provost Olson, Dr. Jacobsen initiates a discourse 
1 The annotations used to mark segments of the recording are as follows: 3:20 -13:34 would indicate that the 
relevant segment of the recording begins at 3 minutes and 20 seconds into the recording and ends at 13 minutes and 
34 seconds into the recording; 1: 12:59 - 1 :21 :26 would indicate that the relevant segment of the recording begins at 
1 hour, 12 minutes, and 59 seconds into the recording and ends at 1 hour, 21 minutes, and 26 seconds into the 
recording. 
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regarding the Faculty Workload Policy and how it must be addressed throughout the 
University and specifically within the College of Engineering. At a point during this 
discourse, Professor Sadid, in a very civil tone, questioned the metrics that would be 
involved in determining the faculty workload specifically, what metrics would be used to 
determine the research value of faculty members. It is clear that Dr. Jacobsen was 
somewhat fmstrated by Professor Sadid's question and follow-up question and he 
specifically asks other Chairs present in the meeting to join in the discussion. At this 
point, Dr. George Imel, Chair of the Department ofNuc1ear Engineering joins in the 
discussion with Professor Sadid. It is clear from listening to the recording that this issue 
was important to both parties. However, both parties were engaged, Dr. George Imel 
being louder, more argumentative, and more aggressive than Professor Sadid. It is 
important to note that Dean Jacobsen actually agreed that the present ad hoc method 
needed to be addressed and metrics established; thus agreeing with the argument set forth 
by Professor Sadid. 
Recording: 13:59 -17:50 
In a continuation of the discussion of Faculty Workload Policy specifically in the College 
of Engineering, Dr. Sadid tries to discuss the specifics of an evaluation that he received 
from Dr. Zoghi. Professor Sadid' s point was that \vithout the establishment of a 
standardized metrics based system. there did not exist an accurate way to judge a faculty 
member's performance. Dr. Jacobsen informs Professor Sadid that a discussion of a 
specific faculty member's evaluation is not a proper subject for an open discussion. 
However, Professor Sadid disagrees with Dr. Jacobsen but does so in a civil tone and 
provides his rationale. From the recording, one can hear an attendee ask that the 
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discussion move toward a general discussion of a topic of common impOli to the college 
and not dwell on a single person's issue, Professor Sadid remarked that it is a concem of 
everyone especially in light of the lack of communication between the College of 
Engineering Chair and the faculty. At one point, Professor Sadid asked for a show of 
hands as to who in the room believed they had effective communications with the Chair 
of the College of Engineering. From the recording, it can be surmised that Professor 
Sadid only saw two people raise their hands. At all times, Professor Sadid's speech was 
appropriate and there is nothing to indicate that his behavior was a disruption to the 
meeting. 
Recording: 23:24 - 25:17 
Professor Sadid questions the workload criteria and mentions that this has been a problem 
for the last three years. Professor Sadid again questions the metrics especially, when an 
administrator tells the faculty that they have exceeded the expectations but there are no 
metrics. Professor Sadid asked what is the administration doing and questions the 
commitment of the Dean and the Chairs especially in light of his raising questions for 
three years. 
Recording: 28:50 - 29:40 
Provost Olson opens the floor for questions. A faculty member other than Professor Sadid 
prefaces a question to Provost Olson openly calling into question the perfonnance of 
Dean Jacobsen and raising the issue of whether or not a dean, especially a part-time dean 
is really needed in the College of Engineering. Indeed, this faculty member said to 
Provost Olson, "I have some major issues with the perfonnance of our Dean." Provost 
Olson jokingly said that he thought that when he came in he heard Professor Sadid say 
that they could do away with deans. Professor Sadid points out that this is true. He states 
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that in two years he has not noticed that the Dean had taken responsibility for anything. 
Therefore, and based on that history, the necessity of a dean should be questioned. 
Recording: 34:50 - 38:09 
Professor Sadid in an exchange with Provost Olson asked if there would be 
communications with the faculty from his office. Provost Olson responded that he had 
just said that there would be. Professor Sadid then states that Idaho State University had a 
long cormpt history prior to the an-ivaI of Dr. Vail as. Professor Sadid stated that with Dr. 
Vailas' arrival that he expected change. However, Professor Sadid commented that the 
present administration would lie with bold face and was not honest with faculty. Dr. 
Olson was not offended by the question and cited his experience at the University of 
South Florida. It was Dr. Olson's opinion that Dr. Vailas has instituted measures to 
address issues raised by Professor Sadid to make them viable and more transparent. 
Recording: 41:28 - 44:06 Discussion on the Budget Process Provost Disparages 
Idaho State Board of Education 
An unidentified faculty member (first name Ken) questioned the budget process and 
insinuated that Dean Jacobsen had kept the process a secret. Dean Jacobsen wanted to 
address the question but Dr. Olson stepped in and informed the faculty member that Dean 
Jacobsen did not have access to the budget. The Provost went on to explain how the 
process worked. The Provost expressed his dismay with the entire budget process. 
Provost Olson then went on to disparage the members of the Idaho State Board of 
Education. He remarked that he thought that he had already been in the state with the 
"wackiest" state government with Blagojevich but this really ta1<.es the cake; and, if you 
think that this is really something, you ought to go to the State Board of Education 
meeting. That is really like going to the circus. "I don't think any of those people have 
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ever gone to college much less getting a degree in one." 
Recording: 59: 16 -1:01:24 
There was a discussion regarding investment in education that the uni versity needed to 
do. Dr. Olson brought up the government of Thailand's commitment to education and 
what that country has done to improve its academic infrastructure. Professor Sadid 
commented that no government would provide funds tlu'ough a grant if the government 
did not see that the institution was already committed to the investment. Professor Sadid 
then asked Dr. Olson if Dr. Olson would hold his Deans responsible for raising funds. 
Dr. Olson replied, "I will yep". Professor Sadid said that in the past fourteen years, there 
have been two deans neither of which raised any funds. Professor Sadid then rhetorically 
asked how can we survive in this economy? Dr. Olson replied to Professor Sadid by 
saying "Y ou are right" and then remarked that we all have a role to play. 
Recording: 1:12:59 -1:21:26 
An Administrative Assistant becomes very emotional, almost to the point of tears in 
describing the treatment that she has received at the College of Engineering by its faculty. 
She says she would leave if she could. Professor Sadid comments that her problem is a 
result of poor leadership. The Administrative Assistant does not agree with Professor 
Sadid that it is all leadership. This exchange provokes a response from Dean Jacobsen in 
which Dean Jacobsen questions the basis of why Professor Sadid maintains that 
every1hing that is wrong at the College of Education is based on the failure of leadership. 
Professor Sadid, without being disrespectful replies to the Dean's inquiry and several 
times in his reply stated that he had proof to back up his position. Dean Jacobsen 
comments that he is not interested in any of Professor Sadid's proof. Dean Jacobsen 
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suggests that they [faculty and administration] had to work together if they were going to 
be successful. Professor Sadid asks of Dean Jacobsen if the Dean was working with them. 
Dean Jacobsen replied that he was and Professor Sadid responded that he was not. Dean 
Jacobsen responded that he did not agree with Professor Sadid's assessment. 
Recording: 1 :45:50 - 1 :46:45 Dean Jacobsen Not Offended by Comments and 
Desires an Open Dialogue 
In speaking to his belief that the members of the College of Engineering had to work 
together, Dr. Jacobsen stated, "I'm not offended by anything you have said" in speaking 
to the whole group. Dr. Jacobsen goes on to say that "I have never learned to properly 
have the ability to hold a grudge" Further Dean Jacobsen said, "I like it when people 
open up and say what they think." At that point Professor Sadid chimed in and mentioned 
two words: "Honesty" and "Integrity" to which Dr. Jacobsen replied "that goes without 
saying Habib." 
Recording: 1:54:50 -1:55:00 Dr. Jacobsen Expresses that the Meeting was Good 
"Don't Hate This Type of Discussion." 
A faculty member "Bruce" asked to speak on a topic and in so doing remarked that the 
meeting had been contentious. Dr. Jacobsen responded. "Its been a good meeting. Don't 
hate this kind of discussion. It is not a bad idea to do this." 
In summary, an analysis of Exhibit lOF reveals the following: 
• That Professor Sadid was engaged in the discussions during the meeting where he felt 
that he had input. In addressing Dean Jacobsen, Provost Dr. Gary Olson and others, 
Professor Sadid was very direct, very professional and not intimidated by others during 
this discourse. 
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• That other faculty members beside Professor Sadid questioned the performance of the 
administration and specifically questioned the performance of Dean Jacobsen. Indeed, 
one faculty member suggested that given the part-time status of the Dean Jacobsen, 
perhaps the College of Engineering would be better off without a Dean. Still another 
faculty member, relying on false information, questioned Dean Jacobsen's honesty and 
the lack of transparency in the budget process. 
• That Provost Dr. Gary Olson was not offended by Professor Sadid's descriptive words 
used to underscore Professor Sadid's observation that the present administration of Dr. 
Vailas' lacked in integrity and was not truthful. 
• That Provost Dr. Gary Olson in this public forum, in language that would be considered 
insubordinate and disrespectful in a non-academic forum, lambasted the Idaho State 
Board of Education and its members and in very strong and disparaging remarks likened 
the members to uneducated circus performers. 
• That a member of the faculty was very upset with how she had been personally treated 
and expressed a strong personal desire to leave the employ of the Employer. 
• That Dean Jacobsen publicly maintained that he was not offended by anything anyone 
had said at the Meeting; and of significant importance Dean Jacobsen states publicly that 
"Its been a good meeting. Don't hate this kind of discussion. It is not a bad idea to do 
this." 
2. Professor Sadid's Speech Is Constitutionally Protected And Therefore Must Fall 
Within the Standards Of Behavior Which The Employer Had A Right To Expect Of 
Him 
In the Employer's claim for review, the Employer relied heavily upon the grant of 
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Summary Judgment issued in litigation involving the Employer and Professor on December 18, 
2009. In that case, the Sixth District Court, Judge David C. Nye, presiding, held that as a matter 
of law that there was no First Amendment protection for Claimant who was speaking not on 
matters of public concern, nor was Claimant speaking as private citizen on matters of public 
concern. Fruiher, even if the Claimant was speaking on a matter of public concern as a private 
citizen, the speech of Claimant was not a motivating factor for the decision to take any action 
complained of in Claimant's complaint. The Employer represented to the Industrial Commission 
that: 
"Accordingly, it has already been determined in a court oflaw that Dr. Sadid had no 
"right" to make statements for which he has suffered retaliation, and that it was not a 
cause for the adverse employment actions, including his terminatioll." (Emphasis added) 
(Employer's Brief on Claim for Review., p. 4) 
The above quote is a misstatement of fact. It is clear from Exhibit B herein that the court 
considered the original complaint and the amended complaint. The amended complaint also 
added new factual allegations but retained the same three counts: "(1) count one - claim under 
§I983; (2) count two - breach of employment contact and implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing; and (3) count three - defamation." (Exhibit B., p. 3 01'25) An examination of Exhibit C, 
the amended complaint, reveals that the complaint was not amended to include an additional 
count ohwongful termination. Such a claim would have been an impossibility as Claimant was 
discharged October 30,2009 and Exhibit C was filed on October 15,2009. Further, the Court's 
decision was narrowly tailored to the allegations made in the complaint and concluded that the 
"Defendants [Employer] are entitled to summary judgment on each count in the Amended 
Complaint." (Exhibit B., p. 24 of 25) Claimant has yet to file a wrongful termination claim. 
Therefore, the Industrial Commission cannot rely on a decision made by the Corui where the 
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decision is not applicable to a cause of action that may be filed in the future. The Employer's 
brief failed to inform the Industrial Commission that on January 19, 20lO, the Court specifically 
refused to address the fact that the District Court failed to address a critical component of 
Claimant's case specifically leaving the decision in the hands of the Appellate Courts. This 
critical component is that all of Claimant's speech was done within the confines of academic 
freedom and therefore is protected speech as guaranteed by the 1 st and 14th Amendments of the 
U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho. 
In the case of Garcetti v Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006), the court held that 
when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, they are not speaking 
as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline. In response to a concern expressed by Justice Souter 
in his dissenting opinion regarding the impact of the majority's holding on teachings of "public 
university professors" and academic freedoms found in "public colleges and universities," the 
majority qualified its holding, adding the following caveat: 
Justice Souter suggests today's decision may have important ramifications for academic 
freedom at least as a constitutional value ... There is some argument that expressions 
related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional 
constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court's customary 
employee speech jurisprudence. We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether 
the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case involving 
speech related to scholarship or teaching. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 425 
(Emphasis added) 
In writing this caveat, the Court reserved for later resolution the intricate and complex question 
of the First Amendment protections applied to academic speech. 
Although aware of the Supreme Court's caveat concerning the academic freedom 
exception to the Garcetti analysis, the District Court deliberately chose not to address the issue 
of academic freedom and how Professors Sadid's speech was either protected or not protected by 
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the First Amendment's application to academic freedom. Instead, the trial judge abdicated this 
responsibility to the Idaho Appellate Courts: 
THE COURT: What I hear you telling me basically 
14 is -- if I pare it all down on that first issue - is 
15 that I should not apply Garcetti to the facts of this 
16 case because that case was not intended to extend to the 
17 academic world. If that's true, isn't that a decision 
18 better left to the appellate courts if we're going to 
19 carve out an exception there? 
20 MR. JOHNSON: Well, perhaps, your Honor. But I 
21 believe the way that we would ask the Court to review 
22 that and analyze that is at least give us a ruling on 
23 it. Let us know where this Court stands on that 
24 particular issue. 
25 THE COURT: So you have something to appeal. (Tr. p. 112)2 
10 THE COURT: And I understand that. Had they said-
11 if they were clear enough to say that this case does not 
12 extend to the academic situation, then we've got the 
13 exception. I'm not sure that I read their language as 
14 being clear enough for me as a district judge. (Tr. p. 113) 
In Kerr v. Hurd, 694 F.Supp.2d 817, 2010 WL 890638 (S.D.Ohio, March 15,2010), the 
trial court at the federal level did not hesitate to let the parties know where it stood on a question 
of significant importance to the academic community. Dr. Elton Kerr (Kerr) was a medical 
professor hired by the entity, University Medical Services (UMSA). As an employee ofUSMA, 
Dr. Kerr also taught at Wright State School of Medicine (WS-SOM). His immediate supervisor 
was Dr. William W. Hurd (Hurd). Kerr was eventually terminated from his contract with USMA, 
which had the effect of terminating his employment with the medical school. Kerr brought a 
cause of action alleging, among other claims, a violation of his First Amendment rights in that he 
had been retaliated against for advocating the use of "vaginal delivery over unnecessary cesarian 
2 The relevant pages of the transcript on Claimant/Plaintiff's Motion For Reconsideration heard on January 19,2010 
is included herein as Exhibit D. 
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procedures, and lecturing WS-SOM residents on the proper and appropriate use of forceps" Id. 
at 10. Hurd argued that Garcetti was applicable to this case, as Kerr was not speaking as a 
private citizen as the speech concerning vaginal delivery was made in Kerr's role as an employee 
instructing students at WS-SOM; therefore, the school had a right to regulate Kerr's speech. 
Acknowledging Hurd's assertion that the United States Supreme Court did not decide whether 
Garcetti applied to speech cases arising in an academic environment, in the absence of a United 
States Supreme Court, or Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision to the contrary, the court was 
bound by precedene. However the court, in performing its duty at the federal trial level, went 
on to state the following: 
Even without the binding precedent, this Court would find an academic exception to 
Garcetti. Recognizing an academic freedom exception to the Garcetti analysis is 
important to protecting First Amendment values. Universities should be the active 
trading floors in the marketplace of ideas. Public universities should be no different from 
private universities in that respect. At least where, as here, the expressed views are well 
within the range of accepted medical opinion, they should certainly receive First 
Amendment protection, particularly at the university level. See Justice Souter's dissent in 
Garcetti, citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 
(1967). The disastrous impact on Soviet agriculture from Stalin's enforcement of Lysenko 
biology orthodoxy stand as a strong counterexample to those who would discipline 
university professors for not following the "party line." Dr. Hurd suggests that any 
academic freedom exception to Garcetti must be construed narrowly and limited to 
classroom teaching, relying on Gorum v. Sessions, 561 F.3d 179 (3rd Cir.2009)(Motion, 
Doc. No. 84, at 14). The Court finds no suggestion in the motion papers that Dr. Kerr's 
advocacy for forceps deliveries was outside either the classroom or the clinical context in 
which medical professors are expected to teach. (Emphasis added) 
Kerr v. Hurd, 2010 WL 890638 at 20. 
Thus, the court found that Kerr's advocacy could not be excluded from the protection of the First 
3 The precedent the court was referring to was the unreported case of Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Ed. ofTipp City 
Exempted Village Sch. Dist., 2008 WL 2987174 (S.D.Ohio) which considered Garcetti rejecting the Seventh 
Circuit's position and adopting the Fourth Circuit's position applying the traditional Pickering-Connick approach to 
cases involving in-class speech by primary and secondary public school teachers. Applying the precedent the court 
sustained the Defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
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Amendment. The court based its decision on the fact that the speech was made within his role as 
an employee and instructor of the school. Therefore, protecting First Amendment values 
warranted an academic freedom exception to the rule that public employees making statements 
pursuant to their official duties were not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes. 
Public and private universities are supposed to be active trading floors in the marketplace of 
ideas. Aware of the fact that the Supreme Court expressly left undecided in Garcetti the extent to 
which its analysis would apply in an academic setting, the Sixth Circuit, granted constitutional 
protection to teacher in-class speech; or as stated in Garcetti, speech related to scholarship or 
teaching. 4 It may be expressly inferred from the position taken by the Sixth Circuit, that because 
of the critical role that the academic community plays in educating the public and expanding the 
scope of human knowledge, the boundaries around protected speech must be broad so as not to 
chill the public discourse. See Amici Curiae Brief for the American Association of University 
Professors, the Foundationfor Individual Rights in Education (Fire), and the Thomas Jefferson 
Center for the Protection of Free Expression in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant, 2010 WL 
2642629 at 23 (July 2010) 
Academic speech under the First Amendment is neither governed by Garcetti nor 
susceptible to the "official duties" analysis reflected in Garcetti. Therefore, the scope of First 
Amendment protection for academic speech (i.e. scholarship or teaching) must be governed by 
more than a half-century of decisions, beginning with Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 
77 S.Ct.1203, (1957), which recognizes the vital role that academic speech by college and 
university professors plays in our society and the First Amendment interest in that speech: 
4 See also Sheldon v. Dhillon, 2009 WL 4282086, pp. *3 -*4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2009) acknowledging that Garcetti 
by its express terms does not address the context squarely presented here; and acknowledging that the Ninth Circuit 
has not determined the scope of the First Amendment's application to the classroom. 
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The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost self-
evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those 
who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in 
our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of 
education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be 
made. Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are 
accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannotflourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and 
distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to 
evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise, our civilization will 
stagnate and die. (Emphasis added) 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211 - 1212 (U.S. 1957) 
More recently, and one year prior to Garcetti, the Tenth Circuit, in Schrier v. University 
of Colorado, 427 F.3d 1253 recognized that academic freedom was of particular concern of the 
First Amendment: 
Courts have conspicuously recognized that academic freedom is a "special concern" of 
the First Amendment: 
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of 
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is 
therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that 
cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State 
a/NY, 385 U.S. 589,603,87 S.Ct. 675,17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967); Vanderhurstv. Colo. 
Mountain Call. Dist., 208 F .3d 908, 913 (10th Cir.2000) (academic freedom is "a special 
concern of the First Amendment"); see also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487,81 
S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960) ("The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is 
nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools."). We have also noted 
that a greater degree of conflict is to be expected in a university setting due to the 
autonomy afforded members of the university community. Hulen, 322 F.3d at 1239 
(recognizing that "conflict is not unknown in the university setting given the inherent 
autonomy of tenured professors and the academic freedom they enjoy,,).5 
5 Hulen v. Yates, 322 F.3d 1229, 1239 (lOth Cir. 2003) reads in pertinent part as follows: 
At the same time, conflict is not unknown in the university setting given the inherent autonomy of tenured 
professors and the academic freedom they enjoy. See Sweezv, 354 U.S. at 250. 77 S.Ct. 1203 (plurality opinion); id. 
at 262. 77 S.Ct. 1203 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result); American Ass'n ofUniv. Professors, 1940 Statement of 
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure with 1970 Interpretive Comments, available at http:// 
www.aaup.orgistatementslRedbooklI940stat.htm (last updated June 2002). 
The actual website has changed to http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/contentsI1940statement.htm and 
the relevant quote is that "Controversy is at the heart of the free academic inquiry which the entire statement is 
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Schrier v. University olCo. 427 F.3d 1253, 1265 -1266 (C.A.lO (Colo.),2005) (Emphasis added) 
Through a review of Exhibit lOF, it can be seen that Professor Sadid's speech in the April 
21, 2009 Meeting addressed issues critical to scholarship at Idaho State University. Professor 
Sadid engaged Dr. Jacobsen in ,1 discourse regarding the Faculty Workload Policy and how it 
must be addressed throughout the University and specifically within the College of Engineering. 
Using his own circumstance by way of example, Professor Sadid made the point that without a 
standardized metrics based system, the College of Engineering did not have an accurate way to 
measure and therefore correctly and precisely judge the performance of its faculty. Professor 
Sadid voiced his disappointment in the lack of honesty and integrity exhibited by the past and 
present administrations. Professor Sadid addressed the need for the Employer to invest in the 
infrastructure of the university commenting that it would be difficult for the university to receive 
grant funding if the grantor did not see a commitment by the university. Professor Sadid openly 
expressed his displeasure with what he perceived as the non-existent fund raising efforts of the 
past fourteen years by the Deans of the College of Engineering. Exhibit 10F lays bare the robust 
atmosphere in which Professor Sadid, as well as others, criticized the administration. Indeed, 
there is no doubt that Professor Sadid's and other's comments were the spark of controversy; 
however, controversy is to be expected and is the heart of free academic inquiry. See fn. 5. 
On March 24, 2010, the Industrial Commission issued its Decision and Order wherein it reversed 
the decision of the Appeals Examiner awarding unemployment benefits to Claimant and declared 
that the Claimant was discharged for employment-related misconduct and therefore ineligible for 
wlemployment benefits. In this case, the Industrial Commission stated: 
designed to foster" (Emphasis added) 
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... This case is analogous to an Idaho Supreme Court case were a claimant continued to 
criticize employer and its polices despite the employer's clear directive to express those 
criticism in private. Gatherer v. Doyles Wholesale, 111 Idaho 470, 725 P.2d 175 
(1986) ... Claimant may argue that his actions did not constitute misconduct and were for 
the benefit of the College and facuIty. However, Claimant's subjective state of mind for 
making the comments is irrelevant. Mattews v. Bucyru- Erie Co., 101 Idaho 657, 659, 
619P.2d 1110, 1112(1980.). 
March 24,2010 Decision and Order of the Industrial Commission pages 10 and11 
Contrary to the position taken in the Industrial Commission's March 24, 2010 Decision 
and Order, it would be a mistake to simply equate Claimant's, administrator's (i.e., Provost etc.) 
professor's, teacher's and other academic's standard of behavior with non-similarly situated 
private or public employee's for purposes of First Amendment protection related to academic 
freedom. Academic Freedom provides considerable protection to academics who from time to 
time, or consistently as the situation dictates, criticize or face criticism of their academy peers or 
superiors. Thus, the comparison of the Industrial Commission of this matter to that of the 
Claimants in Gatherer v. Doyles Wholesale, and Matthews v. Bucyrus Erie Co is inappropriate. 
In Gatherer, the Claimant was a warehouse supervisor of a candy and tobacco wholesaler. 
Claimant's family had previously owned the business and Claimant constantly criticized and 
took issue with the new owner's policies. Claimant was instructed not to raise his voice where 
other employees could hear the criticisms. When asked to work overtime one day, Claimant 
'''created a scene' in front of the other employees in the office." Gatherer at 471, 176. The 
Claimant was subsequently discharged. In Matthews, the Claimant was terminated for obtaining 
a leave of absence under false pretenses not for expressing his legitimated concerns in an 
appropriate forum. In both cases, the Employers were not public entities, nor were the 
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Claimant's distinguished tenured professors with more than twenty-two years seniority.6 The 
latter comparison would chill an academic's ability to speak without fear on controversial 
subjects, where the opinion ofthe academic ran counter to the administration's party line. The 
current decision of the Industrial Commission is known throughout Idaho State University, the 
Employer. The Industrial Commission's decision at present mirrors that of the District Court and 
has thus far failed to take into consideration the fact that Professor Sadid's speech enjoys 
constitutional protection. As could be predicted, the District Court's decision has brought 
significant apprehension to academics within Idaho. (Exhibit E) As most recently argued in the 
Fourth Circuit: 
Botlt in practice and in constitutional law, tlte actual duties of state university 
professors implicate - indeed, demand - a broad range of discretion and autonomy tltat 
find no parallel elsewhere in public service. Much of the controlling language of 
Garcetti implicitly recognizes the profound differences between academic speech by 
professors and other public employees, something that the court below declined to do. 
For example, tlte Garcetti majority's suggestion tltat most public employees are subject 
to "managerial discipline" on the basis of statements contrary to agency policy would 
be anathema in tlte academic setting; indeed, academic speech usually does not 
represent tlte official policy or view of the university. Further, although the Garcetti 
majority comfortingly referred to "whistle-blower protection laws and labor codes" as a 
parallel source of protection for public workers, such alternate recourses are unlikely to 
avail most state university professors. (Emphasis added) 
Amici Curiae Brief for the American Association of University Professors, the Foundation for 
Individual Rights in Education (Fire), and the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of 
Free Expression in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant, 2010 WL 2642629 pp. 21-22 (July 2010) 
Academic Freedom if it is to mean anything must encompass the ability of faculty members of a 
public university: 
" to speak or write-as a private citizen or within the context of one's activities as an employee 
6 The Bucyrus-Erie Company is a maker of heavy machinery used in heavy construction. See 
http://www.bucyruseriemodels.com/home.aspx.This company is not a public university and its employees are not 
public employees engaged in academic pursuit. 
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of the university-without institutional discipline or restraint on matters of public concern as well 
as on matters related to professional duties, the functioning of the university, and university 
positions and policies." (Emphasis added) 
University o/Wisconsin Madison, Recommendation to Amend Faculty Policies and Procedures 
as adopted by the Faculty Senate, April 12, 2010 (Exhibit F) 
In light of the facts of this case, the historical and special concern given to academic 
freedom and the lead set in the judicial districts mentioned herein, it is imperative that the 
Industrial Commission conclude that the academic freedom exception to Garcetti must apply to 
this case. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
It has been shown herein, through a complete and thorough examination of Exhibit 10F, that 
Professor Sadid's speech in the April 21, 2009 meeting was very direct, forceful yet professional 
and of a character that one would expect to encounter in an academic setting among tenured 
faculty members. As noted herein, contention and controversy are at the heart of a vibrant 
academic community. In this case, the Employer's representative refused to characterize the 
Meeting as contentious. Instead, the employer characterized the Meeting as "being a good 
meeting" and implored the faculty to refrain from disdaining such meetings. The Employer's 
representative further commented that he enjoyed it when faculty members "open[ ed] up and say 
[said] what they think [thought]". Given the content, context, and academic setting in which 
Professor Sadid engaged in discussion, his actions were not only within the standard of behavior 
an Employer could expect of its employees, Professor Sadid's speech and participation by the 
Employer's own admission, did not offend the Employer. Lastly but of significant importance, 
Professor Sadid's speech during the Meeting was protected under academic freedom, which is a 
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"special concern" of the First Amendment. Therefore, Professor Sadid' s speech was sheltered 
by the 1st and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Sections 9 and 10 ofthe 
Constitution of the State of Idaho. An examination of Exhibit 10F demands that the Industrial 
Commission conclude that its Decision and Order of March 24,2010 must be reversed thereby 
securing unemployment benefits for the Claimant in this matter. 
Dated this 26th day of August 2010. 
CLAIMANT'S BRIEF ON EXHIBIT 10F 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26th day of August, 2010, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
700 S. CLEARWATER LANE 
BOISE, ID 83712 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0041 
JOHN A. BAILEY, JR 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & BAILEY 
CHTD. 
PO BOX 1391 
POCATELLO, ID 83204-1391 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
STATE HOUSE MAIL 
317 WEST MAIN STREET 
BOISE, ID 83735 
( ) U.S. Mail 
(x) Hand Delivery 
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt 
Requested 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Statehouse Mail 
(x) U.S. Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt 
Requested 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Statehouse Mail 
( ) U.S. Mail 
(x) Hand Delivery 
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt 
Requested 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Statehouse Mail 
R.A. ( on) Coulter 
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College of Engineering 
Faculty/Staff Meeting 
TuesdaYJ April 21 ! 2009 - 3:00 p.m. 
Rendezvous A, REND 
Agenda 
1. Call to Order 
2. Facufty Meeting Minutes - Wednesday, April 6, 2009. Minutes not yet available, will be distributed 
later. 
3. Introduction and Comments - Provost Gary Olson 
4. Opening Remarks - Dean Jacobsen 
5. Lack of Academic Progress - Dismissal Policy - Dr. Wabrek (See attached Item #5) 
6. Utilizing Space In Colonial Hall- Bruce Savage 
7. ISU Enrollment Plan for AYs 2010·2014 (See attached Item #7) 
B. Proposed Path to an ISU Enrollment Plan (See attached Item #8) 
9. Other Business 
10. Announcements: 
a. Remlnder - Provost Olson's Meeting with ALL Faculty Tomorrow, Wednesday, April 22nd, in 
the PSUB Movie Theater 
b. Engineering Advisory Council Meeting, Monday, May 4Ut a15:30 p.m., PSUB Woodriver Room 
(See attached Item #10b) 
11. Adjourn 
/ 
EXHIBIT 
A 
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IN THE DISTRIT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
~'. '.J 
HABIB SADID, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
v. Case No. CV-2008-3942-0C 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, ROBERT 
WHARTON, JA Y KUNZE, MICHAEL 
JAY LINEBERRY, MANOOCHEHR 
ZOGHI, RICHARD JACOBSEN, GARY 
OLSON, AUTHUR V AILAS and 
JOHN/JANE DOES I through X, whose 
true identities are presently unknown, 
DECISION ON MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendants. 
This matter came before this Court for hearing on Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on November 2, 2009. The Plaintiff was represented by Sam 
Johnson. The Defendants were represented by John Bailey. Stephanie Morse was the 
court reporter. The Court reviewed the documents submitted by the parties, heard oral 
argument from counsel, and took the matter under advisement. Now, the Court issues its 
decision granting the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL mSTORY 
The Plaintiff, Habib Sadid, was an associate professor in the Department of Civil 
Engineering at Idaho State University ("ISU"). He began working for the University in 
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1991. In 1993, Sadid was given full tenure and he became an associate professor. In 
1999, he became a full professor at ISU. 
In 2001, Sadid published a letter to ISU faculty and administrators. The letter 
criticized the ISU administration for its plan to merge the College of Technology with the 
College of Engineering. The administration eventually decided not to follow through 
with the merger for 2001 and the plan did not arise again until 2003, 
In 2003, Sadid spoke to the Idaho State Journal about the merger again. Sadid 
argues that the plan was designed in secret, which is deceptive to the community and to 
ISU faculty and staff. Some of Sadid's comments were published in the paper and some 
were published internally by ISU. Sadid contends that ISU retaliated against him for the 
comments made in 2001 and 2003. 
Sadid claims that some of the acts of retaliation are that ISU did not perform its 
faculty evaluations of him from 2001 to 2006. Sadid alleges that more acts of retaliation 
came in 2006 when he was not appointed as the chair of the College of Engineering and 
in 2008 when Michael Lineberry wrote an e-mail which referred to Sadid as a "nut case," 
Sadid claimed that the Lineberry statement defamed him and that it is part of the 
retaliation against him. Sadid claims that the 2006 retaliation led to an economic loss 
suffered by Sadid in the amount of $35,000 per year. On August 24, 2006, Sadid was 
offered an opportunity to apply for the chair position, however, he declined. The position 
was eventually given to a candidate outside of ISU, Additionally, Sadid alleges that ISU 
has further retaliated against him by increasing his salary at the lowest percentage. 
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On September 29, 2008, Sadid filed a non-verified Complaint against ISU and 
Lineberry that contains three counts: (1) violation of constitutional rights under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983; (2) Breach of Employment Contract and the implied Covenant of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing; and (3) Defamation of Character. The Prayer for Relief seeks 
monetary damages, costs, and attorney fees. On August 27,2009, Sadid filed a Motion to 
Amend Complaint and attached a proposed amended complaint to the motion. The 
motion states that it is based upon the grounds that Sadid needed to identify and include 
additional Defendants and needed to include additional factual allegations based upon 
discovery ensued to date. The Motion to Amend Complaint was set for hearing on 
October 5, 2009. The Defendants, ISU and Lineberry, filed a motion for summary 
judgment based on the original Complaint and set it for oral argument on October 13, 
2009. In response to the motion for summary judgment, Sadid filed a motion for 
additional time under Rule 56(f), which the Court granted. The Court also granted the 
. motion to amend complaint and on October 15, 2009, Sadid filed his First Amended 
Complaint, which added six more defendants: Robert Wharton; Jay Kunze; Manoochehr 
Zoghi; Richard Jacobsen, Gary Olson; and Authur Vailas. 1 The amended complaint also 
added new factual allegations but retained the same three counts: (1) count one - claim 
under §I983; (2) count two - breach of employment contact and implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing; and (3) count three - defamation. Additionally, the Prayer 
1 Nothing in the record suggests that the added defendants were properly served with the 
Amended Complaint. However, Defendants' Reply Memorandum re: Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment states that it is filed on behalf of all defendants. Therefore, it appears that 
the added defendants have at least voluntarily appeared in this matter. 
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for Relief in the amended complaint still sought monetary damages, costs, and attorney 
fees. However, it also sought injunctive relief ordering ISU to instate Sadid as Chair of 
the College of Civil Engineering. No other relief is sought. 
After allowing Sadid the additional time he requested pursuant to IRCP 56(f), oral 
argument on Defendants' motion for summary judgment occurred on November 2,2009. 
The Court deems the summary judgment motion to be against the Amended Complaint 
and against all defendants. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Rule 56( c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allows that summary judgment 
"shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Smith v. Meridian 
Joint School Dist. No.2, 128 Idaho 714, 718, 918 P.2d 583, 587 (1996) (quoting I.R.C.P. 
56(c»; see also Idaho Building Contractors Association v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 126 
Idaho 740,890 P.2d 326 (1995); Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745,890 P.2d 331 (1995). 
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at 
all times with the party moving for summary judgment. Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 
894,896-97, 155 P.3d 695, 697-98 (2007). Generally, the record is to be construed in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, with all reasonable 
inferences drawn in that party's favor. ld. If reasonable persons could reach different 
conclusions or inferences from the evidence, the motion must be denied. Id. However, 
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the nonmoving party must submit more than just conc1usory assertions that an issue of 
material fact exists to withstand summary judgment. The nonmoving party's case must 
be anchored in something more than speculation, and a mere scintilla of evidence is not 
enough to create a genuine issue offact. Id.; Tuttle v. Sudenga Industries, Inc., 125 Idaho 
145,868 P.2d 473 (1994). 
Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of the moving party, when the 
nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's 
case upon which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. 
Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530-31, 887 P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1994); Badell v. Beeks, 
115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126 (1988)). The party opposing the summary judgment 
motion "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings, but 
the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. (quoting IDAHO R. CIV. 
P. 56(e); Nelson v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409, 797 P.2d 117 (1990). If the nonmoving party 
does not come forward as provided in the rule, then summary judgment should be entered 
against that party. State v. Shama Resources Ltd. Partnership, 127 Idaho 267, 270, 899 
P.2d 977,980 (1995). 
DISCUSSION 
On or about September 14, 2007, Sadid filed a formal complaint with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and claimed ISU discriminated against 
him for his national origin and/or religion and also retaliated against him since 2001. 
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Sadid asserts that claim was filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. He 
acknowledges that he received a "right to sue" letter from the EEOC and he was 
infonned that he must file a Title VII civil action for illegal discrimination within 90 days 
of receiving the letter. Sadid admits he abandoned any claim under Title VII and is now 
pursuing the claims under § 1983 and he claims that the only time barring for filing 
Section 1983 claim is the statute of limitation as discussed below. Therefore, this matter 
does not concern Title VII but concerns 42 U.S.C. § 1983, breach of contract law, and the 
Idaho Tort Claims Act. The Court will first address the § 1983 Claim. 
1. Plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim 
Sadid claims that the Defendants have violated his right to freedom of speech 
under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1 Sections 9 and 
10 of the Idaho Constitution along with his property rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1 Section 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution. Sadid seeks relief for these alleged violations under Title 42 Section 1983 
of the United States Code. 
Sadid alleges that in his capacity as a faculty member and full·professor of ISU, he 
has, from time to time, openly and publicly expressed his views regarding matters of 
public concern relating to ISU and its standing in the academic and local community. 
See, First Amended Complaint, pg. 5, para. 13. Sadid further specifically identifies two 
separate incidences in which he claims he exercised his protected right to free speech. 
First, he alleges that in 2001 he published a letter to his fellow faculty members and to 
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ISU administrators criticizing ISU's decision to merge the College of Technology with 
the College of Engineering. Id., at para. 14. Second, Sadid alleges that in 2003, he 
publically spoke out against ISU's renewed plan, designed in secret, to merge the two 
colleges and that some of his comments were published in the Idaho State Journal while 
other of his comments were published internally at ISU. Id., at para. 15. Sadid claims 
that the University retaliated against him for the expression of protected speech. 
There are five questions the court must answer to determine whether under § 1983 
there is a valid First Amendment retaliation claim. Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1070 
(9th Cir. 2009). The questions are: 
1. whether the plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern; 
2. whether the plaintiff spoke as a private citizen or public employee; 
3. whether the plaintiffs protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in 
the adverse employment action; 
4. whether the state had an adequate justification for treating the employee 
differently from other members ofthe general public; and 
5. whether the state would have taken the adverse employment action even absent the 
protected speech. 
Id. If the plaintiff did not speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern then the 
plaintiff does not have a First Amendment cause of action based on his employer's 
reaction to the speech. Brewster v. Bd. Of Educ., 149 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 1991). The 
plaintiff has the burden of proof on the first three tests. That is, Plaintiff has the burden 
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of showing that: (1) "the speech addressed an issue of public concern"; (2) "the speech 
was spoken in the capacity of a private citizen and not a public employee"; and (3) "the 
state took adverse employment action" and the speech !twas a substantial or motivating 
factor in the adverse action." Jacobson v. Schwarzenegger, --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2009 WL 
2633762 (C.D.Cal. 2009). Only if plaintiff passes these three tests does the burden shift 
to the defendants to show that the government's interests outweigh the plaintiffs First 
Amendment rights, or that it would have taken the same action even in the absence of the 
protected conduct. Id. 
1. Matter of Public Concern. A public employee's speech is protected under the 
First Amendment only if it falls within the core of First Amendment protection--speech 
on matters of public concern. Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agr., --- u.s. ----, 128 S.Ct. 
2146, 2152, 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47, 103 S.Ct. 
1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). The Supreme Court has made clear that public employees 
do not surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason of their employment. Rather, 
the First Amendment protects a public employee's right, in certain circumstances, to 
speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 
410,417, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 143, 103 
S.Ct. 1684; Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 
(1968). 
The question of whether the matter was a public concern is a question of law. 
Berry v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642, 648 (9th Cir. 2006). If the speech in question 
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does not address a matter of public concern then it is unprotected. Eng at 107l. When 
the speech is a political, social or other concern to the community, then it is a matter of 
public concern. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 128, 103 S.Ct. 1684 (1983). Alternatively, 
if the speech deals with "individual personnel disputes and grievances" and it is not 
related to the "relevance to the public's evaluation of the performance of governmental 
agencies" then it is not a matter of public concern. McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705, F.2d 
1110,1114 (9th Cir. 1983). Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public 
concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as 
revealed by the whole record. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-148. The plaintiff bears the 
burden of showing the court that the speech is a matter of public concern. Eng citing 
Connick. 
Sadid claims that he was speaking of a matter of a public concern. In two of the 
letters (Exhibit A, written February 9, 2003 and MarclL9, 2003) the Court infers that 
Sadid is arguing that this is a matter of public concern because it is an issue of interest to 
the tax paying public. However, "[t]o presume that all matters which transpire within a 
government office are of public concern would mean virtually every remark and certainly 
every criticism directed at a public official would plant the seed of a constitutional case." 
Connick at 149, 103 S.Ct. 1684. Therefore, to simply claim that all matters relating to 
ISU's plans of department mergers are matters of public concern is overly broad. 
The Defendant directed the Court to a case that is similar to this one, Hong v. 
Grant, 516 F.Supp.2d 1158 (C.D. Cal. 2007). In Hong, the defendant (among several 
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others named) was Grant, who was the Chair of the Department of Chemical Engineering 
and Materials Science at the University of California-Irvine. The plaintiff was Hong, 
who was an engineering professor at the university. He made several critical statements 
about the hiring and promotion of other professors. He claimed his First Amendment 
rights were violated when the university retaliated against his statements by denying him 
a salary increase. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which the district court 
granted in their favor. 
The district court analyzed whether Hong's statements were matters of public 
concern and concluded that they were not by stating: "While Hong argues that his 
statements are of public concern because they exposed government waste and 
mismanagement, they are more properly characterized as internal administrative disputes 
which have little or no relevance to the community as a whole." Id. at 1169. The court 
followed the rule set out in Connick that a statement by an employee is not the public's 
concern if it "cannot fairly be considered as relating to any matter of political, social or 
other concern to the community." Hong at 1169 quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, 103 
S.Ct. 1684. 
The Hong Court also related its decision to a 7th Circuit case, Colburn v. Trustees 
of Indiana University, 973 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1992). In Colburn, two professors claimed 
that they were denied tenure and a promotion because the university retaliated against 
their claimed protected speech. In the letters that the professors wrote they claimed that 
the "integrity of the University was being threatened." Id. at 586. The court held that 
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even though the public would have appreciated the knowledge of the alleged wrongdoing 
of the department, it noted that simply because the matter would be interesting to the 
public does not make it a matter of public concern. Id. As a result, the court granted the 
defendant's motion for summary judgment against the two professors. 
After reviewing the argument of Sadid, the case law, and the entire content, form 
and context of his letters, the Court disagrees with Sadid's claim that this was a matter of 
public .concern. The Court finds that the letters contain nothing more than personal 
grievances against ISU regarding matters that relate directly to Sadid's interest in his 
employment. The content and opinions may in fact be interesting to the public; however, 
the value of interest alone does not make the matter a public concern. Furthermore, 
simply because it involves a matter that may have occurred behind close governmental 
doors does not make it a public concern. Sadid's statements go more to matters of an 
internal administrative dispute than a matter of public concern. Here, Sadid has failed to 
show that the statements made were a public concern. He cannot pass the 1st test under 
Eng. As a result, Sadid does not have a valid First Amendment claim for protected 
speech. 
2. Speaking as a Public Employee or Private Citizen. When a person enters the 
government employee workforce, by necessity, he must accept certain limitations on his 
freedom. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671, 114 ~Ct. 1878 (1994). Government 
employers need a significant degree of control over their employees' words and actions, 
much like private employers do. Connick at 143, 103 S.Ct. at 1684. If the government 
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employer did not have control "there would be little chance for the efficient provision of 
public services." ld. 
To this end, the Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion 
and control over the management of its personnel- and internal affairs. This 
includes the prerogative to remove employees whose conduct hinders 
efficient operation and to do so with dispatch. Prolonged retention of a 
disruptive or otherwise unsatisfactory employee can adversely affect 
discipline and morale in the work place, foster disharmony, and ultimately 
impair the efficiency of an office or agency. 
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 1651, (1974). Also, governmental 
employees "often occupy trusted positions in society" and therefore, when they speak out 
in public "they can express views that contravene governmental. policies or impair the 
proper performance of governmental functions." ld. 
Sadid asserts that he was speaking as a private citizen when he wrote the articles 
for the newspaper.2 He argues that because his job description does not mention anything 
to the fact of a duty to write newspaper articles that critique the ISU administration is 
evidence that he was speaking as a citizen. The Court disagrees with Sadid's argument. 
Whether his job description requires him to write articles is not the determining factor of 
him being in the role of a citizen or a public employee. After reviewing Sadid's letters 
that were published, the Court finds that the tone of the letters is that of an employee of 
ISU. Additionally, Sadid should understand that he has limitations of his speech that he 
accepted when becoming a state employee. Furthermore, Sadid continuously argues in 
his brief and even in the published article itself that he was speaking as. a private citizen, 
2 This argument is directly contrary to his assertion in the Amended Complaint that he spoke in 
"his capacity as a Faculty Member and Full Professor of ISU". 
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yet in both of the published articles he identifies himself as an ISU employee. Therefore, 
due to the tone and language of the letter the Court finds that Sadid was speaking as an 
employee and not as a private citizen. As a result, Sadid has also failed to meet the 2nd 
test under Eng. 
3. Whether the Protected Speech was a Substantial or Motivating Factor in 
ISU's Action. As found in the discussion above, the Court fmds in favor of the 
Defendants on this issue for two reasons: 1) the letters written by Sadid were not 
protected speech and 2) nothing in the evidence provided by the Plaintiff proves that ISU 
had any motivation for not hiring Sadid as the Chair. In fact, the Court finds that there is 
nothing in the record to suggest that Sadid even applied for the position of Chair. 
Without such an application, Sadid could have no reasonable expectation that he would 
be hired for the position. Sadid has failed to meet the 3rd test under Eng. 
In light of the foregoing analysis, Sadid's First Amendment claim fails each of the 
first three questions under the Eng test and the Court fmds that there is not a valid First 
Amendment claim .. Therefore, Defendants are granted summary judgment on Count One. 
II. Breach of Contract and Implied Warranty 
Sadid alleges, in Count Two of his Amended Complaint, that ISU breached his 
employment contract and breached the implied warranty of good faith and fair dealing 
associated with that contract. Specifically, Sadid alleges that ISU and its employees 
failed to perform annual evaluations of Sadid for the years 2001 through 2006 and that 
this failure constitutes a breach of ISU policy and his employment contract. Defendants 
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allege, in their motion for summary judgment, that they are entitled to summary judgment 
on Count Two because the contract claim is time barred, plaintiff has failed to establish a 
breach, plaintiff has failed to establish any damages, and because he failed to follow the 
grievances procedures set forth in the Faculty Handbook. 
In response to defendants' summary judgment motion as to Count Two, Sadid 
argues that breaches occurring in 2003 through 2006 are not barred by the five year 
statute of limitations and breaches occurring in 2001 and 2002 are not time barred 
because they are "captured" by the continuing violation doctrine. Additionally, Sadid 
argues that he did file a grievance under the Faculty Handbook and that it was denied. 
1. Whether The Contract Claim Is Time Barred. An action for a written 
contract must be brought within five years. I C. § 5-216. The statutory time period does 
not begin to run until a cause of action has accrued. Saddlehorn Ranch Landowner's, 
Inc. v. Dyer, 146 Idaho 747, 750, 203 P.3d 677,680 (2009); citing Simons v. Simons, 134 
Idaho 824, 830, 11 P.3d 20, 26 (2000). Sadid is claiming that ISD had a contractual 
obligation to perfonn annual evaluations and ISD breached the contract because from 
2001 until 2006 ISD did not complete his annual evaluations. 
Sadid argues that because the Complaint was filed on September 29, 2008, the 
five year statute of limitations allows the Court to look back to September 29, 2003, for 
any alleged breach of contract. Sadid further argues that the "continuing violation" 
doctrine applies to his breach of contract claim and would allow him to attach the 2001 
and 2002 alleged breaches. Sadid did not provide any law that supports the argument that 
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the "continuing violation" doctrine applies to contract actions as opposed to § 1983 
actions or state tort actions. The Court did not fmd any law that states that the doctrine 
relates to claims of breach of contract, similar to this situation. 
In the absence of any case law on this issue, this Court finds that each incidence -
each time an evaluation was not performed - constitutes a separate breach and not an 
ongoing breach. To find otherwise would effectively render the limitation period for any 
cause of action alleging failure to perfonn meaningless when the perfonnance is to be 
done on a regular basis. The purpose of a statute of limitations is to bar stale claims and 
avoid problems of proof arising from stale memories. Accepting Sadid's continuing 
violation theory on a breach of contract claim would hinder and frustrate the ultimate aim 
of limitations periods. The breach of contract claim does not involve an ongoing breach 
but multiple separate breaches. Therefore, the statute of limitations bars any alleged 
breach occurring more than five years prior to the filing of the Complaint. Sadid cannot 
purse a breach of contract claim for any event occurring prior to September 29,2003. 
2. Whether Plaintiff Has Shown a Breach of Contract. Sadid claims that the 
failure of ISU to do the evaluations caused him damages because he did not receive an 
annual salary increase or the Chair position. Sadid directs the Court to section (B)(l) of 
the ISU Handbook, which states: 
Each year the chair of a department must submit to the Dean of the Chair's 
college an evaluation of each faculty member in that department. .. the 
evaluation, together with the opinion of higher administrators, will be used 
as one (I) basis for the fmal recommendation relative to reappointment, 
nonreappointment, acquisition or tenure, or as other personnel action, 
whichever is appropriate. 
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FACULTY/STAFF HANDBOOK, Part 4, Section IV, (B)(l). The Defendants argue that 
(B)(7) actually applies, which states: 
It is the policy of the Board that at intervals not to exceed five (5) years 
following the award of tenure to faculty members, the performance of 
tenured faculty must be reviewed by members of the department or unit and 
the department chairperson or unit head. The review must be conducted in 
terms of the tenured faculty member's continuing performance in the 
following general categories: (a) teaching effectiveness, (b) research or 
creative activities, ( c) professional related services, (d) other assigned 
responsibilities, and (e) overall contributions to the department. 
FACULTY/STAFF HANDBOOK, Part 4, Section IV, (B)(7). Overall, after reviewing the 
ISU faculty handbook provisions that counsel has provided, the Court does not agree with 
Sadid's argument of a breach of contract by ISU by failure to conduct an annual 
evaluation of Sadid. The Court recognizes that Defendant Kunze acknowledged that he 
had a responsibility to conduct faculty evaluations and that he did not complete the 
performance evaluation process with Sadid on an annual basis. Kunze's Deposition, 
Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Counsel, p. 46, Li. 11-22; p. 49, LI. 9-14; p. 56, LI. 1-10; p. 
62, LI. 2-22. However, Sadid received his tenure in 1993, and according to the ISU 
Faculty Handbook, annual evaluations of a tenured professor are not required. What 
matters in this case is whether Sadid received an evaluation every 5 years after receiving 
tenure. For the five year period immediately preceding the filing of the Complaint Sadid 
testified that he did not receive an evaluation in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006. See, 
Affidavit of Plaintiff in Opposition to Defenndants' Motion for Summary Judgment, para. 
5. There is nothing in the record relating to 2007 or 2008. If Sadid received an 
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evaluation in either of these years, his breach of contract claim fails. Sadid, as plaintiff, 
carries the burden of proof on the issue of breach of contract. His failure to provide any 
evidence that ISU failed to evaluate him at any time during the five years immediately 
. preceding the filing of his Complaint warrants summary judgment against him on the 
breach of contract claim. 
Alternatively, the Court does not need to determine whether or not the evaluations 
were completed at least every five years for a tenured professor because Sadid did not 
provide any evidence that shows he had a contract for a yearly salary increase. 
Additionally, at the hearing for this motion, Sadid did not rebut the Defendant's claim 
that he could not receive the Chair position simply because he did not apply for the 
position. Sadid's contract does not guarantee annual evaluations, yearly salary increases, 
or the Chair position. He has not shown any injury from the alleged breach of contract. 
The Court grants Defendants summary judgment on Count Two of the Amended 
Complaint, the breach of contract claim, on the grounds that the statute of limitations has 
terminated any claim for breach occurring prior to September 29, 2003, and that the 
Plaintiff has not shown that ISU failed to evaluate him at any time within the five years 
immediately preceding the filing of the Complaint. Alternatively, Sadid has not shown a 
contractual requirement that in which the parties agreed to assign Sadid the Chair 
position, a yearly salary increase, or an annual evaluation. ISU did not breach the 
contract. Defendants are granted summary judgment on Count Two. 
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III. The Defamation Claim 
Sadid alleges, in Count Three of his Amended Complaint, that Lineberry and ISU 
defamed him. This is a tort claim under state law. Specifically, Sadid alleges that 
Lineberry sent an e-mail on the ISU email system on August 1, 2008, and it addressed 
matters regarding the operation of the College of Engineering. Also in the e-mail was a 
statement about Sadid that referred to him as a "nut case." Sadid alleges that the contents 
of the email were defamatory to his character and that the e-mail constituted retaliation. 
Lineberry and ISU moved for summary judgment on Count Three on the grounds that 
Sadid failed to file a Notice of Tort Claim prior to commencing litigation, that defendants 
are entitled to immunity under I.C. § 6-904(3), and that no defamation occurred. 
In response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Count Three, 
Sadid argues that his Notice of Tort Claim was timely filed because it was filed before 
the filing of the Amended Complaint, that Lineberry was not acting within his official 
capacity at ISU when he made the "nut-case" statement, and that Lineberry acted with 
malice such that the immunity under I.C. § 6-904(3) does not apply. 
1. Whether the Plaintifrs Defamation Claim is Barred by the Idaho Tort 
Claim Act. Sadid filed his original Complaint on September 29, 2008. He served the 
Complaint and Summons on ISU and Lineberry on October 15, 2008. See, Affidavit of 
Service signed by Eric Hansen and filed on October 31, 2008, and Affidavit of Service 
signed by Jamie Hansen andfiled on October 31, 2008. Two copies ofthe Summons and 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial were served on the Attorney General on October 6, 
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2008. See, Affidavit of Service signed by Tri-County Process Serving and filed on 
October 15, 2008. Defendants ISU and Lineberry filed a Motion to Dismiss on 
November 26,2008, allegirig that Plaintiff had not properly served the Secretary of State 
as required by the ITCA. On December 3, 2008, Plaintiff served the Summons, 
Complaint and Notice of Tort Claim on the Secretary of State. See, Affidavit of Service 
signed by Tri-County Process Serving and filed on December 8, 2008. 3 Sadid filed his 
Amended Complaint on October 15, 2009. It alleges that "A written Notice of Tort 
Claim has been filed in compliance with the Idaho Tort Claims Act, with the Secretary of 
State for the State of Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-905 and § 6-907." See paragraph 
32 of the Amended Complaint. 
Lineberry's e-mail that Sadid claims is defamatory was sent in August 2008. 
Whether his defamation claim is barred is an issue that "can be decided as a matter of law 
via the notice requirement of the Idaho Tort Claims act" McQuillen v. City of Ammon, 
113 Idaho 719, 722, 747 P.2d 741, 744 (1987). 
Idaho Code § 6-905 reads: 
All claims against the state arising under the provisions of this act and all 
claims against an employee of the state for any act or omission of the 
employee within the course or scope of his employment shall be presented 
to and filed with the secretary of state within one hundred eighty (180) days 
from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered, 
whichever is later. 
3 The Notice of Tort Claim is not in the Court's file. However, the Affidavit of Plaintiff in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment states that "A written Notice of Tort 
Claim has been filed in compliance with the Idaho Tort Claims-Act, with the Secretary of State 
for the State ofIdaho pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-905 and § 6-907." See paragraph 20 o/the 
Affidavit. 
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I.C. §6-905. The statutory period begins to run at the occurrence of the wrongful act 
even if the full extent of damage is unknown. McQuillen, 113 Idaho, at 722. 
"Knowledge of facts which would put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry is the 
equivalent to knowledge of the wrongful act and will start the running of the 120-day 
period." Id. The ITCA states that the claim must be "presented and filed within the time 
limits." I.C. § 6-908. The State or its employee has 90 days to respond to the claim. 
I.C. § 6-909. If the claim is denied, the claimant may institute an action in the district 
court. I.C. § 6-910. Compliance with the Idaho Tort Claims Act's notice requirement is 
a mandatory condition precedent to bringing suit, the failure of which is fatal to a claim, 
no matter how legitimate." McQuillen (citing Overman v. Klein, 103 Idaho 795, 654 P.2d 
888 (1982); I.C. § 6-908). The notice requirement is in addition to the applicable statute 
of limitations. Id. 
In the original Complaint filed on September 29, 2008, the Plaintiff did not allege 
the he had filed a written notice in compliance with the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The 
Plaintiff argues that this was remedied by his Amended Complaint filed on October 15, 
2009, which does note the filing of the notice with the Secretary of State. Plaintiff's First 
Amended Complaint And Demand For Jury Trial, p. 9. However, the Plaintiffs 
argument i~ misleading, whether the Amended Complaint corrects the problem is 
irrelevant. The focus should be that the Plaintiff filed suit before he filed the notice with 
the Secretary of State, which is a mandatory condition precedent to bringing the suit. 
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In Euclid Ave. Trust v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 306, 193 P.3d 853 (2008), Euclid 
filed a Complaint, Petition for Judicial Review and Request for Jury Trial on December 
12, 2005. The pleading sought judicial review of the City's actions, a declaration that an 
emergency ordinance was invalid, mandatory relief and civil damages. A few days after 
the complaint was filed, Euclid filed a tort claim. Euclid filed an amended complaint in 
January, adding a due process claim. The City filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for 
summary judgment. The trial court granted the City summary judgment and Euclid 
appealed. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that the trial court had granted 
summary judgment to the City on Euclid's claim under the ITCA because Euclid did not 
comply with the notice requirements of the ITCA. The Supreme Court affirmed the 
summary judgment without any discussion of whether the amended complaint cured the 
failure to file the notice before filing suit. 
Plaintiff, in effect, asks the Court to ignore the filing of the original complaint and 
to look only to the filing of the amended complaint to determine if notice was timely 
--
given. However, plaintiff also argues that for purposes of deciding the statute of 
limitations issues, the filing of the amended complaint relates back to the date of filing of 
the original complaint. These are inconsistent positions. A plaintiff cannot "cure" a 
failure to give proper notice prior to filing suit by giving such notice after filing suit. To 
do so defeats the purpose of the notice requirement. Sadid's original Complaint alleged a 
claim for defamation. This claim clearly falls under the ambit of the ITCA. ISU and 
Lineberry had the right to receive a notice of this claim before litigation began. ISU and 
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Lineberry had the right to have 90 days to decide whether to accept or reject the claim 
before litigation began. Those rights, granted under the ITCA, were denied when Sadid 
served the notice of tort claim with the complaint on the Secretary of State. By then, the 
complaint for defamation had been filed and the purposes for the notice requirement 
frustrated. 
The purposes of the notice of claim requirement under the ITCA are to: (1) save 
needless expense and litigation by providing opportunity for amicable resolution of 
differences among parties, (2) allow authorities to conduct a full investigation into the 
cause of the injury in order to determine the extent of the state's liability, if any, and (3) 
allow the state to prepare defenses. Driggers v. Grafe, --- P.3d ----, 2009 WL 4067998 
(Ct. App. 2009). Therefore, using its discretion, the Court finds that the alleged 
defamation claim is barred by the Idaho Tort Claim Act as to any claim against ISU or 
against Lineberry alleging he acted within the scope of his official capacity at ISU.4 
In reaching this conclusion, the court is aware of Madsen v. Idaho Dept. of Health 
and Welfare, 114 Idaho 624, 759 P.2d 915 (Ct. App __ 1988), in which the Court of 
Appeals suggested that a plaintiff could dismiss his complaint without prejudice, serve 
his notice under the ITCA, and then file a new complaint - if the time period for serving 
notice had not yet expired. However, Sadid did not dismiss his Complaint but merely 
filed an Amended Complaint, thus frustrating the purposes of the notice requirement. 
Sadid even filed a Notice of Intent to Take Default prior to the filing of the Amended 
4 These are the only two defendants against whom the defamation claim is asserted. 
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Complaint and within 90 days of the time he claims the notice oftort claim was served on 
the Secretary of State. Obviously, Sadid had no intent to stay litigation while the State 
investigated his claim or the other purposes ofthe notice requirement were met. 
2. Whether Immunity Applies. Defendants argue that even if the defamation 
action is not barred by the notice requirements of the ITCA, they have immunity under 
I.C. § 6-904(3). That statute states: 
A government entity and its employees while acting within the 
course and scope of their employment and without malice or 
criminal intent shall not be liable for any claim which: 
3. Arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false 
arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, 
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights. 
Plaintiff s Amended Complaint asserts that Lineberry acted with malice when he sent the 
--
e-mail. Sadid further argues in opposition to summary judgment that Lineberry did not 
act within his course and scope of employment when he sent the e-mail. I.C. § 6-903(a) 
states that the State is only liable for wrongful acts of its employees if they were acting 
within the course and scope of employment. Therefore, Sadid cannot bring this 
defamation action against ISU. Lineberry, on the other hand, cannot claim the immunity 
afforded by I.C. § 6-904(3) for conduct falling outside the scope of his employment and 
done with malice. 
3. Whether Defamation Occurred. If the comments do not harm the reputation 
of the plaintiff in the community or deter third parties from associating with him then 
they are not defamatory comments, even if they are derogatory. Rubenstein v. University 
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of Wisconsin Ed. Of Regents, 422 F.Supp. 61, 64 (E.D. Wis. 1976). Additionally, if 
comments are not made to the general community then the community cannot "lower its 
estimation" of the plaintiff. Id. In Rubenstein, the plaintiff filed a claim of defamation 
for the defendant's comment of "old biddy" referring to the plaintiff, along with an 
additional opinion that the plaintiff was not suitable for the promotion at issue and also 
commenting that the plaintiff was "just out to make trouble." Id. The court dismissed the 
plaintiffs defamation claims because the remarks did not harm her reputation. Id. 
The issue of defamation in this case is much like that of Rubenstein. Sadid claims 
that the comments made by Lineberry were defamatory and resulted in him not getting 
the Chair position. The e-mail was not sent to the general public and therefore it could 
not affect his reputation in the community or deter any third parties from associating with 
him. Furthermore, Sadid has failed to provide any evidence that any opinion of Sadid 
was affected by the email. Therefore, the Court finds that even though the e-mail' s 
language is derogatory, the term "nut case" is not defamatory because Sadid's reputation 
was not affected. Lineberry is entitled to his opinion. 
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Count Three. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on each count in the Amended 
Complaint. Both parties raised issues not addressed in this decision; however, those 
issues were not addressed because the above issues are dispositive. Defendants are 
hereby granted summary judgment in this matter. Defense counsel is instructed to submit 
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a proposed final judgment. Plaintiff s counsel WIll have three days to file any objection 
to the proposed judgment. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: December 18, 2009. 
v 
<::::=A~~ 
DAVIDC.NYE 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
HABIB SADID, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
v. Case No. CV 2008-39420C 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, ROBERT FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 
WHARTON, JAY KUNZE, MICHAEL DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
JAY LINEBERRY, MANOOCHEHR 
ZOGHI, RICHARD JACOBSEN, GARY 
OLSON, AUTHUR VAlLAS and 
JOHN/JANE DOES I through X, whose 
true identities are presently unknown, 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, Habib Sadid, by and through his attorney of record, Sam 
Johnson, of the law fInn of Johnson & Monteleone, L.L.P., and for causes of action 
against the above-named Defendants complains and alleges as follows: 
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EXHIBIT 
C 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiff, Habib Sadid, Ph.D., PE, is now, and at all relevant times herein was a 
Tenured Faculty member and Full Professor with the College of Engineering at Idaho 
State University, located in the city of Pocatello, Idaho. Professor Sadid currently resides 
in Pocatello, Bannock County, Idaho. 
2. Defendant Idaho State University (hereinafter "ISU"), is now, and at all relevant 
times herein was, a "body politic and corporate, with its own seal and having power to 
sue and be sued in its own name" (See Idaho Code § 33-3003) and is now and at all 
relevant times herein ''was established in the city of Pocatello, Idaho, an institution of 
higher education to be designated and known as the Idaho State University, consisting of 
such colleges, schools or departments as may from time to time be authorized by the state 
board of education." See Idaho Code § 33-3001. 
3. Defendant Robert Wharton, at relevant times herein, held the position of Provost 
and Vice President for Academic Affairs for ISU, and while in his official capacity acted 
under color of law, regulation, custom or policy in a manner which caused Plaintiff to 
suffer from the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured to Plaintiff by the 
United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State ofIdaho, and is being sued in 
his individual and representative capacities. 
4. Defendant Jay Kunze, at relevant times herein, held the position of Dean for the 
College of Engineering for ISU, and while in his official capacity acted under color of 
law, regulation, custom or policy in a manner which caused Plaintiff to suffer from the 
deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured to Plaintiff by the United States 
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Constitution and the Constitution of the State ofIdaho, and is being sued in his individual 
and representative capacities. 
5. Defendant Michael Lineberry, is now, and at all relevant times herein was acting 
pursuant to custom and policy derived from the official capacity delegated to him by ISU, 
and is being sued in both his individual and representative capacities. 
6. Defendant Manoochehr Zoghi, at relevant times herein, has held and does 
currently hold the position of Chair of Department of Civil and Environmental 
Engineering for ISU, and while in his official capacity acted under color of law, 
regulation, custom or policy in a manner which caused Plaintiff to suffer from the 
deprivation of rights, privileges,· or immunities secured to Plaintiff by the United States 
Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Idaho, and is being sued in his individual 
and representative capacities. 
7. Defendant Richard Jacobsen, at relevant times herein, has held and does currently 
hold the position of Dean for the College of Engineering for ISU, and while in his official 
capacity acted under color of law, regulation, custom or policy in a manner which caused 
Plaintiff to suffer from the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured to 
Plaintiff by the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Idaho, and 
is being sued in his individual and representative capacities. 
8. Defendant Gary Olson, at relevant times herein, has held and does currently hold 
the position of Provost and Vice President for Academic Affairs for ISU, and while in his 
-
official capacity acted under color of law, regulation, custom or policy in a manner which 
caused Plaintiff to suffer from the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
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to Plaintiff by the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Idaho, 
and is being sued in his individual and representative capacities. 
9. Defendant Arthur Vailas, at relevant times here~, has held and does currently 
hold the position of President for ISU, and while in his official capacity acted under color 
of law, regulation, custom or policy in a manner which caused Plaintiff to suffer from the 
deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured to Plaintiff by the United States 
Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Idaho, and is being sued in his individual 
and representative capacities. 
10. John/Jane Does I through X, Defendants (''the Doe Defendants"), are individuals 
or entities, political, corporate, or otherwise, whose true identities are unknown at the 
present time, but who engaged in the activities and conduct set forth herein. 
Alternatively, John/Jane Does I through X are entities or individuals who are now, or at 
the material and operative times were, the agents, employees, independent contractors, 
subdivisions, franchisees, wholly-owned subsidiaries, or divisions of Defendants herein, 
or are entities or individuals acting on behalf of, or in concert with, the individual 
Defendant(s) named herein. 
11. The amount in controversy is greater than the sum of $10,000.00, and this claim 
therefore exceeds the jurisdictional limits of the magistrate's division and thereby 
satisfies the monetary prerequisites of the district court. 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
12. Professor Sadid has been a Tenured Faculty member and Associate Professor in 
the Department of Civil Engineering at ISU since 1994, and has been a Full Professor at 
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ISU since 1999; and, as such, Professor Sadid enJoys a property interest m his 
employment with ISU. 
13. In his capacity as a Faculty Member and Full Professor of ISU, Professor Sadid 
has, from time to time, openly and publicly expressed his views embracing matters of 
public concern relating to ISU, and its standing in the academic and local community; 
these expressions constitute "protected speech". 
14. In 2001, for instance, Professor Sadid published a letter to his fellow faculty 
members and ISU administrators criticizing ISU's decision to merge the College of 
Technology with the College of Engineering. ISU ultimately withdrew the merger plan 
by secretly tabling the issue for the time being. 
15. In 2003, Professor Sadid spoke publicly against ISU's renewed plan, designed in 
secret, to again merge the College of Engineering with the College of Technology. (A 
true and correct copy of the newspaper publication is appended hereto as Exhibit "A" and 
by this reference hereby incorporated herein). Professor Sadid has spoken openly and 
publicly on other matters and on other occasions relating to ISU and of importance to the 
academic and local community, some of such publications were likewise published in the 
newspaper (see Exhibit "A "), while others were published internally at ISU. 
16. Starting in 2001 and for the next five (5) years thereafter, ISU acting through the 
then-Dean of Engineering, Defendant Jay Kunze, failed or refused to conduct annual 
performance evaluations of Professor Sadid's work and these retaliatory practices caused 
Professor Sadid to suffer economic losses due to a lack of otherwise normal and 
customary salary increases and growth and advancement opportunities. 
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17. Thereafter, in August 2006, the ISU facUlty by unanimous vote selected Professor 
Sadid as the Chair of the Department of Civil Engineering which selection was approved 
and ratified by the new Dean of Engineering, Defendant Jacobsen. Nonetheless, ISU 
acting through its Provost, Defendant Wharton, overrode the selection of Professor Sadid 
and instead demanded a national search be conducted by a committee chaired by two 
non-engineering faculty, who were hand selected by Provost Defendant Wharton. These 
retaliatory measures culminated in Defendant ISU's selection and appointment of an 
associate professor from Dayton, Ohio, to Chair of the Department of Engineering, 
effective July 2007. The new appointee was clearly not as qualified as Professor Sadid. 
18. Defendants would not have decided to hire the associate professor from Ohio 
instead of Professor Sadid, unless motivated to retaliate against Professor Sadid for his 
use of protected speech. 
19. Defendants have likewise retaliated against Professor Sadid by increasing his 
salary at the lowest of percentages in spite of him performing at the highest levels of 
academic excellence. 
20. On or about August 1, 2008, ISU once again retaliated against Professor Sadid. 
This retaliation took the form of an e-mail published by ISU administrator, Defendant 
Lineberry, where Defendant Lineberry accused Professor Sadid of throwing a ''tirade'' 
and referred to him as a "nut-case" who "cannot help himself'. (A true and correct copy 
of the above referenced e-mail is appended hereto as Exhibit "B" and by this reference 
hereby incorporated herein). 
21. On September 29, 2008, Professor Sadid petitioned the courts for redress of his 
grievances and asserted his right to trial by jury by initiating this lawsuit. 
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22. Since filing suit on September 29, 2008, the Defendants have continued to 
retaliate against Professor Sadid not only for exercising his rights to freedom of speech, 
but have likewise retaliated against Professor Sadid for petitioning the court for redress of 
grievances and for asserting his right to trial by jury. 
23. On or about, April 6, 2009, for example, Defendant Chair Zoghi sent a letter to 
Professor Sadid falsely accusing him of, inter alia, confronting an administrative 
assistant in an "accusatory" manner in an effort to tarnish the exemplary record Professor 
Sadid has created for himself at ISD. (A true and correct copy of the above referenced 
letter is appended hereto as Exhibit "c" and by this reference hereby incorporated 
herein). 
24. Thereafter, on or about May 6, 2009, Defendant Dean Jacobsen placed Professor 
Sadid on notice of his intent to have Professor Sadid dismissed from ISD based upon 
outlandish accusations not supported by real facts. (A true and correct copy of the above 
referenced notice is appended hereto as Exhibit "D" and by this reference hereby 
incorporated herein). The outlandish nature of Defendant Dean Jacobsen's accusations 
are demonstrated most positively by the contrasting performance evaluations signed by 
Defendant Dean Jacobsen and Defendant Chair Zoghi, praising Professor Sadid for his 
laudatory efforts as an outstanding and leading professor at ISD. (A true and correct 
copy of the above referenced performance evaluations are appended hereto as Exhibit 
"E" and by this reference hereby incorporated herein). 
25. Thereafter, on or about July 2, 2009, Defendant Provost Olson issued Professor 
Sadid a "formal letter of reprimand" over alleged ''transgressions of lSD's purchasing 
policies." The alleged transgressions claimed by Defendant Provost Olson, even if true, 
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simply did not warrant the level of disciplinary action taken against Professor Sadid. (A 
true and correct copy of the above referenced reprimand is appended hereto as Exhibit 
"F" and by this reference hereby incorporated herein). 
26. Next, on August 4,2009, Defendant President Vallas, notified Professor Sadid of 
Defendant Dean Jacobsen's recommendation that Professor Sadid's employment with 
ISU be terminated for "adequate cause" and Defendant Professor Vailas has now 
restricted Professor Sadid' s access to the ISU campus and has placed him on 
administrative leave. (A true and correct copy of the above referenced notification is 
appended hereto as Exhibit "G" and by this reference hereby incorporated herein). 
27. Defendants, through their concerted actions, systematically, and by design, 
pattern, and practice have continually retaliated against Professor Sadid for speaking 
openly on matters of public concern and by doing so have impaired and violated 
Professor Sadid's rights to freedom of speech guaranteed under the First Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, and Article 1, Sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution of the 
state of Idaho. The incidents of retaliation have continued to the present day. 
28. Defendants have now placed Professor Sadid's employment based property 
interest in jeopardy without due process by alleging arbitrary, capricious and pretextual 
grounds for termination in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Constitution of the State of 
Idaho. 
29. The above-referenced retaliatory actions likewise stand in direct violation of 
Professor Sadid' s tenured contract of employment with ISU and the laws of the state of 
Idaho, the Rules and Governing Policies and Procedures of the State Board of Education, 
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and all policies and procedures of ISU and any of its departments or offices expressly 
incorporated therein. 
30. As a direct and proximate result of the breach of the employment contract and the 
violations of Professor Sadid's constituponal rights, Professor Sadid has suffered direct 
and consequential losses and damages in amounts to be determined at trial. The losses 
and damages comprise both economic and non-economic harms, including impairment of 
reputation, personal humiliation, and injury to his mental and physical health and well 
being. The losses and damages are prospective in nature and will likely continue for the 
foreseeable future. 
31. Defend~ts would not have retaliated against Professor Sadid but for the fact 
Professor Sadid chose to exercise his right to engage in protected speech. 
32. A written Notice of Tort Claim has been filed in compliance with the Idaho Tort 
Claims Act, with the Secretary of State for the State of Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-
905, and § 6-907. 
33. As a direct and proximate result of the acts and omissions of Defendants, 
Professor Sadid has been required to retain the services of Johnson & Monteleone, 
L.L.P., in connection with the prosecution of this action and requests an award of 
attorney fees and costs incurred in the prosecution and maintenance of the instant action. 
COUNT ONE - DEPRIVATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
UNDER COLOR OF LAW 
34. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference all of the foregoing and following 
allegations of the Complaint. 
35. By retaliating against Professor Sadid in the manner and under the circumstances 
heretofore set forth in this Complaint, Defendants have impaired and violated Professor 
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Sadid's rights to freedom of speech guaranteed under the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, and Article 1, Sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution of the State of 
Idaho and his property rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, section 13 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho. 
These violations entitle Professor Sadid to relief under Title 42, Section 1983 of the 
United States Code, and under the Idaho Constitutional provisions cited above. 
36. As a direct and proximate result of the violations of Professor Sadid's 
constitutional rights, Professor Sadid has suffered direct and consequential losses and 
damages in amounts to be detemiined at trial. 
COUNT TWO - BREACH OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT AND THE 
COVENANT OF' GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING IMPLIED 
THEREIN 
37. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference all of the foregoing and foIIowing 
allegations of the Complaint. 
38. A valid and binding contract of employment was formed and entered into by and 
between Plaintiff and Defendant ISU. 
39. Defendant ISU materiaIIy breached the contract of employment and the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing implied therein. 
40. As a direct and proximate result of the breach of the employment contract and the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied therein, Plaintiff has suffered direct and 
consequential losses and damages in amounts to be determmed at trial. 
COUNT THREE - DEFAMATION OF CHARACTER 
41. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference all of the foregoing and following 
aIIegations of the Complaint. 
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42. Defendants ISU's and Lineberry's retaliatory and slanderous affronts perpetrated 
against and published of and concerning Professor Sadid, with actual malice, have 
defamed his character and good standing in the community. 
43. As a result of these libelous and defaming statements, Professor Sadid's 
reputation in the community, and his professional, financial, and dignitary interests have 
been harmed. 
44. Professor Sadid is therefore entitled to recover damages in amounts to be proven 
at trial. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants as follows: 
1. For Plaintiff's special and general damages in amounts which may be proven at 
trial; 
2. For injunctive relief directing the instatement of Plaintiff to the PQsition of Chair 
of the College of Civil Engineering or to such higher position as this Court deems just 
and equitable in the premises; 
3. For Plaintiffs reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred herein; and 
4. For such other and further relief as this Court deems just and equitable in the 
premises. 
DATED: This ~ day of October, 2009. 
JO~&W:::L2. 
saIIlhIlSOIl I 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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DEMAND FOR JURy TRIAL 
Pursuant to I.R.c.P. 38(b), Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury on any and ail 
issues properly triable by jury in this action. 
DATED: This ~ day of October, 2009. 
JOHNSON & MONTELEONE, L.L.P. 
srun~~ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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and the context of the speech here, Dr. Sadid was 
2 clearly speaking as a private citizen. As we have 
3 pointed out before, it's not a part of his official 
4 duties to criticize ISU and the local newspaper. And 
5 despite the arguments to the contrary, there is just no 
6 way around that conclusion. That isn't a part of his 
7 official capacity. He doesn't get paid to do that, 
8 which was another item that the judge looked at in the 
9 Hong opinion. Those are outside the scope of his 
10 duties. 
11 And when the Court rendered its decision on summary 
12 judgment, the Court indicated and found that whether the 
13 job description requires Dr. Sadid to write articles is 
14 not the determining fact. But, your Honor, we submit 
15 that it is. Garcetti itself says that it is. Garcetti 
16 talks about whether or not the speech is protected 
17 hinging on whether or not the speech was uttered in the 
18 scope of one's official duties. 
19 The United States Supreme Court stated in Garcetti 
20 the controlling factor in Ceballos' case -- again, 
21 Ceballos was the deputy prosecuting attorney subjected 
22 to discipline -- and says a controlling factor in 
23 Ceballos' case is that his expressions were made 
24 pursuant to his duties as a calendered deputy. That was 
25 the controlling factor, your Honor. It's not a 
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the GarcettijEng type of test to the speech in question, 
2 that the result would have to be the same and that 
3 Dr. Sadid's speech is protected and should be protected, 
4 your Honor. 
5 Again, we are speaking on matters of public concern. 
6 We're talking about a tenured professor who has been 
7 with the institution at ISU for over 22 years, your 
8 Honor. If people in his position can't speak publicly 
9 on matters such as those that are found in those 
10 articles, who will be able to do it? No one other than 
11 a professor that's been there with that duration and 
12 that length of tenure is in a position to make that kind 
13 of speech, your Honor. 
14 So we believe that it's particularly critical for 
15 this Court to declare that Dr. Sadid spoke on matters of 
16 public concern and,therefore, was protected from 
17 discipline for doing it. And again, your Honor, we 
18 believe that either test gets you there. But 
19 nonetheless, we believe the proper test is the 
20 
21 
pre-Garcetti framework. 
And, your Honor, with respect to the First 
22 Amendm!!nt, the only other item that I wish to fall back 
23 on at the moment is this notion about the importance of 
24 that public speech. If, again, a professor such as 
25 Habib Sadid cannot speak on those matters and hope to 
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1 controlling factor to look to see whether or not the 
2 newspaper or someone identifies Dr. Sadid as a member of 
3 the faculty at ISU. 
4 What separates a public employee from someone acting 
5 in their capacity as a private citizen is the 
6 determination of whether or not when the speech was 
7 uttered it was done pursuant to official duties. And, 
8 your Honor, it quite clearly was not. Quite clearly it 
9 was not. 
10 And so, your Honor, with respect to this issue on 
11 the First Amendment and the protected status of 
12 Dr. Sadid's speech, we would ask the Court to reconsider 
13 in light of the Pickering/Connick test. The most recent 
14 case that has followed those principles in Idaho is the 
15 KaIT case that I cited to a few moments ago. 
16 Your Honor, we believe that in our particular case, 
17 as a matter of law, that no matter really what test you 
18 apply, you end up with the same result because it seems 
19 to be that the distinguishing factor between the 
20 Pickering/Connick and then the Garcetti and Eng is this 
21 element of whether or not someone was acting in their 
22 official duties when they gave the speech or issued a 
23 speech. 
24 And we think that whether or not the Court wants to 
25 apply on reconsideration the Pickering/Connick test or 
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have protection under the First Amendment, I think it 
2 creates a really troubling scenario for information to 
3 be passed to our public so it can be informed on the 
4 matters such as what's going on at a public institution 
5 of higher learning. 
6 And so we do believe that this is an important case, 
7 your Honor. And we do believe that our position is 
8 strong in this particular case with respect to the First 
9 Amendment. But, your Honor, we also believe that we 
10 have a valid claim for breach of contract. 
11 THE COURT: Before you move on to that --
12 MR. JOHNSON: Yes. 
13 THE COURT: What I hear you telling me basically 
14 is -- if I pare it all down on that first issue -- is 
15 that I should not apply Garcetti to the facts of this 
16 case because that case was not intended to extend to the 
17 academic world. If that's true, isn't that a decision 
18 better left to the appellate courts if we're going to 
19 carve out an exception there? 
20 MR. JOHNSON: Well, perhaps, your Honor. But I 
21 believe the way that we would ask the Court to review 
22 that and analyze that is at least give us a ruling on 
23 it. Let us know where this Court stands on that 
24 
25 
particular issue. 
THE COURT: So you have something to appeal. 
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1 MR. JOHNSON: So that we do have something, if we 
2 need to go there. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. 
4 MR. JOHNSON: But better yet, your Honor, we believe 
5 that in the Garcetti case, the United States Supreme 
6 Court expressly stated that as of this date, we don't 
7 feel we have the need and, therefore, we don't address 
8 whether or not this analysis would carry over to a case 
9 relating to scholarship and education. 
10 THE COURT: And I understand that. Had they said --
11 if they were clear enough to say that this case does not 
12 extend to the academic situation, then we've got the 
13 exception. I'm not sure that I read their language as 
14 being clear enough for me as a district judge. 
15 MR. JOHNSON: And Isee that as a fair point. 
16 Certainly, your Honor. But I would say is that what the 
17 United States Supreme Court is doing, we believe, is 
18 saying that in cases involving speech, academia, 
19 scholarship and teaching, we've got this other framework 
20 that has already been established and has been in play. 
21 And until the United States Supreme Court expressly 
22 extends the Garcetti test to this setting, then the 
23 previous analysis, by simple logic, must apply. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. I understand your position. 
25 MR. JOHNSON: And so our final position on the 
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1 mandatory language in the legal setting, your Honor. 
2 And so that mandatory language says that all faculty 
3 members must be evaluated annually. And, your Honor, 
4 there is no provision in that handbook that says, "Well, 
5 by this we really just mean that it's the nontenured 
6 faculty members." 
7 And so our point on that particular item, your 
8 Honor, is that we've got expressed, plain, unambiguous 
9 language that requires ISU to conduct a performance 
10 evaluation of each faculty member on an annual basis. 
11 And if you apply that handbook language to the facts, 
12 clearly lSU and the defendants here didn't fulfill that 
13 obligation to Dr. Badid. 
14 As the Court acknowledged in its decision on summary 
15 judgment -- and I'm looking at your decision, your 
16 Honor, on page 16 of 25 -- the Court -- this Court says, 
1 Garcetti matter, your Honor -- and I'll move on, but I 
2 just want to make this one last point. 
3 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
4 MR. JOHNSON: Is that Garcetti certainly doesn't 
5 expressly provide that the previous analytical framework 
6 doesn't apply to the academic setting. 
7 And so we've got a scenario where logic works its 
8 way dOVID and the ultimate conclusion is that we've got 
9 to look at the pre-Garcetti analysis for speech in this 
10 setting, your Honor. 
11 So that would be our position on it. And I thank 
12 your Honor for inquiring on that particular question, 
13 and I hope that I've addressed it to the Court's 
14 satisfaction. 
15 Your Honor, on the breach of contract, again, we're 
16 asking the Court to reconsider a certain aspect of the 
17 breach of the contract and that's whether 
18 Professor Sadid has shown a breach. And, your Honor, 
19 the way we read that Faculty Handbook, we just can't see 
20 how any other conclusion can be rendered in this 
21 particular case. 
22 That handbook plainly and clearly spells out that 
23 ISU has a duty to conduct an annual evaluation of each 
24 professor. It says "must." The handbook expressly uses 
25 the word "must, II which has always been deemed as 
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1 matter of law, did breach the contract. 
2 THE COURT: Well, I don't follow that, Counselor, 
3 for the simple reason that Kunze is giving his 
4 interpretation ofthe contract. But that's my job to 
5 interpret the contract, not hk And if the contract is 
6 clear and unambiguous, I have to interpret it. And if 
7 he's wrong on that interpretation, that doesn't allow 
8 you a judgment in his favor -- against him. 
9 MR. JOHNSON: Well, that may all be true, your 
10 Honor. And I will grant that to the Court that if this 
11 Court declares that the language is clear and 
12 unambiguous, then it's a matter for this Court to decide 
13 what of law and not of fact. But if we look strictly at 
14 the language and look at nothing else, your Honor --
15 THE COURT: Tell me how you distinguish the 
16 paragraph that's quoted from the contract higher up on 
17 "The Court recognizes that Defendant Kunze acknowledged 17 page 16. How come that doesn't apply to this situation? 
18 that he had a responsibility to conduct faculty 18 MR. JOHNSON: Further up on page 16, your Honor? 
THE COURT: On page 16 of my decision where there is 19 evaluations and that he did not complete the performance 19 
20 evaluation process with Sadid on an annual basis." 
21 And that testimony is from rsu directly on point 
22 certainly creates a genuine issue of material fact on 
23 whetherur not ISU breached its contractual obligation 
24 with Dr. Sadid. In fact, I think it's fair to argue 
25 that we ought to enter ajudgment finding that ISU, as a 
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20 the block quote coming straight out of the handbook. 
21 MR JOHNSON: Oh, on the periodic--
22 
23 
24 
THE COURT: The five years. 
MR. JOHNSON: -- performance evaluation? 
THE COURT: Are you saying that that's different 
25 from the annual review? 
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Academic Freedom, Constitutional Free Speech, 
and Faculty Governance 
By Nick Gier, President, Higher Education Council 
Idaho Federation of Teachers, AFT/AFL-CIO 
For more details on the Sadid case go to www.idaho-aft.org/Sadid.htm 
The AAUP strongly supports the right of faculty to exercise an independent voice 
in shared governance, without fear of discipline or punishment by the institution. 
--Gary Rhoades, General Secretary 
American Association of University Professors 
In 1889 the founders of the State of Idaho gave the "immediate government of the 
University of Idaho to the faculty." This faculty prerogative was not formally recognized 
until 1968, when the Faculty Senate was established for "shared governance" between the 
faculty and the administration. 
Because meaningful faculty governance came so late in the life of the nation's 
universities, the principle of academic freedom has not been formally extended to the 
right to speak freely in all venues of university governance. Recently, cases of 
administrators accusing their faculty of insubordination and unprofessional conduct and 
actually dismissing professors for these reasons have increased. This obviously has 
caused alarm among the nation's professors. 
In 2006 Supreme Court voted 5-4 in Garcetti v. Ceballos that public employers 
can limit their employee's constitutional right to free speech in the performance of their 
official duties. Richard Ceballos was a deputy district attorney in Los Angeles who 
claimed that he was demoted (to "DA Siberia" so it seems) because of a dispute with his 
supervisor Gil Garcetti. Ceballos filed a grievance, but an appeal board ruled that 
Ceballos had failed to prove retaliation. 
Lower court judges have cited Garcetti in higher education cases, but they seem 
to have ignored Justice Anthony Kennedy's exception. Writing for the majority, he stated 
that the decision would not "apply in the same manner to a case involving speech related" 
to university professors. 
The four justices who dissented in Garcetti v. Ceballos were very concerned 
about removing a large segment of the popUlation from constitutional speech protection. 
Justice John Paul Stevens cited a case in which an English teacher's right to criticize her 
school district's policies as racist was upheld. 
Why should teachers lose their free speech rights just because they are public 
employees, especially teachers whose job is to prepare students for life in a democratic 
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society? The motto for my union, the American Federation of Teachers, is "Democracy 
in Education--Education for Democracy." 
When he proposed that faculty may be exempt from Garcetti, Justice Kennedy 
mentioned only teaching and research, not faculty governance. As far as I know, the 
principle of shared governance is practiced only on college and universities campuses, 
and this makes them significantly different from a district attorney's office or any other 
public employee workplace. 
In a recent column in the Chronicle of Higher Education (12/9/09), Gary Olson, 
Provost at Idaho State University, also limits academic freedom to teaching and research. 
As he states: "A college or university has no comparable incentive to protect extra-
disciplinary speech because such discourse is peripheral to the normal workings of the 
campus." 
I'm truly amazed that Olson has somehow forgotten about faculty governance, 
especially since his faculty has been so aggressive in claiming its prerogatives in this 
area. In 2005 the ISU faculty held a no-confidence vote on then President Richard 
Bowen and he was forced to leave the university. In April of 2010, 68 percent of those 
ISU faculty voting declared that they had no confidence Provost Olson. 
When professors raise issues in faculty senates and general faculty meetings, they 
are rarely speaking from their disciplines; rather, they are talking generally about the 
institution's mission, curriculum, or budget allocations. Faculty committees vote on 
tenure and promotion across the disciplines, and faculty have a major say in these 
essential decisions. Faculty appeal boards also consider faculty grievances and sometimes 
(not often enough from my experience) rule against the administration. 
In a strong response to the misuse of Garcetti in faculty cases, the American 
Association of University Professors maintains that the "critical distinction between a 
faculty member and an employee of a corporation [is that] the faculty member is acting 
not as a spokesperson for the institution--and so subject to control for the views 
expressed--but as a citizen of the institution." 
A federal judge recently rejected a suit by a UC Irvine professor who claimed that 
he was denied a merit raise because he had criticized his department for hiring too many 
part-time faculty. Using Garcetti, the judge ruled that the professor was speaking as a 
public employee and therefore not protected by the First Amendment. 
Conscientious faculty members are now in an incredible bind: just when they 
need free speech protection, Garcetti takes it away. In his dissent in Garcetti Justice 
David Souter wrote: "I have to hope that today's majority does not mean to imperil the 
First Amendment protection of academic freedom in public colleges and universities, 
whose teachers necessarily speak and write 'pursuant to official duties. '" 
Last October ISU President Arthur Vailas dismissed tenured engineering 
professor Habib Sadid for a long history of criticizing (sometimes harshly) ISU 
administrators. An award winning teacher, public servant, and active researcher, Sadid 
had received excellent annual evaluations up until 2008. 
The dismissal was triggered by an April, 2009 faculty meeting in which the dean 
reminded those present that they should not afraid of expressing their opinions. Listening 
to a tape of the meeting, a reasonable person could conclude that Sadid was far from the 
most disruptive participant. 
Sadid appealed his dismissal and an appeal board voted 4-1 in his favor. The 
majority concluded that ISU administrators had denied Sadid due process and had failed 
to prove its case. The Faculty Senate asked Vailas to reverse his decision by a vote of 19-
5, but Vailas declined to do so. 
In 2007 Sadid filed a suit charging that ISU had retaliated against him because he 
had spoken out against administrative decisions. Last December District Judge David 
Nye ruled against Sadid, arguing that he had not provided sufficient evidence for 
retaliation. 
Nye also cited Garcetti to bolster his defense of the ISU's actions. As Nye wrote: 
"Sadid should understand that he has limitations of his speech that he accepted when 
becoming a state employee," and that he "does not have a valid First Amendment claim." 
Justice Kennedy, however, says that Sadid may indeed have such a claim. 
The charges against Sadid involve very serious accusations of libel, harassment, 
and threatening physical harm. Two security agents escorted him off the campus and he 
has not been permitted to return. The faculty appeal board wrote that the lack of 
documentation for these charges was "disturbing." 
Many at ISU and the larger community are asking the following questions: Why 
wasn't proper legal action taken at the time of these alleged infractions? Why didn't 
Sadid's department chair mention them in his annual evaluations? Why wasn't Sadid 
given a chance to defend himself? If these charges are as serious as the administrators 
hype them, then they were negligent in not calling the police. 
Sadid's attorney has appealed Judge Nye's decision and they are preparing a suit 
challenging his dismissal. My faculty union has given Sadid ••••••••••• 
_ for the obvious reason that if his termination stands, then the free speech rights 
of all America's professors are threatened. 
Last June the University of Minnesota Board of Regents issued a revised 
statement on academic freedom, that includes "to speak or write without institutional 
discipline or restraint on matters ... related to professional duties and the functioning of 
the university." 
Within the month I will be requesting that Idaho faculty senates adopt similar 
language to make sure that academic freedom includes faculty governance as well as 
teaching and research. Idaho's faculty deserve nothing less than full free speech rights in 
all areas. 
University of Wisconsin 
Madison 
Faculty Document 2186 
1 March 2010 
(As adopted by the Faculty Senate at its meeting on 12 April 2010) 
RECOMMENDATION TO AMEND FACULTY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 8.01. 
Sponsored by Donald Downs (District 68), Lester Hunt (District 66), Bruce Jones (District 1), Barry Orton 
(District 115), Jean-Pierre Rosay (District 63), Eric Schatzberg (District 82), Howard Schweber (District 
68), John Sharpless (District 60), Bruce Thomadsen (District 88), Stephen Vaughn (District 61), and the 
University Committee 
The Basic Issue 
We ask that the Faculty Senate consider an important issue regarding academic freedom that has arisen in the 
wake of a 2006 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Garcetti v. Ceballos. The issue has gained national attention, 
and many academic freedom organizations have called for appropriate remedial action. The issue pertains to 
the right of faculty members to criticize or question policies and actions undertaken by their respective 
institutions. Our intention is to amend Faculty Policies and Procedures in order to address this problem. 
Back~round 
In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered an opinion that poses a threat to the academic freedom of faculty 
members who make statements that challenge institutional authority and/or positions. In Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, the court held that an assistant district attorney could be punished by his office for complaining in 
a memorandum that the office had been submitting too many affidavits for warrants that were unsupported 
by probable cause. 
Even though Ceballos' comments raised important questions about an important public office, the court 
concluded that he was not speaking as a private citizen, but rather was speaking pursuant to his official 
duties as an employee. Consequently, his speech did not merit First Amendment protection. In order for 
employee speech to be protected by the First Amendment, the person must be speaking as a "private 
citizen" about a "matter of public interest." Ceballos fell short because he was speaking pursuant to his 
official duties. 
Garcetti v. Ceballos narrowed the First Amendment protection of public employees who make statements 
critical of their employers. The issue is not that Ceballos and similarly situated individuals should always 
prevail in their First Amendment claims, but rather that the court ruled that the First Amendment provides 
no protection whatsoever when it comes to speech made as part of one's official duties. In the past, the 
court applied a First Amendment balancing test to public employee speech that addressed a ''matter of 
public concern." Garcetti v. Ceballos withdraws this protection if an employee is speaking as part of his or 
her official duty-a term that is broadly defined for most faculty mem bers. 
In a dissent in Garcetti v. Ceballos, Justice Souter worried that the new doctrine could harm the academic 
freedom of faculty members, whose jobs often involve vigorous debate concerning university matters. Our 
campus has witnessed vigorous debates in recent decades over such matters as free speech, academic 
freedom, the Athletic Board, the Madison Plan, sexual orientation and the military, and the Graduate 
School. These and other issues have often led to the formation of policy, yet such policy has seldom ended 
the debate. 
Judicial events since Garcetti v. Ceballos indicate that Justice Souter's concerns were well founded. In 
Renken v. Gregory (2008), an engineering professor was punished for internally criticizing how the 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee was handling a grant he had received from the NSF; and in Hong v. 
Grant (2007), a professor at the University of California at Irvine was denied a merit raise because he had 
criticized the engineering school's actions regarding hiring, promotions, and staff. And in Gorum v. 
Sessoms (2007), a professor was terminated after several public clashes with the president of Delaware State 
University. In each of these cases the courts refused to apply a First Amendment balancing test on the basis 
of the Garcetti v. Ceballos decision. 
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The impact of Garcetti v. Ceballos has garnered much commentary, including: reforms enacted by the 
Faculty Senate of the University of Minnesota; an article by Peter Schmidt in the Chronicle of Higher 
Education ("Balancing of Power: Professors' Freedoms Under Assault in the Courts," 27 February 2009: 
http://chronicle.com/free/v55/i25/25a00103.htm); and extensive coverage by the AAUP (see the AAUP's 
website: http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/protectvoice/Legal! "Legal Cases Affecting Free Speech." 
Conclusion 
State law (Wisconsin Administrative Code UWS 4.01(2)) says that faculty members enjoy "all the rights 
and privileges of a United States citizen, and the rights and privileges of academic freedom as they are 
generally understood in the academic community. This policy shall be observed in determining whether or 
not just cause for dismissal exists. The burden of proof of the existence of just cause for a dismissal is on 
the administration." 
Faculty must be free "to speak or write without institutional discipline or restraint on matters of public 
concern as well as on matters related to professional duties and the functioning of the university" (AAUP 
1994 statement "On the Relationship of Faculty Governance to Academic Freedom"). The proposed 
amendment to Faculty Policies and Procedures 8.01. would provide principled protection for faculty 
engaged in speech pursuant to their official duties. It would also provide a concrete definition of academic 
freedom that has been missing from FPP while also providing the university with appropriate power to 
punish true insubordination. 
8.01. FACULTY RIGHTS. 
A. Members of the faculty individually enjoy and exercise all rights secured to them by the Constitutions 
of the United States and the State of Wisconsin, and by the principles of academic freedom as they are 
generally understood in higher education, including professional behavior standards and the expectation 
of academic due process and just cause, as well as rights specifically granted to them by: regent action, 
University of Wisconsin System rules, these policies and procedures, and relevant practices or 
established custom of their colleges or schools and departments. 
B. Academic freedom is the freedom to discuss and present scholarly opinions and conclusions regarding 
all relevant matters in the classroom, to explore all avenues of scholarship, research, and creative 
expression, and to reach conclusions according to one's scholarly discernment. It also includes the 
right to speak or write-as a private citizen or within the context of one's activities as an employee of 
the university-without institutional discipline or restraint on matters of public concern as well as on 
matters related to professional duties, the functioning of the university, and university positions and 
policies. 
Academic responsibility implies the faithful performance of professional duties and obligations, the 
recognition of the demands of the scholarly enterprise, and the candor to make it clear that when one is 
speaking on matters of public interest or concern, one is speaking on behalf of oneself, not the 
institution. 
C. In any consideration of matters of tenure and academic freedom, the following statement of policy is 
relevant. It was enunciated at the time of the previous codification of the Laws and Regulations of the 
University of Wisconsin by the Regents of the University of Wisconsin on January 10, 1964. "In 
adopting this codification of the rules and regulations of the University of Wisconsin relating to tenure, 
the Regents reaffirm their historic commitment to security of professorial tenure and to the academic 
( continued) 
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freedom it is designed to protect. These rules and regulations are promulgated in the conviction that in 
serving a free society the scholar must himselfbe free. Only thus can he seek the truth, develop 
wisdom and contribute to society those expressions of the intellect that ennoble mankind. The security 
of the scholar protects him not only against those who would enslave the mind but also against anxieties 
which divert him from his role as scholar and teacher. The concept of intellectual freedom is based 
upon confidence in man's capacity for growth in comprehending the universe and on faith in unshackled 
intelligence. The university is not partisan to any party or ideology, but it is devoted to the discovery of 
truth and to understanding the world in which we live. The Regents take this opportunity to rededicate 
themselves to maintaining in this university those conditions which are indispensable for the flowering 
of the human mind." 
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IDOL Docket No. 1777-2010 
EMPLOYER'S BRIEF ON 
RECONSIDERATION 
F r LED 
COMES NOW the Employer, Idaho State University, by and through counsel of record, and 
submits the follovving brief on Reconsideration of the Commission's Order denying benefits to the 
Claimant, Dr. Habib Sadid, pursuant to the Commission's Order of August 5, 2010. The 
Commission ordered Claimant to submit a duplicate of Exhibit 1 OF, which is a recording of the April 
21, 2009 faculty meeting of the College of Engineering, and held he could submit additional 
arguments based on the recording to demonstrate that his conduct at that meeting was not 
inappropriate. As discussed below, Employer submits that the recording demonstrates that 
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IDOL Docket No. 1777-2010 
EMPLOYER'S BRIEF ON 
RECONSIDERATION 
COMES NOW the Employer, Idaho State University, by and through counsel of record, and 
submits the following brief on Reconsideration of the Commission's Order denying benefits to the 
Claimant, Dr. Habib Sadid, pursuant to the Commission's Order of August 5, 2010. The 
Commission ordered Claimant to submit a duplicate of Exhibit 1 OF, which is a recording of the April 
21, 2009 faculty meeting of the College of Engineering, and held he could submit additional 
arguments based on the recording to demonstrate that his conduct at that meeting was not 
inappropriate. As discussed below, Employer submits that the recording demonstrates that 
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Claimant's conduct amounted to cause for dismissal, and urges the Commission to uphold its 
Decision and Order of March 24,2010. 
The Employer hereby objects to the Claimant's submissions dated August 26,2010. The 
Commission's Order Granting Reconsideration stated that it would accept no additional evidence, 
and the Claimant has attached six additional exhibits in violation of this Order. The Claimant also 
raises new issues relating to First Amendment rights that are unrelated to the issues cited in his 
Motion for Reconsideration. Employer respectfully requests that the additional evidence and 
argument be disregarded. Also, Claimant's Briefis overlength, in violation of Industrial Commission 
Rule 5(C). 
FACTS 
Dr. Sadid was a tenured professor of engineering at Idaho State University. His employment 
was terminated for cause in November 2009 based on a recommendation by the Dean of Engineering 
and approved by the university president. The university followed proper procedures leading to the 
termination. The Dean of Engineering issued a notice of contemplated action to Dr. Sadid on May 
6,2009. (Ex. 5, p.22) The notice cited a specific prior instance of "unprofessional, non-collegial, 
disruptive and insubordinate" behavior; a prior warning against such behavior; specific warnings at 
the time of the behavior (the meeting recorded in Exhibit 10F); a long history of disruptive and 
defamatory behavior; and a similarly long history of refusing to comply with instructions and 
counseling from his superiors. The notice invited Dr. Sadid to meet with the Dean to discuss any 
reason, evidence or information in opposition or mitigation to the contemplated action. The 
requested meeting was held in July, 2009, but failed to reach any satisfactory conclusion. 
While the decision on the Dean's recommendation was pending, Dr. Sadid continued to 
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engage in inappropriate behavior. In June 2009, in comments to College of Engineering staff 
members, he accused the Dean of lying under oath in proceedings related to a lawsuit filed by Dr. 
Sadid. He then distributed to the entire College of Engineering faculty cartoons on the subject. (Ex. 
3, pp. 12-15) He also engaged in unauthorized purchases in violation of University procedures, 
which he had twice previously been warned against. (Ex. 6,pp. 15-25) His response to an additional 
warning was to have his lawyers accuse the University of "retaliation." (Ex. 6, p 17) 
On August 4,2009, the lSU President accepted the recommendation of the Dean and placed 
Dr. Sadid on administrative leave with pay. (Ex. 5,p. 2) Pursuant to University policy, Dr. Sadid was 
given a hearing in front of a panel of faculty members, which was authorized to give a nonbinding 
advisory opinion to the president. That hearing was held over several days in October. The panel 
advised against termination, not on the grounds that his behavior had been appropriate, but on the 
grounds that they felt he had not been given sufficient notice and opportunity to correct his 
inappropriate behavior. The president declined to accept the recommendation ofthe faculty panel, 
and terminated Dr. Sadid on November 8, 2009. 
Dr. Sadid filed for unemployment benefits. The University submitted a response to his claim 
for benefits. (Ex. 7) By decision dated December 3, 2009, the Department of Labor determined that 
Dr. Sadid was ineligible for benefits. (Ex. 8) The Department held, on the basis of the 
documentation and written statement provided by lSU, that Dr. Sadid violated the University's 
policies and was terminated for good cause. Dr. Sadid requested an appeal hearing, not disputing 
the facts regarding his behavior, but, rather, asserting that the real reason he was fired was retaliation 
for his exercise of his right to freedom of speech. (Ex. 9, p.2) 
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Dr. Sadid had filed suit against ISU and some of his College of Engineering colleagues in 
September 2008 alleging discrimination and retaliation. On December 18,2009, while Dr. Sadid's 
appeal hearing was pending, Sixth District Judge David Nye granted summary judgment in favor of 
Idaho State University and the other defendants. The court dismissed Dr. Sadid's claim that his 
rights to free speech were violated. The court found that the public comments for which Dr. Sadid 
claimed he suffered retaliation were not protected speech, but merely the kind of disruptive or 
insubordinate speech for which an employee may be punished or terminated. 
Dr. Sadid claimed in his lawsuit against ISU that he was retaliated against for a series of 
public statements and newspaper articles in opposition to various plans of the previous 
administration. The Sixth District Court considered his factual allegations and held that, as a matter 
of law, the issues in question were not matters of public concern, but rather matters of internal 
administrative dispute. Judge Nye also found that Dr. Sadid had not spoken as a private citizen, but 
expressly as an employee ofISU. He ruled, consistent with U. S. Supreme Court precedent, that there 
is no First Amendment protection for University employees speaking on matters of purely internal 
interest. Finally, the court determined that there was no evidence that Dr. Sadid's speech, even if it 
were protected, was a motivating factor in the employment decision. 
Accordingly, it has already been determined in a court of law that Dr. Sadid had no "right" 
to make the statements for which he claims he has suffered retaliation, and that it was not a cause 
for the adverse employment actions for which he filed suit. 1 
lDr. Sadid argues in his Brief on Exhibit 10F, at pp. 12-13, that Judge Nye's Decision 
dismissing his case did not address his termination. This is arguable at the very least. Dr. Sadid's 
Amended Complaint raised all the factual issues having to do with his termination, including the 
Dean's Notice of Contemplated Action based on Dr. Sadid's behavior at the April 21, 2009 
meeting (Claimant'S Exhibit C, ~24); his reprimand for violation of purchasing procedures (~25); 
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On December 22, 2009, the Department of Labor mailed out a notice of the appeals hearing 
scheduled for January 4. As Idaho State University was closed from December 23 until January 4, 
lSU did not receive notice of the hearing in time to participate. 
At the hearing, consistent with his notice of appeal, Dr. Sadid did not challenge the facts 
which ISU contends were cause for his termination. He asserted that the letters of reprimand and 
other complaints about his behavior were simply an attempt by ISU to lay a paper trail to cover lSU's 
retaliation against him. (Recorded hearing at approximately 22:00) In responding to the allegations 
of disruptive and insubordinate behavior, Dr. Sadid generally acknowledged that it had occurred-
he merely justified his behavior on various grounds, while continuing to assert that the real reason 
for his termination was retaliation for his protected speech. Essentially the only testimony directly 
addressing whether cause for termination existed came at the very end of his testimony, when the 
appeals examiner asked Dr. Sadid if he had done anything to warrant termination. Dr. Sadid 
answered, "no." (Recorded hearing at approximately 23:45) 
The appeals examiner held in favor of Dr. Sadid on the grounds that all of the documents 
submitted by ISU were "hearsay," which could not support a factual finding, while Dr. Sadid's 
uncontroverted oral testimony, that he did not do anything to warrant termination, was sufficient to 
justify a finding in his favor. 
lSU's Notification to Dr. Sadid of his termination for cause (~26); retaliation (various 
paragraphs); and that the alleged cause for termination was a pretext to cover retaliation (~27). 
Because his Amended Complaint was filed before the fmal decision to terminate him, he can 
perhaps argue that his claim for wrongful termination was not decided by Judge Nye's summary 
judgment ruling. But it is clear that he raised all the issues of retaliation and academic freedom 
that he is arguing before the Commission on this Motion for Reconsideration. And Judge Nye 
ruled firmly against him on these same issues. Whether he may have an additional claim for 
wrongful termination is not relevant to any issue before the Commission. 
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lSU's request for a rehearing was denied. lSU filed a claim for review before the Industrial 
Commission and requested an evidentiary hearing, which was denied. However, on review, the 
Commission admitted the documentary evidence that was excluded at the appeal hearing. (Decision 
and Order of March 24, 2010, p. 7) 
The Commission found that lSU clearly expressed to Dr. Sadid its standards of behavior, 
which the Commission found were objectively reasonable. (Decision and Order of March 24,2010, 
p. 9) The Commission then found that Dr. Sadid's admitted behavior at the April 21, 2009 faculty 
meeting violated lSU' s standards of behavior, based on a transcript provided by Dr. Sadid. (Decision 
and Order of March 24,2010, pp. 9-10). On review, the Commission held Dr. Sadid ineligble for 
benefits. (Decision and Order of March 24,2010, p. 10) 
Dr. Sadid contended in his Motion for Reconsideration that, in essence, it was beyond the 
competence of the Commission to judge lSU's "sincerity" in establishing its standards of behavior. 
(Claimant's Brief on Motion for Reconsideration, p. 4) Dr. Sadid further argued that it was improper 
for the Commission to consider the transcript of the April 21 hearing that he submitted, and should 
instead review the audio recording as a whole. He argued it would demonstrate that, in context, his 
statements did not transgress lSU's standards of behavior. The Commission agreed that it should 
consider the actual recording, if available, rather than a transcript, and has invited the parties to 
submit arguments based on the recording. 
LA W AND ARGUMENT 
The Commission previously held that the question in a claim for unemployment benefits is 
not whether the employer had "just cause" for terminating the claimant, but whether the reasons for 
discharge constitute "misconduct" connected with employment within the meaning ofIdaho Code 
EMPLOYER'S BRIEF ON RECONSIDERA nON - 6 
§ 72-1366. That section of the Code expressly states that the personal eligibility requirement of a 
claimant is that his unemployment is not due to the fact that he was discharged for misconduct in 
connection with his employment. It does not matter whether the termination would violate University 
policies or breach the employment contract. Ifit was the result of the claimant's employment-related 
misconduct, the claimant is ineligible for benefits. 
The Commission previously held that the Employer has the burden of showing by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the termination was for misconduct, citing Idaho Department of 
Labor v. JR. Simplot Co., 131 Idaho 318, 320, 955 P.2d 1097, 1099 (1998). Misconduct is defined 
as a "willful, intentional disregard of the employer's interest; a deliberate violation of the employer's 
rules; or a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of its 
employees. Gunter v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 143 Idaho 63, 137 P.3d 450 (2006). 
The Commission went on to find that ISU clearly communicated its expected standards of behavior 
to Dr. Sadid, and that those standards were objectively reasonable. (Decision and Order of March 
24,2010, pp. 7-9) 
The Commission then considered the assorted allegations, contentions and slanders raised 
by Dr. Sadid in the April 21, 2009 meeting, and found that "[t]here is little doubt that these 
statements represent the type of conduct that Employer warned Claimant of in the April 6 and 15, 
2009 letters." (Decision and Order of March 24,2010, p. 10) The Commission found that he violated 
the clearly-expressed standards of the employer by raising them during a faculty meeting and not 
through proper channels. 
The sole issue on reconsideration is whether the recordings show that ISU "invited" Dr. 
Sadid's comments in that forum. The recording indisputably show that ISU did not. Dr. Sadid, in his 
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Brief on Reconsideration, also argues that his speech is constitutionally protected even ifin violation 
of reasonable standards of behavior. This issue, although not relevant to this tribunal's decision, will 
also be addressed below. 
1. Dr. Sadid's Behavior at the April 21 Faculty Meeting. The College of Engineering 
faculty meeting of April 21, 2009 lasted more than two hours. The Dean had prepared an agenda of 
items for discussion, but the faculty also expected lSU's new Provost to address the faculty. The 
Provost was not present when the meeting started, so Dean Jacobsen moved to the next item on the 
agenda, which was to remind the department chairs and the faculty committee assigned to the task 
that the new College-wide faculty workload policy needed to be finished within two weeks. 
At about the 3: 15 mark of the recording, Dr. Sadid asked a question, ostensibly about the uses 
to which the workload policy would be put, but in reality a complaint about his previous evaluations. 
He asked the Dean specifically, "if the College did not have a policy, how did you evaluate faculty?" 
The Dean explained that the individual Departments had workload policies, and that Dr. Sadid, when 
he had been Chair of Civil Engineering, had used one. A discussion between Dr. Sadid and a current 
Chair followed for several minutes, and at about the 11 :30 mark, Dean Jacobson intruded and took 
control. 
The Dean explained the history of workload policies at lSU and the College of Engineering. 
At about the 13:00 mark, Dr. Jacobson suggests there is no need to ascribe blame for the 
shortcomings of workload policies in the past, but the College should instead work on producing a 
policy that has some uniformity while meeting the needs of the individual Departments. At about 
14:00, Dr. Sadid asked a question about the policy under development, which the Dean answered. 
Dr. Sadid can then be heard, beginning at 14: 17, reciting a litany of his accomplishments and asking 
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how his Department chair, in his latest evaluation, "arrived at this decision that I barely meet 
expectationsT 
Dr. Sadid stated his disagreement with the evaluation, based on the supposed lack of metrics, 
and asserted that Dr. Jacobson, as Dean, was responsible for the Chair's evaluation. At 15:06, Dr. 
Jacobson cut him off. The conversation went on as follows: 
Dean: "1 am not going to review a single annual review in this meeting, a public 
setting -" 
Sadid: "Well, I can't help that -" 
Dean: "Nor, nor am 1 going to comment on what Dr. Zoghi's review of your 
performance for this year was about. Sorry. It's not a subject-" 
Sadid: "(garbled) But how can you approve of Dr. Zoghi' s decision, based on what 
metric?" 
Dean: "It's not a subject for an open meeting, Habib." 
Sadid: "It is subject. When can we discuss it? You don't have any communication." 
Dean: "Well that's not true, of course-" 
Sadid: "Yes, it is very true. Ask how many people think we have communications 
with Dr. Jacobson? Two? That's good." 
An argument then developed between faculty members until Dean Jaconson cut it off at 16:20, 
Dean: "There are always things we can do better, and I'd be the fIrst to admit it. 
Beyond that, 1 really don't think we should discuss a single review process here. 
(Inaudible objection) Now the workload policy is a fair subject for discussion-" 
Sadid: "I'm asking you how you arrive at the conclusions -" 
Dean: "You know, 1 think we should talk about the workload policy from the 
bottom up. How -" 
Sadid: "(inaudible statement; the words, "exceeds expectations" can be heard)" 
Dean (cutting him off): "Sorry. Go ahead." 
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Female faculty member: "I'm sorry, this is my first time attending a meeting, but that 
sounds like a one-on-one personal meeting, and I really don't want to go through these 
(inaudible) things ... " 
Dean: "Yeah, this is just -" 
Sadid: "This is everybody's problem. You guys are (inaudible) This is everyone's 
problem. You are afraid to raise your voice because of all the retaliations." 
Discussion ofthe workload policy followed. At the 23 :44 mark, Dr. Sadid again raised the 
issue of how past evaluations were performed, and the failures of the administration to develop a 
consistent workload policy over the previous three years. During this speech, the Provost, Dr. Olson, 
arrived. 
As the Commission can see, Dr. Sadid refused to stick to the agenda and ignored specific 
instructions to keep to the agenda items and not to discuss matters relating to specific annual reviews, 
to the point that other faculty members had to express an opinion that the issue he was raising was 
not appropriate. Clearly, it represents precisely the kind of disruptive conduct that the Employer 
warned Dr. Sadid against in the April 6 and April 15 warning letters establishing the standards of 
behavior he was expected to follow. 
But that was not all. About three minutes into the Provost's presentation, another faculty 
member made a comment critical of the Dean's duties regarding the Idaho Falls program. Dr. Sadid, 
unasked, cut off the Provost's response and spoke for nearly two minutes, concluding with, 
Sadid: "If the Administration doesn't communicate with the faculty, we go up the 
ladder, then faculty has no choice but to take issue public, so public can see what's 
going on on this campus. So we don't want to go there, but the Administration-" 
Provost: "Well, let me say two things about that. [Discussion of proposed town hall-
type meetings]. So at least out of my office, you'll see a lot more communication. That 
doesn't mean necessarily we communicate about everything you might want. Because 
sometimes personnel, well, more often than not personnel-type issue you can't 
bring up." 
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The Provost made a direct statement to Dr. Sadid that personnel issues of the type he regularly 
sought to discuss in open meetings were not appropriate. He went on to discuss a review his office 
was making of the College that could result in the closing of departments or of the entire College, and 
requested faculty members make their views kno\vn. 
Dr. Sadid then launched into another monologue about the 20-year history of corruption at the 
university, the President's failure to change things, and the administration's "lying with bold face." 
He brought up the workload policy again, and the Dean, saying, "the Dean of the college is the Dean 
of these administrators who don't do their jobs." 
Again, this was precisely the kind of outburst of personal recrimination, unrelated to his 
academic duties, that Dr. Sadid had been warned against. It was not invited by either the Dean or the 
Provost, both of whom had specifically cautioned Dr. Sadid against raising such personnel issues in 
public meetings. 
At the 1 :00:30 mark of the recording, Dr. Sadid again questioned the Provost about 
fundraising. He asked in effect whether the Provost agreed that Deans should be involved in raising 
money, and the Provost agreed. Dr. Sadid then said, "1 have been at the College of Engineering for 
22 years. In the past 14 years there have been two Deans. They haven't raised any money. How can 
you [survive?] in this environment with Deans not raising funds?" 
Again, this was the kind of inappropriate attack on the integrity of another faculty member that 
Dr. Sadid was expressly warned not to make in open meetings. He was also returning to the kind of 
backward-looking recriminations that were out of place in the meeting, and that neither the Dean not 
the Provost were seeking. The Dean had previously told Dr. Sadid the purpose of the meeting was not 
to ascribe blame for the bad policies of the past, but to look forward. 
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The Dean did not indicate his thanks for Dr. Sadid's comments. At 1 :03:00 in the recording, 
after the Provost had left, the Dean said, "Let's go back to the agenda. One of the things I have to say 
is, this is the first time I've ever heard the Dean's performance discussed in a meeting with the 
Provost in a public setting. I don't know whether that's usual at Idaho State or not. That's a rather 
interesting phenomenon." Dr. Sadid responded with an accusation about the lack of communication 
between faculty and the administration. 
Beginning at 1: 11 :30, Dr. Sadid made another senes of allegations regarding past 
mismanagement of the College by the last two Deans. 
At the 1: 18 :00 mark, at the end of a lengthy discussion about the bad effects on the College 
of the conflicts among facility members, Dr, Jacobson suggested to Dr. Sadid that his complaints, 
specifically his allegations that everyone he disagreed with was "bad" in some way, were not helpful 
to the process of improving matters in the College. Dr. Sadid cut him off: 
Sadid: "I have documented from [former 1SU President] Bowen all the way down, I 
have documented that these people are unethical, these people are just power-hungers, 
they are working for their own interests ... " 
This continued for another two minutes. At the 1 :20: 17 mark, Dr. Jacobson again stated he 
would not discuss certain issues in that forum, and Dr. Sadid again persisted. 
The comments that Dr. Sadid points out in his Brief on Reconsideration are not germane to 
the issues before the Commission. The Dean's general comment that he was not offended by anything 
said during the meeting is irrelevant. The Dean is not the Employer, and the standard of behavior 
expected of facility members is not measured by whether a Dean is offended. In any event, specific 
comments, referenced above, by the Dean to Dr. Sadid advising him against raising issues at the 
meeting are more determinative of this issue than his general comments to the facility as a whole. 
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Nor did the Provost ever indicate that he was "not offended" (Claimant's Brief on Exhibit 
10F, p. 11) by Dr. Sadid's comments about the current administration's "lying with bold face."[sic] 
Rather, the Provost brushed off his complaints and moved on to other issues. The Provost had 
previously warned Dr. Sadid that personnel issues were not appropriate for open meetings. 
Nor are statements made by other persons relevant before this tribunal. The question is not 
whether Dr. Sadid was critical of the Dean, the Administration or anyone else, but whether his 
behavior comported with the standards established in the warnings he received on April 9 and April 
15. Dr. Sadid was specifically advised, as the Commission found, that "in the future, you are directed 
to follow proper protocol in expressing your concerns (first to the Chair of the Department of Civil 
and Environmental Engineering, the to the Dean of the College of Engineering, then to Idaho State 
University's upper administration)." (Exhibit 3, p. 28) Dr. Sadid was later advised, "You should not 
use such channels as campus-wide meetings, engineering facutly meetings, and widely-distributed 
email communications to make negative comments about the performance and! or character of current 
and former university staff and employees .... Communications intended to expose another individual 
to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to impeach his or her integrity or reputation are not 
appropriate. ... Continuing failure to follow these guidelines will be cause for disciplinary action." 
(Exhibit 4, p. 32) 
Dr. Sadid repeatedly violated these standards of behavior in the April 21, 2009 faculty 
meeting. The recording makes that fact abundantly clear. His statements were not invited, as he 
claims, and the recording makes it clear he was repeatedly cautioned not to raise certain SUbjects. His 
comments clearly were not appreciated, either. As this, the sole issue on reconsideration, can be 
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answered in the negative, the Employer respectfully suggests that the Claimant's motion to reconsider 
should be denied, and the Commission should affirm its decision in this matter. 
2. Academic Freedom. The second half of Dr. Sadid' s brief attempts to argue that anything 
he might happen to say, at any time and in any forum, dealing with Idaho State University, falls under 
the banner of "academic freedom" and is therefore constitutionally privileged. As an initial matter, 
this argument is irrelevant to the question before the Commission. As the Commission previously 
held, the question in a claim for unemployment benefits is not whether the employer had 'just cause" 
for terminating the claimant, but whether the reasons for discharge constitute "misconduct" connected 
with employment within the meaning ofIdaho Code § 72-1366. (Decision and Order of March 24, 
2010, p. 5) As the Commission noted, whether the employer had reasonable grounds for dismissing 
a claimant is irrelevant; the only issue is whether the true reasons for discharge constituted work-
related misconduct. 
Misconduct is defined as n(1) a willful, intentional disregard of the employer's interest; (2) a 
deliberate violation of the employer's rules; or (3) a disregard of standards of behavior which the 
employer has aright to expect of its employees." Quinn v. JR. Simplot Co., 131 Idaho 318, 321, 955 
P.2d 1097, 1100 (1998). This Commission found that Dr. Sadid disregarded reasonable standards of 
behavior. 
Dr. Sadid is now claiming a privilege to engage in the misconduct identified above, on the 
ground that "academic freedom" requires that he be permitted to disrupt meetings, slander colleagues 
and otherwise ignore standards of behavior applicable to others. However, as his own arguments 
make clear, no court has ever established such a privilege. Dr. Sadid relies primarily on Kerr v. Hurd, 
2010 WL 890638 (S.D. Ohio 2010), but that decision declined to establish an academic freedom 
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exception to the employer's right to control employee conduct. Dr. Sadid cannot cite a single case in 
which a court has done so. It is not the place of the Industrial Commission to create such an exception 
where courts have refused. 
Second, the academic concerns raised by Dr. Sadid are simply missing from this case. Nothing 
in the grounds for termination cited by the University has anything to do with scholarship or teaching. 
All of the comments discussed above were related to issues of internal management of an institution 
and its employees, not to academic issues. Dr. Sadid' s position is clearly expressed (at page 19 ofms 
Brief) that because ISU is a university and he is an "academic," he therefore gets to be disruptive and 
violate reasonable standards of behavior. This carries the concept of academic freedom far beyond 
the realm of "scholarship or teaching," which the U.S. Supreme Court noted as an area of concern in 
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,425, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006). 
The offending comments identified above are not related to "scholarship or teaching," but 
merely have to do with Dr. Sadid's disagreements with the proper authorities over the management 
of his employer, Idaho State University. He offers no reasons why "academic freedom" should protect 
such comments. He can cite no legal precedent for his position except a resolution by the faculty 
senate of the University of Wisconsin, which is not a precedent which the Industrial Commission 
needs to consider. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission noted in its Order granting reconsideration that Claimant is entitled to a 
review of the complete record, including the recording of the April 21, 2009 faculty meeting. The 
review reveals nothing that changes the Commission's analysis that Dr. Sadid' s behavior violated the 
Employer's expressly-stated, reasonable standards. For this reason, Dr. Sadid's additional evidence 
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and new issues should be disregarded, and the Commission's Decision and Order of March 24,2010 
should be affirmed. 
SUBMITTED this 1st day of September, 2010. 
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COMES NOW, The Claimant Habib Sadid (Professor Sadid), by and through his 
attorney of record, Ronaldo A. Coulter, and hereby moves the Industrial Commission pursuant to 
R.A.P.P. 5( c) to permit the filing of a brief in excess of 20 pages in the above entitled case or in 
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IDOL# 1777-2010 
MOTION TO PERMIT 
FILING OF A BRIEF IN 
EXCESS OF 20 PAGES OR 
IN THE AL TERNATVE 
SUBSTITUTE WITH BRIEF 
OF 20 PAGES AFFIDAVIT 
OF COUNSEL FOR 
CLAIMANT 
I, RONALDO A. COULTER, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
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1. On August 26,2010, the subject brief was timely filed by the Claimant in this matter. 
2. That the brief that was timely submitted on August 26, 2010 on behalf of Claimant was 
23 pages in length. 
3. That it has been my experience in filing appeals before the Idaho Supreme Court that 
briefs that are only one to three pages over the 50-page limit are routinely accepted. 
4. That on any appeal filed before the Idaho Supreme Court, that a brief timely filed is 
considered accepted as to being timely filed; and, unless specifically rejected by the court, with 
instructions to shorten the brief to comply with LA.R. 34, a brief slightly over 50 pages is 
considered accepted. 
5. That I am familiar with the procedures in filing motions for the filing of briefs in excess 
of 50 pages before the Idaho Supreme Court. (Exhibit A) 
6. That on August 27,2010, I filed a motion to file a brief in excess of 50 pages with the 
Idaho Supreme Court in support of the appellate brief filed on behalf of Claimant; and 
permission was granted by the court. (Exhibit A) 
7. That on September 1, 2010, I was timely served with the Employer's Brief on 
Reconsideration wherein the Employer noted that the brief submitted by Claimant was 
"overlength", and not in compliance with R.A.P.P. 5( c). 
8. That in an abundance of caution, even though Claimant's brief was timely filed, there 
has been no indication from the Industrial Commission that the brief had been rejected due to 
length, and my experience with the Appellate courts leads me to conclude that though it is not 
necessary, I file the subject motion on behalf of Claimant asking that the Industrial Commission 
MOTION TO PERMIT FILING OF BRIEF IN EXCESS OF 20 PAGES OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE SUBSTIUTE WITH BRIEF OF 20 PAGES AFFIDAVIT OF 
COUNSEL 
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accept the brief presently filed that is 23 pages in length or substitute the briefwith one that is 20 
pages in length. 
9. That Exhibit B is 20 pages in length and is the exact same brief (i.e. word for word) that 
was timely filed on August 26,2010. 
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RONALDO A. COULTER 
Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law Group, PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
LS.B. # 3850 
776 E. Riverside Drive, Suite 200 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Tel: (208) 672-6112 
Facsimile: (208) 672-6114 
Email: ron@cmclawgroup.com 
Attorneys for Appellant 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
HABID SADID, an individual, 
Plaintiff! Appellant 
vs. 
) 
) 
) SUPREME COURT 
) 
) No. 37563-2010 
) 
) 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, 
ROBERT WHARTON, JACK KUNZE, 
MICHAEL JAY LINEBERRY, 
MANOOCHEHR ZOGID, RICHARD 
JACOBSEN, GARY OLSON, ARTHUR 
VAlLAS and JOHN!JANE DOES I 
through X, whose true identities are 
presently unknown, 
) MOTION TO PERMIT FILING OF 
) A BRIEF IN EXCESS OF 50 PAGES 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
DefendantIRespondents. ) 
) 
COMES NOW, plaintiff-appellant, Professor Habib Sadid, by and through his counsel, 
Ronaldo A. Coulter, Attomey at Law, and moves this Court pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 
(LA.R.) 32 (d) and 34(b) to pennit the filing of a brief in excess of 50 pages in the above-
MOTION TO PERMIT FILING OF BRIEF IN EXCESS OF 50 PAGES PAGE 1 
EXHIBIT 
A 
entitled case. The filing of a brief in excess of the usual limit has been found to be necessary for 
the following reasons: 
• This appeal involves Constitutional issues which the District Court below specifically felt 
needed to be resolved at the Appellate Court level. 
• This case is a case of first impression within Idaho and will require the court to interpret a 
U.S. Supreme Court case as it applies to academia in Idaho. Therefore, the appeal 
submitted required extensive briefmg and citations to law in several federal circuits 
outside of and including the 9th Circuit as well as Idaho. The brief was revised and 
reduced to its present size and has the least amount of pages to make the arguments 
essential to the case. 
• The actual appeal is 51 pages which includes the Certificate of Service. The remainder of 
the brief which had to be counted by I.A.R. 34(b) includes the Table of Contents, Table 
of Authorities and the both covers for a total of 60 pages by rule. 
Counsel for the respondent has not been contacted in regard to the instant motion. 
DATED this 27th day of August, 2010. 
d~OULTERLAW GROUP, PLLC 
R. A. (RON) COULTER 
Attorney for Appellant 
MOTION TO PERMIT FILING OF BRIEF IN EXCESS OF 50 PAGES PAGE 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th day of August, 2010, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
JOHN A. BAILEY, JR 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & BAILEY 
CHID. 
P.O. BOX 1391 
POCATELLO, IDAHO 83701 
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( ) Facsimile 
( ) Statehouse Mail 
CAMACHO MENDOZA COULTER LAW GROUP, PLLC 
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Clerk of the Courts 
(208) 334-2210 
RONALDO ARTHUR COULTER 
776 E RIVERSIDE DR STE 200 
EAGLE, ill 83616 
P.O. Box 83720 
BoiseJ Idaho 83720-0101 
ORDER GRANTING BRIEF IN EXCESS OF 50 PAGES 
Docket No. 37563-2010 HABIB SADID v. IDAHO Bannock County District Court 
STATE UNIVERSITY #2008-3942 . 
A Motion to Pemlit Filing of a Brief in Excess of 50 Pages having been filed; therefore, 
good cause appearing, , 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that APPELLANT/CROSS-RESPONDENTS Motion to 
Pemlit Filing of a Brief in Excess of 50 pages, b\lt not to exceed 60 pages, be, and hereby is, 
GRANTED. 
cc: All Counsel 
08/2712010 KML 
FOR THE SUPREME COURT 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
For the Court: 
Stephen W. Kenyon 
Clerk of the Courts 
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Attorney at Law 
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Idaho State Bar No.3850 
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IDOL# 1777-2010 
CLAIMANT'S BRIEF ON 
EXlllBIT 10F PERMITTED 
BY ORDER GRANTING 
RECONSIDERATION OF 
AUGUST 5, 2010 
COMES NOW, The Claimant Habib Sadid (professor Sadid), by and through his 
attorney of record, Ronaldo A. Coulter, and hereby submits his BRIEF ON EXHIBIT lOF 
PERMITTED BY ORDER GRANTING RECONSIDERATION OF AUGUST 5,2010. 
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OF AUGUST 5, 2010 
EXHIBIT 
B 
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I 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On October 30, 2009, Claimant was discharged from his position at Idaho State 
University and subsequently applied for unemployment benefits for which he was initially found 
ineligible on December 3,2009. On December 16, 2009, Claimant appealed the original 
determination. On January 5, 2010, a telephonic hearing was held to consider the appeal of 
Claimant. On January 6, 2010, the Appeals Examiner reversed the original decision of 
ineligibility of December 3, 2009 and found that the Employer failed to meet its burden of 
proving by a preponderance of evidence that the Claimant had engaged in inappropriate conduct. 
On or about January 13,2010, the Employer through counsel requested that the hearing be re-
opened as through no fault of the Employer, the Employer did not receive adequate notice of the 
telephonic hearing and therefore was unable to participate. On or about the January 14,2010, the 
Appeals Bureau denied the request to re-open the hearing. 
On or about January 18,2010, the Employer through counsel filed an appeal to the 
Industrial Commission requesting that the Commission hold a hearing that would allow the 
Employer to provide evidence which it could not previously provide at the telephonic hearing or 
remand the case to the Appeals Examiner for an additional hearing and decision. On February 9, 
2010, the Employer's request for a hearing before the Idaho Industrial Commission was denied. 
Additionally, the Employer's request that the matter be remanded to the Appeals Bureau for a 
new hearing was denied. However, The Industrial Commission ruled that the Employer's timely 
appeal of the Appeals Examiner's decision denying a rehearing was also an appeal of the 
decision of the Appeals Examiner's decision awarding unemployment benefits to Claimant. 
Wherefore, the Industrial Commission informed the parties that it would review de novo the 
evidentiary record established during the Appeals Examiner's hearing of January 5, 2010, 
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established a briefing schedule for both the Claimant and the Employer, and informed both 
parties that it would then issue a new decision upon completion of its review. 
On March 24, 2010, the Industrial Commission issued its Decision and Order wherein it 
reversed the decision of the Appeals Examiner awarding unemployment benefits to Claimant and 
declared that Claimant was discharged for employment-related misconduct and therefore 
ineligible for unemployment benefits. On April 12, 2010, Claimant through counsel filed a 
Motion for Reconsideration with the Industrial Commission. On or about April 20, 2010, the 
Employer filed an Employer's Objection to the Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration. 
On August 5, 2010, the Industrial Commission issued an Order Granting 
Reconsideration. It further ordered the Claimant to serve a duplicate CD, Exhibit lOF on the 
Commission and all interested parties within ten (l0) days ofthe date of the Order. It further 
ordered that Claimant would be afforded the opportunity to submit a brief arguing its position 
based on 10F; said brief to be submitted ten (l0) days from the date of service of Exhibit 10F. 
Lastly, the order called for the Employer and IDOL, if they desired, to submit briefs within seven 
(7) days of the date Claimant's briefwas filed with the Industrial Commission. On August 16, 
2010, Exhibit 10F was filed with the Industrial Commission, mailed to the IDOL and mailed to 
the Employer. 
II 
THE APPLICABLE LAW 
In reviewing Exhibit 10F, the Industrial Commission must decide whether the speech and 
conduct of Professor Sadid at the April 21, 2009, Idaho State University, College of Engineering 
Faculty Staff meeting constituted "misconduct" connected with the Claimant's employment such 
that the Claimant can be denied unemployment benefits. Beaty v. City of Idaho Falls, 110 Idaho 
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891,892, 719 P.2d 1151, 1152 (1986)." See March 24,2010 Decision and Order of the 
Industrial Commission pages 5 and 6: 
The burden of proving misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence falls strictly on 
the employer. Appeals Examiner of Idaho Dept. of Labor v. JR .. Simplot Co., 131 Idaho 
318, 320, 955 P.2d 1097, 1099 (1998) The Idaho Supreme Court has defined misconduct 
as a willful, intentional disregard of the employer's interest; a deliberate violation of the 
employer's rules; or a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has a right 
to expect of its employees. Gunter v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 143 Idaho 
63, 137 P.3d 450 (2006) (citing Johns v. S. H Kress & Company, 78 Idaho 544, 548, 307 
P.2d 217,219 (1957)). 
See March 24, 2010 Decision and Order of the Industrial Commission pages 5 and 6 
III 
ANALYSIS 
A. Professor Sadid Did Not Engage In Any Conduct Sufficient to Disqualify Him From 
Receiving Unemployment Benefits As His Conduct was not a Willful, Intentional 
Disregard Of His Employer's Interest; A Deliberate Violation Of The Employer's 
Rules; Nor A Disregard Of Standards Of Behavior Which The Employer Had A 
Right To Expect Of Him 
1. During the April 21, 2009 College of Engineering Faculty Staff Meeting, Professor 
Sadid's Conduct Was Not In Disregard of the Standards of Behavior that His 
Employer Had a Right to Expect. His Employer Expressed Satisfaction With The 
Meeting, The Employer Expressed That the Employer Valued the Discussion, And 
the Employer Publicly Expressed That the Employer Was Not Offended By Any 
Remarks Made During the Meeting 
The Notice of Contemplated Action (NOCA) (Exhibit 5., pp. 22-23) specifically alleges 
that during the April 21, 2009 College of Engineering Faculty/Staffmeeting (hereinafter referred 
to as "the Meeting" or Meeting), Professor Sadid was unprofessional, non-collegial, disruptive 
and insubordinate. The NOCA also alleged that Professor Sadid disrupted the meeting in 
complete disregard of an established agenda by "revisiting personnel issues" that had previously 
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been discussed in an appropriate forum and by labeling some Idaho State University personnel as 
corrupt and untruthful. Lastly, the NOCA alleged that Professor Sadid falsely asserted that for 
the past fourteen years that the Deans of the College of Engineering had failed in their fund 
raising responsibilities, as the Deans were deficient in their duties to raise funds for College of 
Engineering. 
An analysis of the 2 hour, 17 minute 21 second Meeting reveals that Professor Sadid's 
behavior was that which could be expected of an academic fully engaged in discussions of 
significant importance in a precise, forceful, professional and appropriate manner. A recording 
of this meeting is captured on Exhibit 1 OF. A review of this recording reveals that Professor 
Sadid was candid but in no way was Professor Sadid engaged in behavior that could be described 
as misconduct especially in light of the academic setting in which the meeting took place. 
Preliminarily, it must be noted that the first part of the published agenda was a Call to Order and 
Introduction and Comments by the Provost, Gary Olson. (Exhibit A) Rather than following the 
established agenda, it is clear from listening to Exhibit 1 OF that Professor Sadid did not disregard 
the established agenda; rather, it was Dean Jacobsen who departed from the agenda and began an 
earnest discussion of the Faculty Workload Policy. What follows is an analysis of relevant 
sections of the recording where Professor Sadid and others are engaged in discussions in the 
meeting. For ease of identification, the specific place on the recording is marked in bold: l 
Recording: 3:20 -13:34 sec. 
In a discussion prior to the arrival of Provost Olson, Dr. Jacobsen initiates a discourse 
regarding the Faculty Workload Policy and how it must be addressed throughout the 
University and specifically within the College of Engineering. At a point during this 
1 The annotations used to mark segments of the recording are as follows: 3:20 -13:34 would indicate that the 
relevant segment of the recording begins at 3 minutes and 20 seconds into the recording and ends at 13 minutes and 
34 seconds into the recording; 1: 12:59 - 1 :21 :26 would indicate that the relevant segment of the recording begins at 
1 hour, 12 minutes, and 59 seconds into the recording and ends at 1 hour, 21 minutes, and 26 seconds into the 
recording. 
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discourse, Professor Sadid, in a very civil tone, questioned the metrics that would be 
involved in determining the faculty workload specifically, what metrics would be used to 
determine the research value of faculty members. It is clear that Dr. Jacobsen was 
somewhat frustrated by Professor Sadid's question and follow-up question and he 
specifically asks other Chairs present in the meeting to join in the discussion. At this 
point, Dr. George Imel, Chair of the Department of Nuclear Engineering joins in the 
discussion with Professor Sadid. It is clear from listening to the recording that this issue 
was important to both parties. However, both parties were engaged, Dr. George Imel 
being louder, more argumentative, and more aggressive than Professor Sadid. It is 
important to note that Dean Jacobsen actually agreed that the present ad hoc method 
needed to be addressed and metrics established; thus agreeing with the argument set forth 
by Professor Sadid. 
Recording: 13:59 -17:50 
In a continuation of the discussion of Faculty Workload Policy specifically in the College 
of Engineering, Dr. Sadid tries to discuss the specifics of an evaluation that he received 
from Dr. Zoghi. Professor Sadid's point was that without the establishment of a 
standardized metrics based system, there did not exist an accurate way to judge a faculty 
member's performance. Dr. Jacobsen informs Professor Sadid that a discussion of a 
specific faculty member's evaluation is not a proper subject for an open discussion. 
However, Professor Sadid disagrees with Dr. Jacobsen but does so in a civil tone and 
provides his rationale. From the recording, one can hear an attendee ask that the 
discussion move toward a general discussion of a topic of common import to the college 
and not dwell on a single person's issue, Professor Sadid remarked that it is a concern of 
everyone especially in light of the lack of communication between the College of 
Engineering Chair and the faculty. At one point, Professor Sadid asked for a show of 
hands as to who in the room believed they had effective communications with the Chair 
of the College of Engineering. From the recording, it can be surmised that Professor 
Sadid only saw two people raise their hands. At all times, Professor Sadid's speech was 
appropriate and there is nothing to indicate that his behavior was a disruption to the 
meeting. 
Recording: 23:24 - 25:17 
Professor Sadid questions the workload criteria and mentions that this has been a problem 
for the last three years. Professor Sadid again questions the metrics especially, when an 
administrator tells the faculty that they have exceeded the expectations but there are no 
metrics. Professor Sadid asked what is the administration doing and questions the 
commitment of the Dean and the Chairs especially in light of his raising questions for 
three years. 
Recording: 28:50 - 29:40 
Provost Olson opens the floor for questions. A faculty member other than Professor Sadid 
prefaces a question to Provost Olson openly calling into question the performance of 
Dean Jacobsen and raising the issue of whether or not a dean, especially a part-time dean 
is really needed in the College of Engineering. Indeed, this faculty member said to 
Provost Olson, "I have some major issues with the performance of our Dean." Provost 
Olson jokingly said that he thought that when he carne in he heard Professor Sadid say 
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that they could do away with deans. Professor Sadid points out that this is true. He states 
that in two years he has not noticed that the Dean had taken responsibility for anything. 
Therefore, and based on that history, the necessity of a dean should be questioned. 
Recording: 34:50 - 38:09 
Professor Sadid in an exchange with Provost Olson asked ifthere would be 
communications with the faculty from his office. Provost Olson responded that he had 
just said that there would be. Professor Sadid then states that Idaho State University had a 
long corrupt history prior to the arrival of Dr. Vailas. Professor Sadid stated that with Dr. 
Vailas' arrival that he expected change. However, Professor Sadid commented that the 
present administration would lie with bold face and was not honest with faculty. Dr. 
Olson was not offended by the question and cited his experience at the University of 
South Florida. It was Dr. Olson's opinion that Dr. Vailas has instituted measures to 
address issues raised by Professor Sadid to make them viable and more transparent. 
Recording: 41:28 - 44:06 Discussion on the Budget Process Provost Disparages 
Idaho State Board of Education 
An unidentified faculty member (first name Ken) questioned the budget process and 
insinuated that Dean Jacobsen had kept the process a secret. Dean Jacobsen wanted to 
address the question but Dr. Olson stepped in and informed the faculty member that Dean 
Jacobsen did not have access to the budget. The Provost went on to explain how the 
process worked. The Provost expressed his dismay with the entire budget process. 
Provost Olson then went on to disparage the members of the Idaho State Board of 
Education. He remarked that he thought that he had already been in the state with the 
"wackiest" state government with Blagojevich but this really takes the cake; and, if you 
think that this is really something, you ought to go to the State Board of Education 
meeting. That is really like going to the circus. "I don't think any of those people have 
ever gone to college much less getting a degree in one." 
Recording: 59: 16 -1:01:24 
There was a discussion regarding investment in education that the university needed to 
do. Dr. Olson brought up the government of Thailand's commitment to education and 
what that country has done to improve its academic infrastructure. Professor Sadid 
commented that no government would provide funds through a grant if the government 
did not see that the institution was already committed to the investment. Professor Sadid 
then asked Dr. Olson if Dr. Olson would hold his Deans responsible for raising funds. 
Dr. Olson replied, "I will yep". Professor Sadid said that in the past fourteen years, there 
have been two deans neither of which raised any funds. Professor Sadid then rhetorically 
asked how can we survive in this economy? Dr. Olson replied to Professor Sadid by 
saying "You are right" and then remarked that we all have a role to play. 
Recording: 1:12:59 -1:21:26 
An Administrative Assistant becomes very emotional, almost to the point of tears in 
describing the treatment that she has received at the College of Engineering by its faculty. 
She says she would leave if she could. Professor Sadid comments that her problem is a 
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result of poor leadership. The Administrative Assistant does not agree with Professor 
Sadid that it is all leadership. This exchange provokes a response from Dean Jacobsen in 
which Dean Jacobsen questions the basis of why Professor Sadid maintains that 
everything that is wrong at the College of Education is based on the failure of leadership. 
Professor Sadid, without being disrespectful replies to the Dean's inquiry and several 
times in his reply stated that he had proof to back up his position. Dean Jacobsen 
comments that he is not interested in any of Professor Sadid's proof. Dean Jacobsen 
suggests that they [faculty and administration] had to work together if they were going to 
be successful. Professor Sadid asks of Dean Jacobsen if the Dean was working with them. 
Dean Jacobsen replied that he was and Professor Sadid responded that he was not. Dean 
Jacobsen responded that he did not agree with Professor Sadid's assessment. 
Recording: 1:45:50 -1:46:45 Dean Jacobsen Not Offended by Comments and 
Desires an Open Dialogue 
In speaking to his belief that the members of the College of Engineering had to work 
together, Dr. Jacobsen stated, "I'm not offended by anything you have said" in speaking 
to the whole group. Dr. Jacobsen goes on to say that "I have never learned to properly 
have the ability to hold a grudge" Further Dean Jacobsen said, "I like it when people 
open up and say what they think." At that point Professor Sadid chimed in and mentioned 
two words: "Honesty" and "Integrity" to which Dr. Jacobsen replied "that goes without 
saying Habib." 
Recording: 1:54:50 -1:55:00 Dr. Jacobsen Expresses that the Meeting was Good 
"Don't Hate This Type of Discussion." 
A faculty member "Bruce" asked to speak on a topic and in so doing remarked that the 
meeting had been contentious. Dr. Jacobsen responded. "Its been a good meeting. Don't 
hate this kind of discussion. It is not a bad idea to do this." 
In summary, an analysis of Exhibit lOF reveals the following: 
• That Professor Sadid was engaged in the discussions during the meeting where he felt 
that he had input. In addressing Dean Jacobsen, Provost Dr. Gary Olson and others, 
Professor Sadid was very direct, very professional and not intimidated by others during 
this discourse. 
• That other faculty members beside Professor Sadid questioned the performance of the 
administration and specifically questioned the performance of Dean Jacobsen. Indeed, 
one faculty member suggested that given the part-time status of the Dean Jacobsen, 
perhaps the College of Engineering would be better offwithout a Dean. Still another 
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faculty member, relying on false information, questioned Dean Jacobsen's honesty and 
the lack of transparency in the budget process. 
• That Provost Dr. Gary Olson was not offended by Professor Sadid's descriptive words 
used to underscore Professor Sadid's observation that the present administration of Dr. 
Vailas' lacked in integrity and was not truthfuL 
• That Provost Dr. Gary Olson in this public forum, in language that would be considered 
insubordinate and disrespectful in a non-academic forum, lambasted the Idaho State 
Board of Education and its members and in very strong and disparaging remarks likened 
the members to uneducated circus performers. 
• That a member of the faculty was very upset with how she had been personally treated 
and expressed a strong personal desire to leave the employ of the Employer. 
• That Dean Jacobsen publicly maintained that he was not offended by anything anyone 
had said at the Meeting; and of significant importance Dean Jacobsen states publicly that 
"Its been a good meeting. Don't hate this kind of discussion. It is not a bad idea to do 
this." 
2. Professor Sadid's Speech Is Constitutionally Protected And Therefore Must Fall 
Within the Standards Of Behavior Which The Employer Had A Right To Expect Of 
Him 
In the Employer's claim for review, the Employer relied heavily upon the grant of 
Summary Judgment issued in litigation involving the Employer and Professor on December 18, 
2009. In that case, the Sixth District Court, Judge David C. Nye, presiding, held that as a matter 
of law that there was no First Amendment protection for Claimant who was speaking not on 
matters of public concern, nor was Claimant speaking as private citizen on matters of public 
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concern. Further, even if the Claimant was speaking on a matter of public concern as a private 
citizen, the speech of Claimant was not a motivating factor for the decision to take any action 
complained of in Claimant's complaint. The Employer represented to the Industrial Commission 
that: 
"Accordingly, it has already been determined in a court of law that Dr. Sadid had no 
"right" to make statements for which he has suffered retaliation, and that it was not a 
cause for the adverse employment actions, including his termination." (Emphasis added) 
(Employer's Brief on Claim for Review., p. 4) 
The above quote is a misstatement of fact. It is clear from Exhibit B herein that the court 
considered the original complaint and the amended complaint. The amended complaint also 
added new factual allegations but retained the same three counts: "(1) count one - claim under 
§I983; (2) count two - breach of employment contact and implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing; and (3) count three - defamation." (Exhibit B., p. 3 of25) An examination of Exhibit C, 
the amended complaint, reveals that the complaint was not amended to include an additional 
count of wrongful termination. Such a claim would have been an impossibility as Claimant was 
discharged October 30,2009 and Exhibit C was filed on October 15,2009. Further, the Court's 
decision was narrowly tailored to the allegations made in the complaint and concluded that the 
"Defendants [Employer] are entitled to summary judgment on each count in the Amended 
Complaint." (Exhibit B., p. 24 of25) Claimant has yet to file a wrongful termination claim. 
Therefore, the Industrial Commission cannot rely on a decision made by the Court where the 
decision is not applicable to a cause of action that may be filed in the future. The Employer's 
brief failed to inform the Industrial Commission that on January 19,2010, the Court specifically 
refused to address the fact that the District Court failed to address a critical component of 
Claimant's case specifically leaving the decision in the hands of the Appellate Courts. This 
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critical component is that all of Claimant's speech was done within the confines of academic 
freedom and therefore is protected speech as guaranteed by the 1st and 14th Amendments of the 
U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution of the State ofIdaho. 
In the case of Garcetti v Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006), the court held that 
when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, they are not speaking 
as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline. In response to a concern expressed by Justice Souter 
in his dissenting opinion regarding the impact of the majority's holding on teachings of "public 
university professors" and academic freedoms found in "public colleges and universities," the 
majority qualified its holding, adding the following caveat: 
Justice Souter suggests today's decision may have important ramifications for academic 
freedom at least as a constitutional value ... There is some argument that expressions 
related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional 
constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court's customary 
employee speech jurisprudence. We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether 
the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case involving 
speech related to scholarship or teaching. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 425 
(Emphasis added) 
In writing this caveat, the Court reserved for later resolution the intricate and complex question 
of the First Amendment protections applied to academic speech. 
Although aware of the Supreme Court's caveat concerning the academic freedom 
exception to the Garcetti analysis, the District Court deliberately chose not to address the issue 
of academic freedom and how Professors Sadid's speech was either protected or not protected by 
the First Amendment's application to academic freedom. Instead, the trial judge abdicated this 
responsibility to the Idaho Appellate Courts: 
THE COURT: What I hear you telling me basically 
14 is -- if I pare it all down on that first issue - is 
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15 that I should not apply Garcetti to the facts of this 
16 case because that case was not intended to extend to the 
17 academic world. If that's true, isn't that a decision 
18 better left to the appellate courts if we're going to 
19 carve out an exception there? 
20 MR. JOHNSON: Well, perhaps, your Honor. But I 
21 believe the way that we would ask the Court to review 
22 that and analyze that is at least give us a ruling on 
23 it. Let us know where this Court stands on that 
24 particular issue. 
25 THE COURT: So you have something to appeal. (Tr. p. 112)2 
10 THE COURT: And I understand that. Had they said-
11 if they were clear enough to say that this case does not 
12 extend to the academic situation, then we've got the 
13 exception. I'm not sure that I read their language as 
14 being clear enough for me as a district judge. (Tr. p. 113) 
In Kerr v. Hurd, 694 F.Supp.2d 817, 2010 WL 890638 (S.D.Ohio, March 15,2010), the 
trial court at the federal level did not hesitate to let the parties know where it stood on a question 
of significant importance to the academic community. Dr. Elton Kerr (Kerr) was a medical 
professor hired by the entity, University Medical Services (UMSA). As an employee ofUSMA, 
Dr. Kerr also taught at Wright State School of Medicine (WS-SOM). His immediate supervisor 
was Dr. William W. Hurd (Hurd). Kerr was eventually terminated from his contract with USMA, 
which had the effect of terminating his employment with the medical school. Kerr brought a 
cause of action alleging, among other claims, a violation of his First Amendment rights in that he 
had been retaliated against for advocating the use of "vaginal delivery over unnecessary cesarian 
procedures, and lecturing WS-SOM residents on the proper and appropriate use of forceps" Id. 
at 10. Hurd argued that Garcetti was applicable to this case, as Kerr was not speaking as a 
private citizen as the speech concerning vaginal delivery was made in Kerr's role as an employee 
2 The relevant pages of the transcript on ClaimantIPlaintiff's Motion For Reconsideration heard on January 19, 2010 
is included herein as Exhibit D. 
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instructing students at WS-SOM; therefore, the school had a right to regulate Kerr's speech. 
Acknowledging Hurd's assertion that the United States Supreme Court did not decide whether 
Garcetti applied to speech cases arising in an academic environment, in the absence of a United 
States Supreme Court, or Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision to the contrary, the court was 
bound by precedent3• However the court, in performing its duty at the federal trial level, went 
on to state the following: 
Even without the binding precedent, this Court would find an academic exception to 
Garcetti. Recognizing an academic freedom exception to the Garcetti analysis is 
important to protecting First Amendment values. Universities should be the active 
trading floors in the marketplace of ideas. Public universities should be no different from 
private universities in that respect. At least where, as here, the expressed views are well 
within the range of accepted medical opinion, they should certainly receive First 
Amendment protection, particularly at the university level. See Justice Souter's dissent in 
Garcetti, citing Keyishian v. Bd of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 
(1967). The disastrous impact on Soviet agriculture from Stalin's enforcement of Lysenko 
biology orthodoxy stand as a strong counterexample to those who would discipline 
university professors for not following the "party line." Dr. Hurd suggests that any 
academic freedom exception to Garcetti must be construed narrowly and limited to 
classroom teaching, relying on Gorum v. Sessions, 561 F.3d 179 (3rd Cir.2009)(Motion, 
Doc. No. 84, at 14). The Court finds no suggestion in the motion papers that Dr. Kerr's 
advocacy for forceps deliveries was outside either the classroom or the clinical context in 
which medical professors are expected to teach. (Emphasis added) 
Kerr v. Hurd, 2010 WL 890638 at 20. 
Thus, the court found that Kerr's advocacy could not be excluded from the protection of the First 
Amendment. The court based its decision on the fact that the speech was made within his role as 
an employee and instructor of the school. Therefore, protecting First Amendment values 
warranted an academic freedom exception to the rule that public employees making statements 
3 The precedent the court was referring to was the unreported case of Evans-Marshall v. Ed of Ed ofTipp City 
Exempted Village Sch. Dist., 2008 WL 2987174 (S.D.Ohio) which considered Garcetti rejecting the Seventh 
Circuit's position and adopting the Fourth Circuit's position applying the traditional Pickering-Connick approach to 
cases involving in-class speech by primary and secondary public school teachers. Applying the precedent the court 
sustained the Defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
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pursuant to their official duties were not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes. 
Public and private universities are supposed to be active trading floors in the marketplace of 
ideas. Aware of the fact that the Supreme Court expressly left undecided in Garcetti the extent to 
which its analysis would apply in an academic setting, the Sixth Circuit, granted constitutional 
protection to teacher in-class speech; or as stated in Garcetti, speech related to scholarship or 
teaching. 4 It may be expressly inferred from the position taken by the Sixth Circuit, that because 
of the critical role that the academic community plays in educating the public and expanding the 
scope of human knowledge, the boundaries around protected speech must be broad so as not to 
chill the public discourse. See Amici Curiae Brief for the American Association of University 
Professors, the Foundationfor Individual Rights in Education (Fire), and the Thomas Jeffirson 
Center for the Protection of Free Expression in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant, 2010 WL 
2642629 at 23 (July 2010) 
Academic speech under the First Amendment is neither governed by Garcetti nor 
susceptible to the "official duties" analysis reflected in Garcetti. Therefore, the scope of First 
Amendment protection for academic speech (i.e. scholarship or teaching) must be governed by 
more than a half-century of decisions, beginning with Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 
77 S.Ct.1203, (1957), which recognizes the vital role that academic speech by college and 
university professors plays in our society and the First Amendment interest in that speech: 
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost self-
evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those 
who guide and train our youth. To impose any straitjacket upon the intellectual leaders in 
our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of 
education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be 
made. Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are 
4 See also Sheldon v. Dhillon, 2009 WL 4282086, pp.*3 -*4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2009) acknowledging that Garcetti 
by its express terms does not address the context squarely presented here; and acknowledging that the Ninth Circuit 
has not determined the scope of the First Amendment's application to the classroom. 
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accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannotflourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and 
distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to 
evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise, our civilization will 
stagnate and die. (Emphasis added) 
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211 - 1212 (U.S. 1957) 
More recently, and one year prior to Garcetti, the Tenth Circuit, in Schrier v. University 
of Colorado , 427 F.3d 1253 recognized that academic freedom was of particular concern of the 
First Amendment: 
Courts have conspicuously recognized that academic freedom is a "special concern" of 
the First Amendment: 
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of 
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is 
therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that 
cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents ofUniv. of State 
o/NY., 385 U.S. 589, 603, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967); Vanderhurst v. Colo. 
Mountain Col!. Dist., 208 F.3d 908, 913 (lOth Cir.2000) (academic freedom is "a special 
concern of the First Amendment"); see also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487,81 
S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (l960) ("The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is 
nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools."). We have also noted 
that a greater degree of conflict is to be expected in a university setting due to the 
autonomy afforded members of the university community. Hulen, 322 F.3d at 1239 
(recognizing that "conflict is not unknown in the university setting given the inherent 
autonomy of tenured professors and the academic freedom they enjoy,,).5 
Schrier v. University of Co. 427 F.3d 1253, 1265 -1266 (C.A.lO (Colo.),2005) (Emphasis added) 
Through a review of Exhibit 1 OF, it can be seen that Professor Sadid' s speech in the April 
5 Hulen v. Yates, 322 F.3d 1229, 1239 (lOth Cir. 2003) reads in pertinent part as follows: 
At the same time, conflict is not unknown in the university setting given the inherent autonomy of tenured 
professors and the academic freedom they enjoy. See Sweezy, 354 U,S. at 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203 (plurality opinion); id 
at 262. 77 S,Ct. 1203 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result); American Ass'n ofUniv, Professors, 1940 Statement of 
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure with 1970 Interpretive Comments, available at http:// 
www.aaup.orgistatementslRedbookl1940stat.htm (last updated June 2002). 
The actual website has changed to http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/contentsI1940statement.htm and 
the relevant quote is that "Controversy is at the heart of the free academic inquiry which the entire statement is 
designed to foster" (Emphasis added) 
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21, 2009 Meeting addressed issues critical to scholarship at Idaho State University. Professor 
Sadid engaged Dr. Jacobsen in a discourse regarding the Faculty Workload Policy and how it 
must be addressed throughout the University and specifically within the College of Engineering. 
U sing his own circumstance by way of example, Professor Sadid made the point that without a 
standardized metrics based system, the College of Engineering did not have an accurate way to 
measure and therefore correctly and precisely judge the performance of its faculty. Professor 
Sadid voiced his disappointment in the lack of honesty and integrity exhibited by the past and 
present administrations. Professor Sadid addressed the need for the Employer to invest in the 
infrastructure of the university commenting that it would be difficult for the university to receive 
grant funding if the grantor did not see a commitment by the university. Professor Sadid openly 
expressed his displeasure with what he perceived as the non-existent fund raising efforts of the 
past fourteen years by the Deans of the College of Engineering. Exhibit 10F lays bare the robust 
atmosphere in which Professor Sadid, as well as others, criticized the administration. Indeed, 
there is no doubt that Professor Sadid's and other's comments were the spark of controversy; 
however, controversy is to be expected and is the heart of free academic inquiry. See tn. 5. 
On March 24, 2010, the Industrial Commission issued its Decision and Order wherein it reversed 
the decision of the Appeals Examiner awarding unemployment benefits to Claimant and declared 
that the Claimant was discharged for employment-related misconduct and therefore ineligible for 
unemployment benefits. In this case, the Industrial Commission stated: 
... This case is analogous to an Idaho Supreme Court case were a claimant continued to 
criticize employer and its polices despite the employer's clear directive to express those 
criticism in private. Gatherer v. Doyles Wholesale, 111 Idaho 470, 725 P.2d 175 
(1986) ... Claimant may argue that his actions did not constitute misconduct and were for 
the benefit of the College and faculty. However, Claimant's subjective state of mind for 
making the comments is irrelevant. Mattews v. Bucyru- Erie Co., 101 Idaho 657, 659, 
619 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1980.). 
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March 24,2010 Decision and Order of the Industrial Commission pages 10 andll 
Contrary to the position taken in the Industrial Commission's March 24,2010 Decision 
and Order, it would be a mistake to simply equate Claimant's, administrator's (i.e., Provost etc.) 
professor's, teacher's and other academic's standard of behavior with non-similarly situated 
private or public employee's for purposes of First Amendment protection related to academic 
freedom. Academic Freedom provides considerable protection to academics who from time to 
time, or consistently as the situation dictates, criticize or face criticism of their academy peers or 
superiors. Thus, the comparison of the Industrial Commission of this matter to that of the 
Claimants in Gatherer v. Doyles Wholesale, and Matthews v. Bucyrus Erie Co is inappropriate. 
In Gatherer, the Claimant was a warehouse supervisor of a candy and tobacco wholesaler. 
Claimant's family had previously owned the business and Claimant constantly criticized and 
took issue with the new owner's policies. Claimant was instructed not to raise his voice where 
other employees could hear the criticisms. When asked to work overtime one day, Claimant 
'''created a scene' in front of the other employees in the office." Gatherer at 471, 176. The 
Claimant was subsequently discharged. In Matthews, the Claimant was terminated for obtaining 
a leave of absence under false pretenses not for expressing his legitimated concerns in an 
appropriate forum. In both cases, the Employers were not public entities, nor were the 
Claimant's distinguished tenured professors with more than twenty-two years seniority.6 The 
latter comparison would chill an academic's ability to speak without fear on controversial 
subjects, where the opinion of the academic ran counter to the administration's party line. The 
current decision of the Industrial Commission is known throughout Idaho State University, the 
6 The Bucyrus-Erie Company is a maker of heavy machinery used in heavy construction. See 
http://www.bucyruseriemodels.com/home.aspx.This company is not a public university and its employees are not 
public employees engaged in academic pursuit. 
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Employer. The Industrial Commission's decision at present mirrors that ofthe District Court and 
has thus far failed to take into consideration the fact that Professor Sadid's speech enjoys 
constitutional protection. As could be predicted, the District Court's decision has brought 
significant apprehension to academics within Idaho. (Exhibit E) As most recently argued in the 
Fourth Circuit: 
Both in practice and in constitutional law, the actual duties of state university 
professors implicate - indeed, demand - a broad range of discretion and autonomy that 
find no parallel elsewhere in public service. Much of the controlling language of 
Garcetti implicitly recognizes the profound differences between academic speech by 
professors and other public employees, something that the court below declined to do. 
For example, the Garcetli majority's suggestion that most public employees are subject 
to "managerial discipline" on the basis of statements contrary to agency policy would 
be anathema in the academic setting; indeed, academic speech usually does not 
represent the official policy or view of the university. Further, although the Garcetti 
majority comfortingly referred to "whistle-blower protection laws and labor codes" as a 
parallel source of protection for public workers, such alternate recourses are unlikely to 
avail most state university professors. (Emphasis added) 
Amici Curiae Brief for the American Association of University Professors, the Foundation for 
Individual Rights in Education (Fire), and the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of 
Free Expression in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant, 2010 WL 2642629 pp. 21-22 (July 2010) 
Academic Freedom if it is to mean anything must encompass the ability of faculty members of a 
public university: 
" to speak or write-as a private citizen or within the context of one's activities as an employee 
of the university-without institutional discipline or restraint on matters of public concern as well 
as on matters related to professional duties, the functioning of the university, and university 
positions and policies." (Emphasis added) 
University of Wisconsin Madison, Recommendation to Amend Faculty Policies and Procedures 
as adopted by the Faculty Senate, April 12, 2010 (Exhibit F) 
In light of the facts of this case, the historical and special concern given to academic 
freedom and the lead set in the judicial districts mentioned herein, it is imperative that the 
Industrial Commission conclude that the academic freedom exception to Garcetti must apply to 
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this case. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
It has been shown herein, through a complete and thorough examination of Exhibit 10F, that 
Professor Sadid's speech in the April 21, 2009 meeting was very direct, forceful yet professional 
and of a character that one would expect to encounter in an academic setting among tenured 
faculty members. As noted herein, contention and controversy are at the heart of a vibrant 
academic community. In this case, the Employer's representative refused to characterize the 
Meeting as contentious. Instead, the employer characterized the Meeting as "being a good 
meeting" and implored the faculty to refrain from disdaining such meetings. The Employer's 
representative further commented that he enjoyed it when faculty members "open[ed] up and say 
[said] what they think [thought]". Given the content, context, and academic setting in which 
Professor Sadid engaged in discussion, his actions were not only within the standard of behavior 
an Employer could expect of its employees, Professor Sadid's speech and participation by the 
Employer's own admission, did not offend the Employer. Lastly but of significant importance, 
Professor Sadid's speech during the Meeting was protected under academic freedom, which is a 
"special concern" of the First Amendment. Therefore, Professor Sadid's speech was sheltered 
by the 1st and 14th Amendments of the u.s. Constitution and Article 1, Sections 9 and 10 of the 
Constitution of the State of Idaho. An examination of Exhibit 10F demands that the Industrial 
Commission conclude that its Decision and Order of March 24,2010 must be reversed thereby 
securing unemployment benefits for the Claimant in this matter. 
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Dated this 26th day of August 2010. 
R.A. (Ron) Coulter 
Attorney for Claimant 
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HABIB SADID, 
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IDOL # 1777-2010 
DECISION AND ORDER 
ON RECONSIDERATION 
FiLE 
JAN 2 0 2011 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Appeal of a Decision granting Claimant unemployment insurance benefits and an 
Order denying Employer's request to reopen issued by an Idaho Department of Labor 
Appeals Examiner. Denial of request to reopen is AFFIRMED, and Decision granting benefits 
REVERSED. 
This matter originally came before the Idaho Industrial Commission on appeal and 
a Decision and Order was issued. Thereafter, Claimant filed a Motion for Reconsideration 
which argued the importance of what was said at the April 21, 2009 faculty meeting. 
A recording of the April 21, 2009 faculty meeting was admitted into evidence before the 
Appeals Examiner, but no recording appeared in the Commission's file. Accordingly, the 
Commission requested the Claimant resubmit the April 21, 2009 faculty meeting recording 
as Exhibit 10F. The parties were also given an opportunity to brief their positions based on 
Exhibit 10F. With the complete record, the Commission now issues its Decision and Order 
with Exhibit 10F on the above entitled matter. 
Employer, Idaho State University, appeals the Idaho Department of Labor's (IDOL 
or Department) Decision fmding Claimant eligible for benefits as well as IDOL's Order 
denying Employer's request to reopen the hearing. The Appeals Examiner found in her Decision 
DECISION AND ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION - 1 
that Employer discharged Claimant, but not for misconduct. Employer failed to appear for 
the hearing. On August 8, 2008, Employer submitted a request to re-open the hearing. The 
Appeals Examiner denied that request because Employer failed to provide sufficient facts to 
warrant re-opening. 
The Commission will briefly address a few procedural issues. First, Employer's request 
for a new hearing or remand is denied per the Commission's February 9, 2010 Order. Second, 
as discussed in the prior Decision and Order and in the Order Granting Reconsideration, 
Employer's original brief filed February 22, 2010, is untimely. Third, Claimant's Motion 
to Strike is granted, since the Commission's rules do not allow reply briefs; Employer's reply 
brief will not be considered. Finally, the Commission will grant Claimant permission to file a 
22 page brief, but will not consider the attached exhibits. 
The undersigned Commissioners have conducted a de novo review of the record in 
accordance with Idaho Code § 72-1368(7). Super Grade, Inc. v. Idaho Depart. of Commerce 
and Labor, 144 Idaho 386, 390, 162 P.3d 765, 769 (2007). The Commission has relied on the 
audio recording of the hearing held before the Appeals Examiner on January 5, 2010, along 
with the Exhibits [1 through 10, including 10F] admitted into the record during that proceeding. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission concurs with and adopts the Findings of Fact set forth in the 
Appeals Examiner's Order to Deny Re-Opening. The Commission sets forth additional findings 
of fact as follows: 
1. Claimant worked for Employer on two occasions. During his last period 
of employment, Claimant worked as a full professor from August 1991 
until he was discharged on October 23,2009. Claimant was suspended on 
August 4, 2009 pending the University President's ruling on the 
recommended termination notice. 
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2. Claimant had a history of voicing concerns via emails and at faculty 
meetings. On April 6, 2009, Claimant received a warning letter from the 
Chair of the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering 
informing Claimant to raise his concerns via the proper procedure. 
Claimant was to first discuss the matter with the Chair of the Department, 
then to the Dean of the College of Engineering, then to Employer's upper 
administration. 
3. Employer sent another letter on April 15, 2009, again warning Claimant 
that voicing his concerns at faculty and campus-wide meetings and 
through widely disbursed emails and communication intended to expose 
another individual to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to impeach 
his or her integrity or reputation was not appropriate. The letter, again, 
reminded Claimant to utilize proper procedures raising his concerns. 
4. At an April 21, 2009 faculty meeting, Claimant again raised concerns 
about work and personal matters, and expressed criticism of the 
administration. 
5. Dean Jacobsen issued a Notice of Contemplated Action due to Claimant's 
continued pattern of behavior. 
6. After further review, the University President, Dr. Vailas, discharged 
Claimant. 
DISCUSSION 
Claimant worked as a full professor for Employer from August, 1991 until October 23, 
2009. Employer discharged Claimant for a myriad of reasons, including insubordination 
and for being disruptive and unprofessional. (Exhibit 5, pp. 19-20). Due to Claimant's 
ongoing behavior, Employer believed that it had adequate cause to discharge Claimant. 
Employer points to several emails and letters Claimant sent showing criticism to the 
administration, as well as statements made by Claimant at faculty meetings and an 
awards banquet that Employer contends were unprofessional and disruptive. Employer's 
decision to discharge Claimant was based on its policies which state that discipline is warranted 
if acts or omissions directly and substantially affect or impair an employee's performance of his 
or her profession or assigned duties or the interest of the Board; or constitutes conduct that is 
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seriously prejudicial to the University. (Exhibit 5, p. 15). In April, 2009, Employer supplied 
Claimant with two letters, each stating to use the proper protocol in expressing his concerns, and 
that failure to follow the protocol could lead to discipline. (Exhibit 3, p. 28; Exhibit 4, p. 32). 
Employer contends that Claimant again expressed previously raised personal concerns during 
a staff meeting that had a designated agenda. 
Claimant does not dispute that he authored the emails and letters found in the record 
or that he made the comments in the staff meeting. Instead, Claimant denies that his actions 
constitute misconduct and maintains that his actions were not disruptive or unprofessional. 
(Audio Recording). 
Idaho Code § 72-1366(5) provides that a claimant is ineligible for unemployment 
insurance benefits if that individual's unemployment resulted from the claimant's discharge 
for employment-related misconduct. What constitutes ')ust cause" in the mind of an employer 
for dismissing an employee is not necessarily the legal equivalent of "misconduct" under Idaho's 
Employment Security Law. The two issues are separate and distinct. In a discharge, whether 
the employer had reasonable grounds for dismissing a claimant is irrelevant. The only concern 
is whether the reasons for discharge constituted "misconduct" connected with the claimant's 
employment such that the claimant can be denied unemployment benefits. Beaty v. City 
ofIdaho Falls, 110 Idaho 891, 892, 719 P.2d 1151, 1152 (1986). 
The burden of proving misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence falls strictly 
on the employer. Appeals Examiner ofIdaho Dept. of Labor v. J.R. Simplot Co., 131 Idaho 318, 
320, 955 P.2d 1097, 1099 (1998). A "preponderance of the evidence" simply means that 
when weighing all of the evidence in the record, the evidence on which the finder of fact relies is 
more probably true than not. Edwards v. Independence Services, Inc., 140 Idaho 912, 915, 104 
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P.3d 954,957 (2004). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has defined misconduct as a willful, intentional disregard of 
the employer's interest; a deliberate violation of the employer's rules; or a disregard of standards 
of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of its employees. Gunter v. Magic Valley 
Regional Medical Center, 143 Idaho 63, 137 P.3d 450 (2006) (citing Johns v. S. H. Kress & 
Company, 78 Idaho 544, 548, 307 P.2d 217, 219 (1957)). In addition, the Court requires the 
Commission to consider all three grounds in determining whether misconduct exists. Dietz v. 
Minidoka County Highway Dist., 127 Idaho 246, 248, 899 P.2d 956, 958 (1995). We have 
carefully considered all three grounds for determining misconduct. 
Before analyzing each of the following grounds, the Commission must clarify the 
hearsay evidence found in the record. Employer did not appear at the hearing. Instead, 
Employer supplied a significant amount of correspondence from individuals regarding the 
alleged adverse affects of Claimant's criticisms. The written statements made by those other 
than Claimant are considered hearsay. "Hearsay is defined as testimony in court, or written 
evidence, of a statement made out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion of the 
truth of the matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-
of-court asserter." State v. Woodbury, 127 Idaho 757,759, 905 P.2d 1066, 1068 (Ct.App. 1995). 
The Commission holds discretionary power to admit or exclude hearsay evidence. 
As stated by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
The Commission has the discretionary power to consider any type of reliable 
evidence having probative value, even if that evidence is not admissible in a court 
of law. Stolle v. Bennett, 144 Idaho 44, 49-50 (2007). The Commission has the 
discretion to admit evidence if "it is a type commonly relied upon by prudent 
persons in the conduct of their affairs." Id.; I.C. § 67-5251. This does not mean, 
however, that the Commission is required to admit such evidence. Rather, the 
Commission is given latitude to exclude hearsay evidence. 
Higgins v. Larry Miller Subaru-Mitsubishi, 145 Idaho 1, 175 P.3d 163 (2007). 
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However, hearsay evidence, alone, is insufficient to support findings of fact. Application 
of Citizen Utilities Company, 82 Idaho 208, 214, 351 P.2d 487,493 (1960). The Commission's 
findings must be supported by substantial and competent evidence. Id. at 213, 351 P.2d at 492. 
Substantial and competent evidence is defined as "relevant evidence that a reasonable mind 
might accept to support a conclusion." Henderson v. Ecc1ipse Traffic Control and Flaggin Inc., 
147 Idaho 628, 213 P.3 718, 722 (2009). 
Employer's hearsay evidence is admitted into the record based on its probative value and 
is afforded appropriate weight. Since Employer was absent from the hearing, the infonnation 
contained therein provides insights into Employer's arguments. However, because the authors of 
the statements and those allegedly adversely affected by Claimant's emails/letters/public 
statements did not testify, that evidence is afforded a lesser degree of weight and persuasion 
in the face of sworn testimony provided during the proceeding in direct contradiction to it. 
The hearing examiner, as the trier of fact, is entitled to place greater or less weight on any 
partiCUlar piece of evidence according to its relative credibility. Morgan v. Idaho Dept. of Health 
and Welfare, 120 Idaho 6, 8, 813 P.2d 345, 347 (1991). Therefore, to the extent that Employer 
relies on written assertions of individuals other than Claimant, those written statements are 
considered hearsay and carry less weight than Claimant's assertions. 
The analysis proceeds to detennine whether Claimant's conduct constitutes misconduct. 
Under the "standards-of-behavior" test, the employer must prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the claimant's conduct fell below the standard of behavior it expected and that 
the employer's expectation was objectively reasonable under the particular circumstances. 
Harris, 141 Idaho at 4, 105 P.3d at 270. As the Idaho Supreme Court has pointed out, an 
"employer's expectations are ordinarily reasonable only where they have been communicated to 
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the employee." Folks v. Moscow School District No. 281, 129 Idaho 833, 838, 933 P.2d 642, 
647 (1997). Therefore, the employer must communicate expectations and duties that do not 
naturally flow from the employment relationship. Pimley v. Best Values, Inc., 132 Idaho 432, 
974 P.2d 78 (1999). Notably, there is no requirement that the employer must demonstrate 
that the employee's behavior was subjectively willful, intentional, or deliberate in his or her 
disregard of the employer's expectations. Welch v. Cowles Publishing Co., 127 Idaho 361, 364, 
900 P.2d 1372, 1375 (1995). 
Employer contends that Claimant's conduct of openly criticizing the administration 
in widely dispersed emails, faculty meetings, and social functions constitutes misconduct. 
Employer informed Claimant of the proper protocol to raise his concerns. In an April 6, 2009 
letter to Claimant, Employer wrote "In the future, you are directed to follow proper protocol 
in expressing your concerns (first to the Chair of the Department of Civil and Environmental 
Engineering, then to the Dean of the College of Engineering, then to Idaho State University's 
upper administration)." (Exhibit 3, p. 28). Again, in an April 15, 2009 letter, Employer stated 
"You should not use such channels as campus-wide meetings, engineering faculty meetings, and 
widely-distributed email communications to make negative comments about the performance 
and/or character of current and former university staff and employees ... Communications 
intended to expose another individual to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to impeach his 
or her integrity or reputation are not appropriate. You have previously been counseled to 
observe collegiality in the workplace and to follow the protocol of meeting first with your 
department chair, next with the dean of engineering, and then, if necessary, with other 
ISU administrators regarding your concerns. Continuing failure to follow these guidelines 
will be cause for disciplinary action." (Exhibit 4, p. 32.). 
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Claimant did not rebut that he received the letters at hearing, and referred to receiving the 
letters in his correspondence with Employer. (Exhibit 4, pp. 29-33, Exhibit 10, p. 146). This 
information clearly shows that Employer informed Claimant of the proper procedure to express 
his concerns and that making statements that "expose another individual to public hatred, 
contempt or ridicule, or to impeach his or her integrity or reputation are not appropriate" and 
should not be made in faculty or campus-wide meetings or in widely distributed emails. 
Employer's expectation is objectively reasonable under these circumstances. Employer 
contends that actions, such as Claimant's, impair or affect the interest of the college and 
university by creating a negative and disruptive atmosphere in the college, and that fundraising 
efforts are hampered by negative publicity generated by Claimant's criticisms. (Exhibit 7, p. 3). 
Employer's concerns are well taken and the adverse affect of openly criticizing administration 
can have the above effect. It is important to note that Employer did not forbid Claimant 
from raising his concerns. Rather, Employer required Claimant to raise his issues through 
a certain procedure. There is also nothing inherently inappropriate about the procedure required 
by Employer, nor does Claimant directly attack the validity of the procedure at hearing. 
Therefore, Employer's expectation is reasonable. 
Therefore, the analysis turns to whether Claimant's conduct at an April 21, 2009 staff 
meeting violated the "standard-of-behavior" expressed and warned of in Employer's previous 
letters. After a review of the audio recording of the April 21, 2009, the Commission finds 
that Claimant did violate the standard of behavior which Employer expected. 
With the resubmission of Exhibit 10F, the Commission had the benefit of listening to 
the entire meeting, not merely reviewing the transcribed notes. Even so, the Commission's 
conclusion remains unchanged. While it is true that some of Claimant's concerns at the 
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faculty meeting were genuinely related to the workload policy and the business of the faculty 
meeting, the other portion of Claimant's comments were not. At the meeting Claimant 
stated that the University was corrupt for 20 years, that the administration is absolutely corrupt, 
and that nothing has changed since the new University president arrived. (Exhibit 10F). 
Further, Claimant told the members of the meeting that the administrators are lying 
with bold face, that they have isolated the faculty and done nothing except when needed. 
Claimant further stated that the administration refuses to communicate with faculty at all 
levels and that it is doing whatever it wants. When discussing leadership of the administration, 
Claimant said that he had documents to show that those people are unethical and are just 
"power hungers." (Exhibit 10F). They were working to protect their own interest and not 
the public. Claimant stated that he truly questioned the integrity and honesty of the 
administration in the College and the University. 
Dean Jacobsen did conclude with statements about the meeting being a good meeting 
and that it was not a bad idea to hold the meeting. The Dean also stated that he believed that 
the College has the ability to move ahead "but not sniping at each other, and working 
against each other, and undermining each other." (Exhibit lOF). The Dean's general statements 
were directed to the meeting as a whole, which included many comments and discussions in 
addition to those by Claimant, but the Dean's general statements do not negate the numerous 
previous warnings that Claimant had received. 
The Commission concludes that the statements made by Claimant in the faculty 
meeting represent the type of conduct that Employer warned Claimant of in the April 6 and 
15,2009 letters. Claimant's statements raised personal concerns and attack members of 
the administration in a faculty meeting. Employer contends that the faculty meeting had a 
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set agenda, which did not include Claimant's statements or the subject matter. Employer's 
expectation was clear that such matters should be raised through proper channels and not at 
faculty meetings, the record demonstrates that Claimant's conduct during the April 21, 2009, 
faculty meeting fell below Employer's reasonable and communicated expectation. 
As noted in the prior Decision and Order, this case is similar to Gatherer v. Doyles 
Wholesale, III Idaho 470, 725 P.2d 175 (1986). In that case, Gatherer had been repeatedly 
instructed to privately approach management with his disagreements with the employer's 
policies. The Court found that Gatherer's outbursts, which resulted in Gatherer's discharge, 
can only be viewed as showing a disregard for the standards that his employer had a right 
to expect of its employees. 
Claimant's long history of disagreement with Employer does not negate Employer's 
ability to request Claimant raise his concerns via the proper procedures. Claimant was to 
first discuss the matter with the Chair of the Department, then to the Dean of the College 
of Engineering, then to Employer's upper administration. Employer's warning letters to 
Claimant on April 6 and April 15 communicated the standard of behavior which Employer 
expected Claimant uphold. While the record also demonstrates that Claimant is a highly 
accomplished professor, those facts do not negate the expectation that Claimant raise 
volatile concerns through the proper procedure. 
Claimant raises First Amendment freedom of speech arguments in his brief on 
reconsideration. Claimant alleges that his speech is constitutionally protected and, therefore, 
must fall within the standards of behavior which Employer had a right to expect. 
Claimant's arguments are duly noted, but they are separate from the issue of whether 
Employer discharged Claimant for misconduct. Misconduct and Claimant's eligibility for 
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unemployment benefits are determined by the standards set forth above. In particular, the 
current discussion is focused on whether Claimant's conduct fell below a standard of behavior 
which Employer had a right to expect, which in this case is substantially more restrictive 
than what is granted by the First Amendment. 
Claimant's motion for reconsideration reminds the Commission that the gnevance 
process at Idaho State University is extensive and after the hearings regarding Claimant's 
allegations were held, a recommendation to restore Claimant to his position was issued by 
the Faculty Senate. Regardless, President Vailas terminated Claimant. Claimant points out 
that that Employer's grievance process requires proof of adequate cause to terminate an 
employee. The law and process for receiving unemployment benefits does not vary depending 
on the particular grievance procedure an employer may have established. In this case, 
Employer has the burden of proving Claimant was discharged for employment related reasons. 
Claimant may argue that his actions did not constitute misconduct and were for the 
benefit of the College and faculty. However, Claimant's subjective state of mind for making 
the comments is irrelevant. Matthews v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 101 Idaho 657, 659, 619 P.2d 1110, 
1112 (1980). Employer clearly informed Claimant that his critical comments should not 
be raised at the faculty meetings. Because Claimant is ineligible for benefits under the 
"standards-of-behavior" test, it is unnecessary to analyze this matter under the other 
two grounds. Claimant is ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits. 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Employer discharged Claimant for employment-related misconduct. 
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ORDER 
Based on the forgoing analysis, the Decision ofthe Appeals Examiner is REVERSED. 
Employer discharged Claimant for employment-related misconduct. The Appeals Examiner's 
Decision Denying Employer's Request to Re-Open is AFFIRMED. This is a final order under 
Idaho Code § 72-1368(7). 
DATED this ;2.0 f::L day of =--:Ja~ ~ , 2011. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
I 
Thomas -P. Baskin, Commissioner 
I/J!m~~ 
R. D. Maynard, Coufinissioner 
/ 
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TO THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY AND THE 
EMPLOYER/RESPONDENT ATTORNEY OF RECORD JOHN A. BAILEY, Racine, Olson 
Nye, Budge & Bailey, Chtd., P.O.Box 1391, Pocatello, Idaho, 83204, e-mail: jab@racinelaw.net. 
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named appellant appeals against the above-named respondents to the 
Idaho Supreme Court for the Decision and Order entered in the above-entitled action on the 
20th day of January, 2011, rendered by the Idaho Industrial Commission which was a final 
order under Idaho Code (LC.) § 72-1368(7). 
2. That the appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
decision and order described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable decision and order under 
and pursuant to LC. 72-1368(9) and Idaho Appellate Rule (LA.R.) 1I(d). 
3. A preliminary statement of issues which the appellant asks the Court to review at 
a minimum; and, which shall not prevent the appellant from timely asserting other issues for 
review are: 
(a) The Industrial Commission erred when it concluded that appellant's behavior at 
the April 21, 2009 faculty meeting fell below a standard of behavior reasonably to 
be expected by the employer. 
(b) In finding that the appellant engaged in misconduct, the Industrial Commission 
erred in concluding that the concept of academic freedom as recognized and 
protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, 
and Sections 9 and IO ofthe Constitution of the State ofIdaho have no bearing in 
determining whether or not appellant's speech was misconduct. 
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4. As this appeal involves questions of fact established by the record, the appellant 
requests that full transcripts of the proceeding before the Appeals Examiner be produced and 
included in the record on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. The appellant also requests 
that the following be made a part of the record if not included in the standard record 
submitted to the Court from the Industrial Commission: 
(a) All briefs submitted by the appellant and employer in this action; 
(b) All exhibits submitted by the appellant and employer to this action; and 
(c) All decisions and orders made in this action by any government agency. 
1. I certify that: 
(a) A copy of this appeal has been filed with the Idaho Industrial Commission; 
(b) That the appellant filing fee to the Idaho Supreme Court has been paid; 
(c) That the appellant filing fee to the Idaho Industrial Commission has been paid; 
and 
(d) That service has been made upon all parties pursuant to LA.R. 20. 
DATED this 17th day of February, 2011 
CAMACHO MENDOZA COULTER LAW GROUP, PLLC 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
DOCKET No. 1777-2010 
Attorney for Appellant 
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(x) U.S. Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt 
Requested 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Statehouse Mail 
CAMACHO MENDOZA COULTER LAW GROUP, PLLC 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
DOCKET No. 1777-2010 
R.A. (RON) COULTER 
Attorney for Appellant 
Page 4 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
HABID SADID, Appellant/Claimant, ) 
) 
) 
SUPREME COURT # 395.tjQ 
vs. ) 
) 
IDAHO STATE UNNERSITY, ) 
) 
Respondent/Employer, ) 
) 
and ) 
) 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Respondent.) 
) 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
OF CLAIMANT HABID SADID 
Appeal From: Industrial Commission Chairman Thomas E. Limbaugh, 
presiding 
Case Number: 
Order Appealed from: 
Representative for Claimant: 
Representative for Employers: 
Representative for IDOL: 
Appealed By: 
Appealed Against: 
IDOL # 1777-2010 
DECISION AND ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION 
FILED JANUARY 20, 2011 
R.A. COULTER 
776 E. Riverside Drive, Ste. 200 
Eagle, ID 83615 
JOHN A. BAILEY, JR. 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391 
TRACEY K. ROLFSEN, 
Deputy Attorney General 
317 W. Main Street 
Boise ID 83735 
HABIB SADID, Claimant/Appellant 
...., 
rn 
co 
N 
N 
~c:S2 
:~.n:'o 
-"'I 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL OF CLAIMANT HABIB SADID - 1 
r 
Notice of Appeal Filed: 
Appellate Fee Paid: 
Transcript: 
Dated: 
February 18, 2011 
$86.00 to Supreme Court and 
$50.00 to Industrial Commission 
Checks were received. 
Transcript will be ordered 
February 18, 2011 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL OF CLAIMANT HABIB SADID - 2 
CERTIFICATION 
I, DENA K. BURKE ,the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial 
Commission of the State of Idaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct 
photocopy of the NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED FEBRUARY 17. 2011; AND THE DECISION 
AND ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION FILED JANUARY 20, 2011; and the whole thereof, 
Docket Number 1777-2010 for Habib Sadid. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the official seal of 
said Commission this 18th day of FEBRUARY ,2011. 
CERTIFICATION 
De~a K. Burke . .;; - t 'C:. -r 
ASSIstant COmmISSlO]1 S~cretary 
~ . 
':~ ~ e-~ 
""".. '~,. t, '" 
'i ,~ 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
HABID SADID, 
Claimant/Appellant, 
vs. 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, 
EmployerlRespondent, 
and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
Respondent. 
) 
) SUPREME COURT NO# 38549-2011 
) 
) 
) 
) NOTICE OF COMPLETION 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
TO: STEPHEN W. KENYON, CLERK OF THE COURTS; AND 
CHARLES D. COULTER, ESQ., FOR CLAIMANT HABID SADID; AND 
JOHN A. BAILEY, JR., ESQ., FOR EMPLOYER IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY; 
AND IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Agency's Record was completed on this date, 
and, pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been 
served by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following: 
TRACEY K. ROLFSEN 
P.O. B ~39 P.O. BOX 1391 
CHARL~D. COULTER JOHN A. BAILEY, JR. 
BOI ,ID ~701-0239 POCATELLO, ID 83204-1391 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
317 W. MAIN ST. 
BOISE, ID 83735 
You are further notified that, pursuant to Rule 29( a), Idaho Appellate Rules, all parties 
have twenty-eight days from this date in which to file objections to the Record, including 
requests for corrections, additions or deletions. In the event no objections to the Agency's 
Record are filed within the twenty-eight day period, the Record shall be deemed settled. 
DATED at Boise, Idaho this 13TH day of JUNE ,2011. 
_f'fHf nFE~ 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIQN"'.:, \ . (',','ft4" 
:.. A.< .;;·;;'.·.·l> .. ··~·~' .. ·#~~'!1. " .. "' .. # t~rkL I{I~. 0 p,{j!;\ 
Dena K. Burke .:.: :~, [~\ I. ;:;~ ~ 
Assistant Commission Secretaryd • 
NOTICE OF COMPLETION - 1 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BABID SADID, 
Claimant/Appellant, 
vs. 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, 
Employer/Respondent, 
and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
Respondent. 
) 
) SUPREME COURT NO# 38549-2011 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
AMENDED 
NOTICE OF COMPLETION 
TO: STEPHEN W. KENYON, CLERK OF THE COURTS; AND 
R.A. COULTER, ESQ., FOR CLAIMANT HABID SADID; AND 
JOHN A. BAILEY, JR., ESQ., FOR EMPLOYER IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY; 
AND IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Agency's Record was completed on this date, 
and, pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been 
served by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following: 
R.A. COULTER JOHN A. BAILEY, JR. 
776 E. RIVERSIDE DR STE 200 P.O. BOX 1391 
EAGLE, ID 83616 POCATELLO, ID 83204-1391 
TRACEY K. ROLFSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
317 W. MAIN ST. 
BOISE, ID 83735 
You are further notified that, pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, all parties have 
twenty-eight days from this date in which to file objections to the Record, including requests for 
corrections, additions or deletions. In the event no objections to the Agency's Record are filed 
within the twenty-eight day period, the Record shall be deemed settled. 
DATED at Boise, Idaho this 14TH day of JUNE ,2011. 
"tst~nnLf;-!!? 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIQN' . 
"'---. 
• '.~ > 
AMENDED NOTICE OF COMPLETION - 1 
RONALDO A. COULTER 
Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law Group, PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
776 E. Riverside Drive, Suite 240 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 2011 JU:'1 21 P !2: 55 
~ECC:IVED Telephone: (208) 6726112 Facsimile: (208) 672 6114 
Idaho State Bar No.3850 
ron@cmclawgroup.com 
I/,~OUS 1 1\1:'[ CO~1MISSION 
Attorneys for Claimant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
HABIB SADID, 
Claimant! Appellant, 
vs. 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, 
EmployerlRespondent, 
and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
Respondent. 
) 
) SUPREME COURT NO# 38549-2011 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
IDOL # 1777-2010 
MOTION TO CORRECT AGENCY'S 
RECORD TO INCLUDE EXHIBIT 10F 
AUDIO CD FILED AUGUST 16,2010 
COMES NOW, Claimant! Appellant, Habib Sadid, through his counsel of record, R.A. 
(Ron) Coulter, of the law firm of Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law Group, PLLC, and submits 
this Motion to Correct Agency's Record to Include Exhibit 10F Audio CD Filed August 16, 
2010. This Motion is made pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 29(a) and 31 (a)(4). 
Claimant! Appellant requests that the audio CD, Exhibit 1 OF, previously served on the Idaho 
Industrial Commission on August 16,2010 pursuant to the Agency's order granting 
reconsideration on August 5,2010, be incorporated into the Agency's Record following 
MOTION TO CORRECT AGENCY'S RECORD TO INCLUDE EXHIBIT 
10F AUDIO CD FILED AUGUST 16,2010 1 
/ 
Claimant's Notice of Service of Duplicate CD, Exhibit 10F, found at page 166 of the Agency's 
Record served June 14,2011. This Motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Correct Agency's Record to Include Exhibit 10F Audio CD Filed August 16,2010. 
For the convenience of the Agency, Claimant/Appellant is also attaching two copies of the audio 
CD, Exhibit 10F, previously submitted to the Agency, so that upon the granting of this Motion, 
the Agency need only attach the CD(s) to the settled Agency's Record to be filed with the Idaho 
Supreme Court. Copies of the audio CD, Exhibit 10F, will be served by mail on the parties 
along with the service of this Motion and its supporting documents. 
Dated this 27th day of June, 2011. 
R.A. (Ron) Coulter 
Attorney for Claimant/Appellant 
MOTION TO CORRECT AGENCY'S RECORD TO INCLUDE EXHIBIT 
10F AUDIO CD FILED AUGUST 16,2010 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th day ofJune, 2011, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
700 S. CLEARWATER LANE 
BOISE, ID 83712 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0041 
JOHN A. BAILEY, JR 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & BAILEY 
CHTD. 
PO BOX 1391 
POCATELLO, ID 83204-1391 
TRACEY K. ROLFSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
317 WEST MAIN STREET 
BOISE, ID 83735 
( ) U.S. Mail 
(x) Hand Delivery 
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt 
Requested 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Statehouse Mail 
(x) U.S. Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt 
Requested 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Statehouse Mail 
(x) U.S. Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt 
Requested 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Statehouse Mail 
R.A. (Ron) Coulter 
MOTION TO CORRECT AGENCY'S RECORD TO INCLUDE EXHIBIT 
10F AUDIO CD FILED AUGUST 16,2010 3 
RONALDO A. COULTER 
Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law Group, PLLC 
Attorney at Law 
776 E. Riverside Drive, Suite 240 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 672 6112 
Facsimile: (208) 672 6114 
Idaho State Bar No.3850 
ron@cmclawgroup.com 
Attorneys for Claimant 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
HABIB SADID, 
Claimant! Appellant, 
vs. 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, 
Employer/Respondent, 
and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
Respondent. 
) 
) SUPREME COURT NO# 38549-2011 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
IDOL # 1777-2010 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO CORRECT AGENCY'S 
RECORD TO INCLUDE EXHIBIT lOF 
AUDIO CD FILED AUGUST 16,2010 
COMES NOW, Claimant! Appellant, Habib Sadid, through his counsel of record, R.A. 
(Ron) Coulter, of the law firm of Camacho Mendoza Coulter Law Group, PLLC, and submits 
this Memorandum in Support of Motion to Correct Agency's Record to Include Exhibit 10F 
Audio CD Filed August 16,2010. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On February 17, 2011, Claimant filed a Notice of Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court of 
the Decision and Order entered in the above-entitled action on January 20,2011 and rendered by 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CORRECT AGENCY'S RECORD 
TO INCLUDE EXHIBIT 10F AUDIO CD FILED AUGUST 16,2010 
the Idaho Industrial Commission. In his Notice of Appeal, Claimant requested a full transcript of 
the proceedings before the Industrial Commission, including among other items, all briefs 
submitted, all exhibits submitted, and all decisions and orders made in this action. On June 14, 
2011, the Agency served an Amended Notice of Completion and the Agency's Record on the 
Claimant! Appellant, the Employer/Respondent, and the Idaho Department of LaborlRespondent. 
ARGUMENT 
On August 5, 2010, the Industrial Commission issued an Order Granting 
Reconsideration. In that Order, the Commission noted that its files were missing an audio CD 
entitled Exhibit 10F, being a recording ofthe April 21, 2009 Idaho State University College of 
Engineering Faculty Staff Meeting. In the August 5th Order the Commission stated, "To further 
the interests of justice, Claimant is entitled to a review of the complete evidentiary record. The 
Commission will review a duplicate CD as was designated by Exhibit 10F by the Appeals 
Examiner ." 
Pursuant to the August 5th Order, Claimant filed a Notice of Service of Duplicate CD, 
Exhibit 10F, with the Commission on August 16,2010. The Notice and a duplicate copy of the 
CD were served on the Employer and the Department of Labor by U.S. Mail. Claimant and 
Employer were also allowed to argue their positions based on Exhibit 10F via a brief and 
responding brief respectively. The audio CD, Exhibit 10F, was part of the Record at the 
Commission. Importantly, the audio file should remain in its audible form because a simple 
transcript would not convey the tone or demeanor of the speakers at the meeting. 
In his Notice of Appeal, Claimant requested that copies of all briefs and exhibits be 
included in the Agency's Record on appeal. The audio CD, Exhibit 1 OF, was one such exhibit, 
and for that reason, the audio CD, Exhibit 10F, should be included in the Agency's Record. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CORRECT AGENCY'S RECORD 
TO INCLUDE EXHIBIT 10F AUDIO CD FILED AUGUST 16,2010 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 29(a), Claimant requests the addition of audio CD, Exhibit 10F 
to the Agency's Record. Further, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 31 (a)(4) the clerk ofthe 
Agency shall lodge all "audio and audio-visual recordings offered or played during the 
proceedings" with the Supreme Court. Transcription of the CD is not requested or required. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, Claimant respectfully requests that the Commission 
correct the Agency's Record to include a copy of the audio CD, Exhibit 1 OF, after the Notice of 
Service of Duplicate CD (See Agency's Record, p. 166), and before Claimant's Brief on Exhibit 
10F at page 173 of the Agency's Record. 
Dated this 2ih day of June, 2011. 
R.A. (Ron) Coulter 
Attorney for Claimant! Appellant 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CORRECT AGENCY'S RECORD 
TO INCLUDE EXHIBIT 10F AUDIO CD FILED AUGUST 16,2010 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th day of June, 2011, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
700 S. CLEARWATER LANE 
BOISE, ID 83712 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0041 
JOHN A. BAILEY, JR 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & BAILEY 
CHTD. 
PO BOX 1391 
POCATELLO, ID 83204-1391 
TRACEY K. ROLFSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
317 WEST MAIN STREET 
BOISE, ID 83735 
( ) U.S. Mail 
(x) Hand Delivery 
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt 
Requested 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Statehouse Mail 
(x) U.S. Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt 
Requested 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Statehouse Mail 
(x) U.S. Mail 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Certified Mail, Return Receipt 
Requested 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) Statehouse Mail 
R.A. (Ron) Coulter 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO CORRECT AGENCY'S RECORD 
TO INCLUDE EXHIBIT 10F AUDIO CD FILED AUGUST 16,2010 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
HABID SADID, 
Claimant/Appellant, 
vs. 
IDAHO STATE UNIVERSITY, 
EmployerlRespondent, 
and 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
Respondent. 
) 
) SUPREME COURT NO# 38549-2011 
) 
) 
) ORDER AUGMENTING RECORD 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
On June 27, 2011, Claimant filed a motion to augment the Clerk's Record on appeal. 
Claimant requests that Exhibit lOF be made part of the record for this appeal, and Defendants 
have submitted no objection to the motion. 
Accordingly, the motion to augment is hereby GRANTED. The Agency's Record shall 
include the Exhibit lOF and it shall be added to the List of Exhibits. 
IT IS SO ORDERE-&\.. 
DATED this /5- dayofJuly,20ll. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
/ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the /s-rf::. day of July, 2011 a true and correct copy of the ORDER 
AUGMENTING RECORD was served by regular Unite States Mail upon the following: 
R.A. COULTER 
776 E. RIVERSIDE DRIVE, STE 200 
EAGLE, ID 83616 
TRACEY K. ROLFSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 
317 W. MAIN ST. 
BOISE, ID 83735 
db 
ORDER AUGMENTING RECORD - 1 
JOHN A. BAILEY, JR. 
P.O. BOX 1391 
POCATELLO, ID 83204-1391 
CLERK OF THE COURTS 
SUPREME COURT -JUDICIAL BRANCH 
STATEHOUSE MAIL 
BOISE, ID 83720-01~ 
~f{. I 
